To commit juror harassment—agreement—sufficiency of evidence—Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to harass jurors was reversed where the State presented insufficient evidence of an agreement to threaten or intimidate jurors following the conviction of defendant's brother for assault. Although defendant, his brother, and his brother's girlfriend all interacted with multiple jurors in the hallway outside of the courtroom, most of defendant's contact with the jurors occurred in a relatively brief amount of time when defendant was alone, and there was almost no evidence that defendant's group communicated with each other or that they synchronized their behavior to support an inference, beyond mere suspicion, that they had reached a mutual understanding to harass the jurors. State v. Mylett , 374 N.C. 376 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—Map Act—recordation of roadway corridor map—compensation for taxes paid—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, the trial court properly took into account the taxes paid by the homeowners–on property that essentially had no fair market value after the map was recorded–when considering the amount of compensation due the homeowners. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. , 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—pre-judgment interest—prudent investor standard—appropriate interest rate—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, the trial court erred in applying a compounded interest rate of 8% per annum to the value of both the 1992 and 2006 takings when determining pre-judgment interest, because this method essentially combined two allowable methods rather than choosing between them. A party may choose between a presumptively reasonable statutory rate pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 24-1, or rebut that rate with a prudent investor rate compounded, if compounded rates would have been available. Further, the trial court erred by basing its decision on a non-diversified prudent investor's investment portfolio. The issue was remanded to determine the appropriate interest rate. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. , 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—quick-take procedure by NCDOT—timeliness of filing—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the proceeding to continue to trial despite NCDOT having filed a motion for a permissive counterclaim to assert quick-take rights under N.C.G.S. § 136-104 (which would allow it to take title immediately to the subject property). Trial courts have broad discretion pursuant to section 136-114 to make all necessary orders and rules to carry out the purpose of the condemnation statutes, the trial court in this case did not block NCDOT's right to assert a permissive counterclaim under all circumstances, and the trial court properly took into account the length of time the proceeding had been pending (over three years) before denying NCDOT's attempt to assert its right two months prior to trial. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. , 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—recordation of roadway corridor map—fair market value—expert testimony—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the homeowners' appraiser to testify that the fair market value of the property was zero after the map was recorded where evidence was presented that there was no market at all for the property in that geographic area based on the effect of the map, even though the homeowners were able to continue using their property. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. , 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—recordation of roadway corridor map—jury instructions—consideration of project once completed—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, any error in the trial court's instruction to the jury to consider the proposed highway project in its completed state when determining the amount of just compensation–where the nature of the taking was an indefinite negative easement and not similar to a fee simple taking–would not have impacted the result and therefore was not prejudicial where the evidence supported the jury's verdict on fair compensation. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. , 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—recordation of roadway corridor map—nature of taking—evidentiary rulings—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings regarding evidence of the parties' respective appraisers where the court correctly applied the proper measure of just compensation for a partial taking pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 136-112–the difference between the fair market value of the property before the map was recorded and after–and allowed only the testimony that was in accordance with that measure, after determining that the nature of the taking was that of an indefinite negative easement, not a three-year restriction as NCDOT argued. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding potentially misleading expert testimony that analogized the property restrictions after the map was recorded to those placed on property in floodplains. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. , 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Selection—Batson challenge—pretext—erroneous analysis—Where an African-American first-degree murder defendant lodged Batson challenges to the State's exercise of peremptory challenges against two black potential jurors, the trial court erred in its analysis that ultimately concluded the State's use of its peremptory challenges was not based on race. The trial court erroneously considered the peremptory challenges exercised by defendant; failed to explain how it weighed the totality of the circumstances, including the historical evidence of discrimination raised by defendant; and erroneously focused only on whether the prosecution asked white and black jurors different questions, rather than also comparing their answers. State v. Hobbs , 374 N.C. 345 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Selection—Batson challenge—pretext—erroneous analysis—Where an African-American first-degree murder defendant lodged a Batson challenge to the State's exercise of a peremptory challenge against a black potential juror, the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis that ultimately concluded the State's use of its peremptory challenge was not based on race. That court failed to conduct a comparative juror analysis and failed to weigh all the evidence presented by defendant, including historical evidence of discrimination. State v. Hobbs , 374 N.C. 345 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Selection—Batson challenge—prima facie case—mootness—Whether an African-American first-degree murder defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination in a Batson challenge (Batson's first step) was a moot question because the State provided purportedly race-neutral reasons for its peremptory challenges against black potential jurors (Batson's second step) and the trial court ruled on them (Batson's third step). State v. Hobbs , 374 N.C. 345 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Breach of lease—automatically renewing—acceptance of rent—right to evict—A Section 8 apartment complex did not waive the right to evict a tenant for breaches of her lease agreement when it accepted her rent payments knowing she had violated her lease. The Supreme Court held that a landlord does not, by accepting rent payments, waive the right to terminate an automatically renewing lease at the end of the lease term for breaches where (1) the landlord notifies the tenant of the breaches, (2) the landlord communicates to the tenant that, as a result of the breaches, the landlord will not renew the lease at the end of the then-effective lease term, (3) the landlord accepts rent from the tenant through the end of the then-effective lease term, and (4) non-renewal of the lease is specifically enumerated in the lease as a remedy in the event of a breach by the tenant. Winston Affordable Hous., LLC v. Roberts , 374 N.C. 395 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Termination of lease—federally subsidized housing—compliance with federal law—A summary ejectment action was remanded to the trial court for findings as to whether a Section 8 apartment complex complied with federal requirements when terminating a tenant's lease. Termination of a lease or a federal subsidy for a tenant in federally subsidized housing requires compliance with applicable federal law as incorporated in the terms of the lease. Winston Affordable Hous., LLC v. Roberts , 374 N.C. 395 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Termination of lease—nonpayment of rent—sufficiency of findings—A summary ejectment action was remanded because it did not contain sufficient findings to support the conclusion that a Section 8 apartment complex was entitled to possession of a tenant's apartment based on her nonpayment of rent. The record did not contain a termination notice regarding nonpayment of rent, and there were no findings as to whether a rent increase was made in accordance with the terms of the lease and federal requirements. Winston Affordable Hous., LLC v. Roberts , 374 N.C. 395 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Public university—student disciplinary records—effect of federal law on state disclosure requirement—Student disciplinary records sought pursuant to the Public Records Act (PRA)–including the name of the student, the violation committed, and any sanction imposed by the university, but not the date of offense–must be disclosed as public records, despite the records also qualifying as educational records under the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). The federal and state law were not in conflict with each other under these circumstances, and the federal law did not grant discretion to the university to determine whether the records should be disclosed. Therefore, FERPA did not operate to preempt the PRA, either through the doctrine of conflict preemption or field preemption, so as to protect from disclosure the disciplinary records at issue. DTH Media Corp. v. Folt , 374 N.C. 292 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Reasonable suspicion—disorderly conduct—vehicle passenger—"flipping the bird"—A state trooper lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in disorderly conduct where the trooper saw a vehicle traveling down the road with defendant's arm out of the window making a pumping-up-and-down motion with his middle finger. The trooper did not know whether defendant's gesture was directed at him or at another driver, and the facts were insufficient to lead a reasonable officer to believe that defendant was intending to or was likely to provoke a violent reaction from another driver that would cause a breach of the peace. State v. Ellis , 374 N.C. 340 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Search warrant application—affidavit—probable cause—nexus between location and illegal activity—An affidavit submitted with an application for a search warrant established probable cause to search a residence for suspected drugs and related paraphernalia even though the affidavit did not relate any evidence that drugs were actually sold at the residence, where it showed some connection between the residence and an observed illegal drug transaction conducted by two people known to live at the residence. State v. Bailey , 374 N.C. 332 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Grounds for termination—willful abandonment—incarceration—order prohibiting direct contact with children—The trial court's findings supported its conclusion that a father's parental rights in his children were subject to termination on the ground of abandonment (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7)). Even though the father was incarcerated and was prohibited by a custody and visitation order from directly contacting his children, he made no attempts during the determinative six-month period to contact the mother or anyone else to inquire about the children's welfare or to send along his best wishes to them. Further, the father would not even clearly tell his trial counsel whether he wanted to contest the termination of parental rights action. In re A.G.D. , 374 N.C. 317 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)