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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-265

Filed 19 December 2023

Nash County, Nos. 22 JA 19–22
Edgecombe County, Nos. 22 JA 104–07

IN THE MATTER OF:

J.K., C.K., J.K., K.K.,

Minor Children.

Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 9 December 2022 by Judge Joseph E. Brown in Nash County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 November 2023.

Best, Lawrence Law, P.A., by Natarlin R. Best, for petitioner-appellee Edgecombe County Department of Social Services.

N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, by Staff Counsel Michelle FormyDuval Lynch, for guardian ad litem.

Parent Defender Wendy C. Sotolongo, by Deputy Parent Defender Annick Lenoir-Peek, for respondent-appellant mother.

ZACHARY, Judge.

Respondent-Mother appeals from the trial court's order terminating her

parental rights to her four children, “Jovan,” “Carlton,” “Jalen,” and “Keshawn”¹ (collectively, “the boys”). After careful review, we affirm.

I. Background

Jovan, the son of Respondent-Mother and Walter Battle, was born in 2014. Carlton, Jalen, and Keshawn, the sons of Respondent-Mother and Jerontric Green, were born in 2010, 2008, and 2007, respectively. On 31 January 2022, Nash County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a child protective services report alleging that the boys “were not in school and . . . they lived in an injurious environment due to improper care.” According to DSS, Respondent-Mother did not allow a child protective services worker to see the boys or enter the home in which she and the boys resided with her parents; Respondent-Mother subsequently moved into a motel with the boys for three days, and then was discovered by child protective services workers to have returned with the boys to her parents’ home.

On 16 February 2022, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging that each of the boys was a neglected and dependent juvenile. In the juvenile petitions, DSS alleged that the boys “have not been in school for well over a year and [were] almost two school years behind academically.” DSS asserted that it “attempted to ensure that the [boys] [we]re registered for school but [Respondent-Mother] . . . refused to register the [boys] for in-person or online school” even though she “admit[ted] that at least

¹ We use the pseudonyms adopted by the parties for ease of reading and to protect the juveniles’ identities.

some of the [boys] have special needs that should be addressed by the school system.” Respondent-Mother variously cited obstacles such as inadequate clothing, lack of internet access, and the necessity that she obtain vaccination records as DSS attempted to assist her in enrolling the boys in school.

DSS also alleged in the juvenile petitions that Respondent-Mother “has demonstrated mental health issues[,]” as evidenced by her behavior and the boys’ interaction with child protective services workers. Respondent-Mother made a false report of a robbery at her previous home in Virginia, which was resolved with law enforcement officers’ discovery of the “stolen” items in the closet of her home; stated that “people break into her home and steal receipts”; and reported to medical personnel that “someone broke into the hotel and beat the minor child,” Jovan, whom she later found in the car. She also claimed that there was “a conspiracy with the Virginia school system that [wa]s preventing her children from being in school.” In addition, the boys “spoke in whispers[,]” “refused to even say their names[,]” and parroted statements as Respondent-Mother instructed them.

Finally, DSS alleged that the boys were dependent juveniles, because Respondent-Mother was “unable to provide a safe home for the [boys] and lack[ed] an alternative child care arrangement.” Although Respondent-Mother had access to an alternative care arrangement, she refused “to allow the [boys] to be placed with their father[s] or paternal relatives[.]”

After the petitions were filed, Respondent-Mother agreed to kinship

placements for the boys. Carlton, Jalen, and Keshawn were placed with their father, while Javon was placed with his paternal aunt as his father relocated from Detroit to assist and participate in his care.

On 16 June 2022, during a pre-adjudication hearing, it came to the trial court's attention that DSS had a potential conflict of interest: one of its social workers was related to Mr. Battle. On 6 July 2022, the trial court entered a pre-adjudication order noting that DSS "has a conflict issue, one of the Social Workers in the Agency is related to one of the fathers in this case." Accordingly, DSS was "coordinating with Edgecombe County DSS to transfer this case to their jurisdiction after the adjudication."

On 15 September and 12 October 2022, the matter came on for the adjudication hearing. At the outset, Respondent-Mother moved for a continuance and, when the trial court denied that motion, she requested that the trial court replace her appointed attorney. The trial court denied Respondent-Mother's request for replacement counsel, and when she renewed that request on the second day of the adjudication hearing, the trial court denied it again.

At the end of the adjudication hearing, DSS voluntarily struck its allegation that the boys were dependent juveniles. The trial court adjudicated the boys to be neglected juveniles, and the matter came on for a disposition hearing on 3 November 2022. The trial court received disposition reports from DSS and the guardian ad litem, and heard the arguments of counsel. Respondent-Mother also directly

addressed the trial court.

On 9 December 2022, the trial court entered an adjudication and disposition order in which it adjudicated the boys as neglected juveniles and awarded legal custody of the boys to their respective fathers. The trial court also ordered that the matter be transferred to Edgecombe County for further review hearings. Respondent-Mother timely filed notice of appeal.

II. Discussion

Respondent-Mother argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying her motion for a continuance, and her request for the appointment of replacement counsel; (2) she received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the trial court erred in both its adjudication and disposition of this matter. We disagree.

A. Denial of Continuance

Respondent-Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for a continuance.

1. Standard of Review

Our Juvenile Code provides that, in certain circumstances, a trial court may continue a hearing on a juvenile petition alleging abuse, neglect, and/or dependency:

The court may, for good cause, continue the hearing for as long as is reasonably required to receive additional evidence, reports, or assessments that the court has requested, or other information needed in the best interests of the juvenile and to allow for a reasonable time for the parties to conduct expeditious discovery. Otherwise, continuances shall be granted only in extraordinary

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circumstances when necessary for the proper administration of justice or in the best interests of the juvenile.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-803 (2021).

“Ordinarily, a motion to continue is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and absent a gross abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s ruling is not subject to review.” *In re L.G.*, 274 N.C. App. 292, 295, 851 S.E.2d 681, 684–85 (2020) (citation omitted). “Continuances are not favored and the party seeking a continuance has the burden of showing sufficient grounds for it. The chief consideration is whether granting or denying a continuance will further substantial justice.” *Id.* at 295, 851 S.E.2d at 685 (citation omitted). “To prevail on appeal, [an appellant] must demonstrate the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. She must also show she suffered prejudice as a result of the error.” *Id.* (cleaned up).

2. Analysis

Respondent-Mother alleges that the trial court’s denial of her motion for a continuance “prejudiced [her] in such a way that the trial court abused its discretion[.]” However, because Respondent-Mother is unable to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling, she cannot show that the trial court abused its discretion.

“Since continuances are not favored, motions to continue ought not to be granted unless the reasons therefor are fully established.” *In re D.J.*, 378 N.C. 565,

570, 862 S.E.2d 766, 770 (2021) (cleaned up). In *D.J.*, the respondent moved for a continuance in order to secure the testimony of a community health center employee. *Id.* at 567, 862 S.E.2d at 768. After the trial court denied the motion, the respondent's counsel made an offer of proof that the respondent received "several services" at the community health center, including substance abuse counseling; that the proffered witness was "a bridge counselor, . . . she's able to connect these services"; and that her testimony "would be extremely valuable" to the respondent's case. *Id.* at 567–68, 862 S.E.2d at 769. Our Supreme Court held that the respondent could not show prejudice because "[w]hile [the] respondent made an offer of proof concerning the witness's testimony, the offer of proof is vague" in that "it does not say what the witness's testimony would be." *Id.* at 570, 862 S.E.2d at 770; *see also In re C.C.G.*, 380 N.C. 23, 27, 868 S.E.2d 38, 42 (2022) (finding no prejudice in the denial of a continuance sought to obtain the respondent's testimony where the "respondent's counsel neither indicated [that the] respondent intended to testify nor provided an affidavit or offer of proof of [the] respondent's potential testimony"); *In re A.L.S.*, 374 N.C. 515, 518, 843 S.E.2d 89, 92 (2020) (finding no prejudice in the denial of a continuance where, "despite two opportunities, [the] respondent-mother's counsel offered only a vague description of the [witness]'s expected testimony and did not tender an affidavit or other offer of proof to demonstrate its significance").

At the beginning of the adjudication hearing below, Respondent-Mother's trial counsel moved for a continuance because they did not "have everybody that

[Respondent-Mother] wants here to testify.” A few months prior, Respondent-Mother provided her counsel with a list of Virginia residents “that she wanted [her trial counsel] to try to get subpoenaed before we tried the case.” Counsel explained that he “contacted those people and they told me that they weren’t going to . . . honor our subpoena coming from North Carolina.” Although he had “done a little bit of research about . . . other ways to try to get them here[,]” the desired witnesses were not subpoenaed or their attendance otherwise compelled. Nonetheless, counsel asserted that “if we need to go forward I’m ready, I’m prepared to try the case, but we don’t have everybody that she wants here to testify.”

Respondent-Mother’s offer of proof in this case is even weaker than those that our Supreme Court held insufficient in *D.J.*, *C.C.G.*, and *A.L.S.* Here, trial counsel made no offer of proof below. On appeal, Respondent-Mother explains that her “entire argument rests upon evidence that could only have been obtained from witnesses that reside in Newport News, Virginia” because “her defense relied on proving that she had made multiple attempts to rectify the situation involving her inability to access virtual school.” These proffers are vague and insufficient, failing to provide any indication of the substance of the requested witnesses’ expected testimony.

Respondent-Mother has not shown that “the reasons [for a continuance] [we]re fully established.” *D.J.*, 378 N.C. at 570, 862 S.E.2d at 770 (citation omitted). “A mere intangible hope that something helpful to a litigant may possibly turn up affords no sufficient basis for delaying a trial to a later term.” *Id.* (cleaned up). Respondent-

Mother's argument is overruled.

B. Request for Replacement Counsel

Respondent-Mother next argues that “[t]he trial court erred in denying [her] request for another attorney to be appointed to represent her.” After the trial court denied her motion to continue, Respondent-Mother addressed the court and requested the appointment of replacement counsel “[b]ecause we’re not getting along” and “[t]hings that I have asked him to do he hasn’t done[.]” On the second day of the adjudication hearing, Respondent-Mother again requested replacement counsel:

[RESPONDENT-MOTHER]: . . . I have been through this before and the judge had issued me another [court]-appointed lawyer when the other lawyer that I had with my son’s case we didn’t get along or things weren’t going right so I didn’t say that I would hire another lawyer but I did want another lawyer.

THE COURT: Well, I can remove him but I’m going to allow him to sit there with you and you can represent yourself or he can continue to sit there with you and represent you.

[RESPONDENT-MOTHER]: Sir -- can I ask what is the problem with getting another lawyer?

THE COURT: We’re here having this case heard today, ma’am. So you can represent yourself and I will let him sit there so he can help you or he can sit there and represent you, one or the other.

[RESPONDENT-MOTHER]: So I don’t have a right to get another lawyer or a continuance?

THE COURT: We’re hearing this case today, ma’am.

“Generally, in the absence of some substantial reason for the appointment of

replacement counsel, an indigent must accept counsel appointed by the court unless he wishes to waive counsel and represent himself. Mere dissatisfaction with one's counsel is not a substantial reason for the appointment of replacement counsel." *In re S.L.L.*, 167 N.C. App. 362, 364, 605 S.E.2d 498, 499 (2004) (citation omitted). Respondent-Mother makes no showing of "some substantial reason for the appointment of replacement counsel" above and beyond "[m]ere dissatisfaction with [her] counsel[.]" *Id.* And, as previously discussed, she is unable to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for a continuance.

In making her argument that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for replacement counsel, Respondent-Mother also relies in part on her allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, which we discuss below but find unavailing. Ultimately, however, Respondent-Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion "[b]ecause of the disagreement between [herself] and trial counsel[.]" This is an insufficient basis for the appointment of replacement counsel, *see id.*, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Respondent-Mother's requests accordingly.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Respondent-Mother also asserts that her "[t]rial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to properly defend the case." Respondent-Mother raises several allegations in support of this argument, including trial counsel's failure to: (1) subpoena out-of-state witnesses; (2) raise a conflict-of-interest issue regarding

DSS; (3) move to dismiss the dependency ground; (4) make certain evidentiary objections at the adjudication hearing; (5) obtain or introduce documentary evidence on Respondent-Mother's behalf; (6) meet with Respondent-Mother before the dispositional hearing; and (7) object to the sufficiency of the dispositional hearing.

1. Standard of Review

“A party alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show that counsel's performance was deficient and the deficiency was so serious as to deprive the party of a fair hearing.” *In re L.N.H.*, 382 N.C. 536, 541, 879 S.E.2d 138, 143 (2022) (cleaned up). “In order to show deprivation of a fair hearing, the party must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, there would have been a different result in the proceedings.” *Id.* (cleaned up). Further, “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Counsel is given wide latitude in matters of strategy, and the burden to show that counsel's performance fell short of the required standard is a heavy one for a party to bear.” *Id.* at 541–42, 879 S.E.2d at 143 (cleaned up).

2. Analysis

First, as addressed above, Respondent-Mother's claim regarding the potential testimony from out-of-state witnesses is insufficient to support a showing of deficient performance by her trial counsel, let alone prejudice to her case. Similarly insufficient is Respondent-Mother's cursory argument regarding her trial counsel's alleged failures to object to the testimony of DSS's expert witness and “multiple hearsay

issues.” Respondent-Mother “cites no legal authority in support of her argument[s] on this point” and, accordingly, has abandoned these arguments. *In re F.C.D.*, 244 N.C. App. 243, 250, 780 S.E.2d 214, 219 (2015); *see also* N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (“Issues not presented in a party’s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.”). For the same reason, Respondent-Mother has also abandoned her arguments regarding her counsel’s alleged failures “to obtain or introduce records” on her behalf, as well as “to meet with [her] prior to the dispositional hearing.”

As regards DSS’s alleged conflict of interest, Respondent-Mother acknowledges that, at present, there is no “codified” conflict of interest where a county DSS employs a person who is related to one of the parties to a child protective services case, and notes that legislation to codify such a relationship as a conflict of interest is currently pending. *See* S.B. 625 § 3.(a), Gen. Assemb., 2023 Sess. (N.C. 2023). It is also undisputed that the trial court was made aware of the potential conflict of interest prior to the adjudication hearing. In its pre-adjudication order, the trial court noted that “one of the Social Workers in the Agency is related to one of the fathers in this case.” The trial court also reported that “DSS is coordinating with Edgecombe County DSS to transfer this case to their jurisdiction after the adjudication.” “A referral to another county is permissible when in the professional judgment of the county director the agency would be perceived as having a conflict of interest.” *In re S.D.A., R.G.A., V.P.M., & J.L.M.*, 170 N.C. App. 354, 358, 612 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2005) (cleaned

up); *accord* 10A N.C. Admin. Code 70A.0103(b) (2022). And indeed, in the order from which appeal is taken, the trial court ordered “this case be transferred to Edgecombe County” for subsequent hearings. Moreover, at the disposition hearing, DSS informed the trial court that the social worker in question “has not been involved in this case.”

Respondent-Mother contends that her trial counsel’s performance was deficient on this point merely because he “never once raised the issue[.]” and that “[h]aving the adjudication and disposition in Nash County prejudiced” her. However, Respondent-Mother does not elaborate on this unsupported assertion, nor does she show that “there would have been a different result in the proceedings” had the matter been transferred to Edgecombe County prior to the adjudication and disposition hearings. *L.N.H.*, 382 N.C. at 541, 879 S.E.2d at 143 (citation omitted). Accordingly, this argument is unpersuasive.

Respondent-Mother also fails to persuade on her argument concerning her counsel’s failure to move to dismiss the dependency ground. Although the juvenile petitions alleged that the boys were neglected *and* dependent, the boys were each placed in the custody of their respective fathers with Respondent-Mother’s consent. Recognizing that the facts of this case did not support an adjudication of dependency, DSS voluntarily struck the allegation of dependency during the adjudication hearing. Respondent-Mother cannot show that “there would have been a different result in the proceedings” had her counsel raised this issue first. *L.N.H.*, 382 N.C. at 541, 879 S.E.2d at 143 (citation omitted).

Lastly, Respondent-Mother's argument concerning her trial counsel's conduct at the dispositional hearing boils down to a disagreement with his decision not to introduce any evidence on her behalf after noting that she disagreed with the recommendations in the dispositional reports. Her specific complaint "is that no one brought the trial court's attention to the fathers' extensive criminal histories, which could endanger the lives of the [boys]." Even assuming, *arguendo*, that her trial counsel's performance was deficient in this respect, Respondent-Mother can show no resultant prejudice because DSS's dispositional report includes both fathers' criminal histories. Moreover, Respondent-Mother addressed the trial court directly and had the opportunity to direct the trial court's attention to this matter herself. We therefore disagree with Respondent-Mother's contention that she received ineffective assistance of counsel.

D. Adjudication

Respondent-Mother challenges all or parts of the trial court's findings of fact 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 in its adjudication order.

1. Standard of Review

"In reviewing a non-jury adjudication of neglect, the trial court's findings of fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, even where some evidence supports contrary findings. Additionally, uncontested findings of fact are deemed to be supported by the evidence and are binding on appeal." *In re G.W.*, 286 N.C. App. 587, 591, 882 S.E.2d 81, 86 (2022) (cleaned up).

“This Court reviews the trial court’s conclusions of law to determine whether they are supported by the findings of fact. The determination of whether a child is neglected is a legal conclusion” that this Court reviews de novo. *Id.* (cleaned up).

“An appeal de novo is one in which the appellate court uses the trial court’s record but reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial court’s rulings.” *In re K.S.*, 380 N.C. 60, 64, 868 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2022) (cleaned up). When conducting de novo review, “the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court.” *Id.* (cleaned up). “De novo review of an adjudication of neglect . . . does not allow a reweighing of the evidence.” *Id.* at 65, 868 S.E.2d at 4.

2. Analysis

At the outset, we note that the guardian ad litem concedes that finding of fact 3 erroneously states that Mr. Battle was a resident of Nash County at the time of the filing of the juvenile petitions, when in fact he then resided in Detroit, Michigan. However, it is well settled that “erroneous findings unnecessary to the determination do not constitute reversible error.” *In re T.M.*, 180 N.C. App. 539, 547, 638 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2006). Additionally, Respondent-Mother’s challenges to findings of fact 7, 8, and 11 are based largely on other arguments that she raised on appeal, which we have already considered and rejected; accordingly, these challenges are without merit, as well.

Respondent-Mother claims that finding of fact 10 “seems to infer that [she] was

not credible when she said that she was not given enough time to enroll the children in home school before they were removed.” To the extent that this challenge addresses the trial court’s finding of her credibility or lack of it, it is beyond our purview. “Only the trial court may assess the credibility and weight of the evidence.” *In re K.W.*, 282 N.C. App. 283, 290, 871 S.E.2d 146, 152 (2022). “Issues of witness credibility are to be resolved by the trial judge[,]” who “has discretion as finder of fact with respect to the weight and credibility that attaches to the evidence.” *Id.* (cleaned up). “The trial court must itself determine what pertinent facts are actually established by the evidence before it, and it is not for an appellate court to determine de novo the weight and credibility to be given to evidence disclosed by the record on appeal.” *Id.* (citation omitted). This challenge to that portion of finding of fact 10 thus fails.

Respondent-Mother also argues that portions of the trial court’s findings of fact 12 and 13 contain “post-petition evidence [that] should be struck and disregarded by this Court.” “[P]ost-petition evidence is admissible for consideration of the child’s best interest in the dispositional hearing, but not an adjudication of neglect” *In re A.B.*, 179 N.C. App. 605, 609, 635 S.E.2d 11, 15 (2006). We agree that the portions of these findings that address the various conditions of the boys when they were placed with their fathers, as well as their fathers’ conduct subsequent to the boys’ placement in their respective custodies, contain post-petition evidence. Thus, we do not consider those portions of these findings of fact in our review of the trial court’s adjudication. Likewise, we also do not consider those portions of finding of fact 14 that Respondent-

Mother alleges are mere recitations of her testimony. *See In re L.C.*, 253 N.C. App. 67, 70, 800 S.E.2d 82, 86 (2017) (“[W]e do not treat those recitations of testimony as actual ‘findings’ in conducting our analysis.”).

Upon our de novo review of the remaining findings of fact, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are sufficient to support the conclusion that the boys were neglected juveniles. Respondent-Mother’s argument is overruled.

E. Disposition Order

Finally, Respondent-Mother raises several arguments arising from the disposition of this matter. Primarily, Respondent-Mother argues that “[t]he trial court failed to hold a proper dispositional hearing.” Respondent-Mother also argues that the trial court erred by awarding legal custody of the boys to their respective fathers.

1. Standard of Review

“We review a dispositional order only for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” *In re B.W.*, 190 N.C. App. 328, 336, 665 S.E.2d 462, 467 (2008) (cleaned up).

2. Analysis

Respondent-Mother first argues that “[t]he trial court never held a proper dispositional hearing in this matter” because the trial court did not receive oral testimony and only considered the dispositional reports before adopting the

recommendation set out therein. Respondent-Mother cites *In re A.M.*, a termination-of-parental-rights case that she describes as “similar to an underlying disposition,” in which this Court concluded that “[c]onsideration of written reports, prior court orders, and the attorney’s oral arguments was proper; however, in addition the trial court needed some oral testimony.” 192 N.C. App. 538, 542, 665 S.E.2d 534, 536 (2008).

This Court has already rejected a similar argument as “overstat[ing] the formal requirements of an initial disposition hearing.” *In re K.W.*, 272 N.C. App. 487, 493, 846 S.E.2d 584, 589 (2020). In *K.W.*, we explained that “[u]nlike the adjudicatory hearing, the initial dispositional hearing may be informal[.]” *Id.* “In addition to considering evidence otherwise barred by the Rules of Evidence, the trial court may incorporate into its findings information obtained from written reports by the parties, as well as findings made at adjudication” and the trial court may also “rely on written reports in the disposition hearing even if they have not been admitted into evidence.” *Id.* at 494, 846 S.E.2d at 589; *see also* N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901(a). “When a trial court’s disposition order relies on information gained from individuals addressing the court during the disposition hearing, that information must be in the form of sworn testimony”; however, “the absence of sworn testimony in a disposition hearing does not render the hearing improper.” *K.W.*, 272 N.C. App. at 495, 846 S.E.2d at 589–90.

Here, as in *K.W.*, “the record reflects that the trial court received no new information from individuals during the disposition hearing other than references to

reports and the court's own findings in the adjudication order." *Id.* at 495, 846 S.E.2d at 590. The trial court also heard the arguments of counsel and Respondent-Mother on her own behalf, but as Respondent-Mother acknowledges, "the arguments of counsel are not evidence." *In re C.M.B.*, 266 N.C. App. 448, 461–62, 836 S.E.2d 746, 754 (2019) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the disposition hearing below was not improper, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering a disposition order without taking oral testimony.

Respondent-Mother also contends that the trial court erred in awarding the boys' legal custody to their respective fathers. Specifically, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion because: (1) the boys "would have been enrolled in school faster had they remained" in her custody; (2) the boys' "fathers have extensive criminal records"; and (3) the ordered "visitation schedule is unworkable." However, Respondent-Mother only supports the last of these three arguments with citation to legal authority; consequently, the first two arguments are abandoned. *See F.C.D.*, 244 N.C. App. at 250, 780 S.E.2d at 219.

As for visitation, Respondent-Mother seems to argue that the trial court should not have ordered that her visitation be supervised by the boys' fathers because she and the boys' fathers "do not get along." Indeed, the trial court found as fact in the disposition portion of its order that Respondent-Mother "refuses to communicate with" Mr. Green. Nonetheless, Respondent-Mother does not argue that the trial court's order of supervised visitation fails to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-

905.1(c), which governs the minimum requirements for visitation in cases where a juvenile is placed in the custody of a relative.

After careful review, we conclude that Respondent-Mother has not shown that “the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” *B.W.*, 190 N.C. App. at 336, 665 S.E.2d at 467 (citation omitted). As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding supervised visitation.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Judges TYSON and FLOOD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).