Interlocutory order—denying motion for reconsideration—partial summary judgment—rejecting statute of repose defense—substantial right affected—In a products liability action arising from a fatal plane crash, where the aircraft's engine manufacturer (defendant) argued that all of plaintiffs' claims were barred by the eighteen-year statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), but where the trial court denied summary judgment to defendant with respect to plaintiffs' claim for negligent failure to warn, the Court of Appeals' order dismissing defendant's appeal from the trial court's subsequent interlocutory order–denying defendant's motion to reconsider the partial summary judgment ruling–was reversed because the Court of Appeals had incorrectly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's appeal. Firstly, defendant had timely appealed from the correct order. Secondly, plaintiffs' contention that interlocutory orders denying reconsideration are never immediately appealable was meritless, especially where the order at issue substantially altered the court's earlier reasoning for granting partial summary judgment. Finally, unlike statutes of limitations, which are purely procedural and only provide immunity from civil liability, statutes of repose provide immunity from suit–a substantial right that is lost if a case proceeds to trial; therefore, appellate jurisdiction was proper where the order affected defendant's substantial right to immunity from suit under GARA's statute of repose. Byrd v. Avco Corp. , No. 270PA24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Certification—class consisting of home builders—entitlement to refund of water and sewer impact fees paid to city —In a declaratory judgment action filed by two home construction companies, each seeking a refund of allegedly illegal Capital Facilities Fees (CFFs) paid to the City of Raleigh in exchange for connection to the city's water and sewer systems, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the companies' motion to certify–pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 23–a class consisting of home builders who had also paid the CFFs. The plain language of the applicable "refund statute" (N.C.G.S. § 160D-106) provided for refunds of illegally imposed fees to any "person who made the payment," making no distinction between those who ultimately bore the economic burden of the fee and those who passed that burden on to others through subsequent private transactions. Therefore, the fact that some class members incorporated the CFFs into the prices they charged home buyers did not defeat the existence of a class, create conflicts of interest among class members, or render a class action inferior to other available methods of adjudicating the case. Wardson Constr., Inc. v. City of Raleigh , No. 115A25 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Certification—feasibility of ascertaining class members—no predominance or superiority issues—In a class action lawsuit against a county regarding two types of waste disposal fees, the trial court's order certifying three of four proposed classes was affirmed. First, members of two of the proposed classes–those who paid either a "Green Box Fee" or a "Landfill Fee" but who used private waste collection services–could be feasibly and objectively ascertained from customer lists of the few private waste collection services in the county. Second, with regard to one of the proposed classes, any individualized issues regarding whether a member did or did not use a county-provided waste disposal unit did not predominate over the common issues, including whether the private facilities offered the "same services" as the county. Finally, with regard to the class encompassing those from whom the county overcollected–based on fees that exceeded the cost of operating the county's waste disposal facilities in violation of N.C.G.S. § 153A-292(b)–the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that a class action was a superior method of adjudicating those claims than any alternative, based on efficiency considerations. Armistead v. County of Carteret , No. 66A25 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Protective order—annotated statement from complainant—incorporation by reference—factfinding sufficient—In a proceeding for a domestic violence protective order (DVPO), the trial court’s incorporation-by-reference approach to factfinding–attaching to the DVPO a copy of the complainant's written statement bearing the judge's strike-throughs and other notes–was sufficient to sustain the DVPO issued because it allowed the appellate court to determine that the DVPO, and its underlying legal conclusions, reflected an appropriate application of law. A comparison of the testimony at the DVPO hearing with the judge’s annotated copy of the written statement revealed that the judge struck the portions that were not corroborated by the parties’ testimonies and left intact the portions that were corroborated. While not the best practice, the trial court's method demonstrated sufficient engagement with the written statement to transform what would otherwise be improper “mere recitations” of evidence into proper evidentiary findings under Civil Procedure Rule 52. Jay v. Jay , No. 97A25 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Robbery with a dangerous weapon—taking of property—sufficiency of evidence—The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon where the State's evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, constituted substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that defendant took the victim's property–either himself or acting in concert with another–including: the victim was first pistol-whipped by defendant and then stomped on by defendant and other assailants and, when the victim woke up after a period of unconsciousness, his phone, house key, and cash were missing. Along with evidence of defendant's opportunity to take the victim's property, the State presented evidence pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b) that defendant participated in a prior armed robbery, which tended to support the inference that defendant committed the attack in this case with the intent to rob the victim. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing defendant's conviction was itself reversed. State v. Perry , No. 64PA24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Harsher punishment following successful appeal—original minimum sentence erroneously undercalculated—proper punishment imposed after second trial—In a prosecution where defendant's multiple convictions on charges arising from a string of motor vehicle and credit card thefts were consolidated into two judgments for sentencing and where, on one consolidated judgment, the trial court erroneously undercalculated defendant’s minimum sentence under the Structured Sentencing Act (SSA) after his first trial, the prohibition on imposing a harsher punishment following a criminal defendant's successful appeal (as set forth in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1335) was not offended when the trial court imposed the proper, lawful minimum sentence after defendant's second trial. While both the SSA and section 15A-1335 appeared applicable to defendant’s resentencing, the former controlled because it provided more specific sentencing criteria than the latter. Thus, on remand, the trial court was required to enter a harsher sentence than defendant’s original sentence in order to comply with the SSA because courts may not impose illegal sentences. State v. Thomas , No. 262PA24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Agreement by father to pay son's legal bills—enforceability—sufficiency of email correspondence—memorandum or note—In an action filed by plaintiff law firm to collect monies owed for legal services it provided to defendant's son, defendant's oral promise to pay his son's legal bills was enforceable where his email correspondence with the firm constituted a sufficient written "memorandum or note" of his promise, thereby satisfying the statute of frauds requirement (N.C.G.S. § 22-1); therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision reversing the trial court's judgment in favor of the law firm was itself reversed. Defendant's emails, though informal, were signed by defendant and provided adequate evidence of the essential terms of his oral guaranty, including the debt owed (the legal fees), the principal debtor (defendant's son), the promisor (defendant), and the promisee (the law firm). Notably, the emails indicated both defendant's ongoing involvement in managing his son's legal affairs and his commitment to paying his son's debt to the firm, including: an assurance that an "invoice" for "services rendered" by the firm would be "turned around promptly"; a request that the firm send all invoices directly to defendant's email; and a recurring use of plural pronouns like "us" and "our," suggesting a shared responsibility between him and his son. Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, LLP v. Muntjan , No. 29A24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Statute of limitation—plain language—ability of parties to shorten the limitation period by contract—In a case brought under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA)–arising from defendant's failure to timely remediate damage from a water heater leak, resulting in plaintiffs' home being demolished due to mold–a term of the contract between the parties limiting plaintiffs' right to seek damages from defendant to one year controlled over the UDTPA's four-year statute of limitation. While statutes of limitation establish the maximum amount of time that can elapse between the accrual of a claim and the filing of that claim, because the legislature chose not to restrict parties' ability to contractually shorten the limitation period for UDTPA claims, the general rule of freedom of contract applied. Accordingly, where the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the contractual limitation was unenforceable, its decision was reversed. Warren v. Cielo Ventures, Inc. , No. 203PA24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)