North Carolina Judicial Branch

Cruelty to animals—felony offense—knowledge element—circumstantial evidence sufficient—In an appeal from defendant's conviction of felony cruelty to animals arising from defendant driving his truck into a baby stroller containing a pedestrian's cat, the Court of Appeals misstated the knowledge element of the offense–applying a "knew or should have known" standard, while the relevant statute required actual knowledge. Notwithstanding that error, the lower appellate court reached the correct result because the evidence presented, taken in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for the jury to reasonably infer that defendant actually knew the cat was in the stroller when he struck it with his truck: the pedestrian was known in the community as "Cat Man" and was often seen with his cat in the stroller; defendant had repeated interactions with the pedestrian; defendant's front-seat passenger saw the cat before the collision; and defendant was observed driving straight toward the stroller looking angry. Accordingly, the Supreme Court clarified, modified, and affirmed the Court of Appeals' opinion on the animal cruelty charge. State v. Ford , No. 31A24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Class certification—fees charged to developers by town—individualized issues predominating over common issues of law and fact—In a putative class action lawsuit seeking a declaration that a town's "recreation fees"–charged to developers constructing new subdivisions in the town in lieu of dedicating a portion of the subdivisions for use as public parks or other recreation areas–were illegal and must be refunded, the trial court's order certifying a class that included all of plaintiff's claims for declaratory relief was vacated because the class included several claims for which individualized issues predominated over common issues of law and fact, such as the fair market value of real property or the cost that a particular development imposed on the town. The matter was remanded for a new class certification analysis based on claims not involving individualized fact issues, including whether fracturing the declaratory judgment action would create potential claim-splitting concerns or would otherwise no longer be the superior means of adjudicating the remaining claims. Empire Contractors, Inc. v. Town of Apex , No. 322A24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Business dispute—purported transfer of interests—noncompliance with operating agreement—In a designated complex business case involving a dispute between three investors over the membership and management of their real estate development limited liability company (LLC) (in which two of the investors were identified as the LLC's managers, and the investors' three individually controlled real estate companies as members), the Business Court did not err by granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim. Although plaintiff asserted that the real estate companies had transferred their membership interests before voting to oust him as manager, rendering their vote invalid, any transfer of interest had to be in accordance with the mandatory transfer provisions of the LLC's Operating Agreement. Plaintiff waived his argument regarding two of the three relevant provisions; as to the third, plaintiff's own assertions defeated his claim because he admitted to not completing steps necessary to effectuate the transfers. Thus, the purported transfers were null and void, and the vote to remove plaintiff as manager was valid. Gvest Real Est., LLC v. JS Real Est. Invs., LLC , No. 308A24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Condemnation—Map Act—recordation of highway corridor map—rescinded years later—indefinite taking—measure of damages—In a condemnation case involving restrictions imposed upon plaintiffs' private property through the recordation of a highway corridor map pursuant to the Map Act, which remained in effect for nearly twenty years until the General Assembly rescinded all Map Act corridors in response to Kirby v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 368 N.C. 847 (2016), which held that Map Act restrictions constituted takings by eminent domain, the Court of Appeals' decision treating the restrictions on plaintiffs' property as temporary takings–for purposes of calculating just compensation–was reversed. Under Kirby and other binding precedent, corridor recordings under the Map Act constituted indefinite takings of fundamental property rights, and the corridors' rescission years later did not retroactively convert these takings into temporary ones, since the nature of a taking must be determined at the moment it occurs. Accordingly, the proper measure of damages in this case would have been the difference between the fair market value of plaintiffs' property immediately before and immediately after the corridor map was recorded, considering all pertinent factors including the indefinite nature of the restrictions and any effect of reduced ad valorem taxes. Mata v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. , No. 217PA24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Restrictions recorded under the Roadway Corridor Official Map Act—damages not raised in condemnation action—right to damages abandoned—Although restrictions were imposed on private property by a highway corridor map recorded in 1992 pursuant the now-repealed Roadway Corridor Official Map Act–a taking by the North Carolina Department of Transportation (defendant) which entitled the landowner (plaintiff) to damages–plaintiff abandoned his right to seek such damages via his 2018 inverse condemnation action where he had failed to raise the issue in a prior condemnation action affecting the property: a complaint and declaration of taking concerning plaintiff's property (including portions of the land restricted by the 1992 map), filed by defendant in 2010 and settled by entry of a consent judgment in 2011. The Map Act provides for the waiver of further proceedings for compensation where pertinent affirmative defenses were not pleaded in earlier matters affecting the restricted property (N.C.G.S. § 136-106). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming trial court's application of N.C.G.S. § 136-111 (providing remedies where no complaint and declaration of taking was filed) to permit plaintiff to pursue damages, was reversed. Sanders v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. , No. 87PA24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Collateral estoppel—juvenile abuse petition—no privity—no factual determinations—doctrine inapplicable—Where a district court dismissed with prejudice a petition filed by the department of the social services (DSS) in August 2022 alleging sexual misconduct by respondent-father toward his minor child–including allegations that had been made, and deemed unsubstantiated, in 2021 and which were found to be false in a child custody order (CCO) entered in March 2022; and allegations made in March 2022 that led to an order dismissing an interference petition (IPO) filed by DSS against respondent-father–the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the 2021 allegations and the March 2022 allegation were collaterally estopped by the CCO and IPO, respectively. As to the CCO, the requirement of privity was not satisfied because the only parties to the child custody action were the child's parents, and they did not represent the interests of DSS; accordingly, the district court was not collaterally estopped from adjudicating the DSS petition by the CCO. As to the IPO, its "findings of fact" concerning whether respondent-father had abused the child were not determinations by the district court, but rather were recitations of respondent-father's arguments; accordingly, the IPO did not preclude the proper adjudication of the juvenile petition. In re A.D.H. , No. 265PA24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Limited liability company—duty between majority and minority members—no legal precedent—In a designated complex business case involving a dispute between three investors over the membership and management of their real estate development limited liability company (LLC) (in which two of the investors were identified as the LLC's managers, and the investors' three individually controlled companies as members), the Business Court did not err by granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud (for which a fiduciary duty must be alleged) because there was no legally recognized fiduciary duty between a majority coalition of minority LLC members and other minority members. The Supreme Court declined to extend corporate shareholder oppression principles to LLCs in light of key distinctions between corporations and LLCs; given the basis of plaintiff's assertions, other claims may have been more suitable. Further, plaintiff did not assert an individual cause of action–separate and distinct from any injury to the LLC itself–with regard to loans executed by defendants or to defendants' effort to oust plaintiff and his company from the business. Gvest Real Est., LLC v. JS Real Est. Invs., LLC , No. 308A24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Possession of stolen gun—knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe gun was stolen—sufficiency of evidence—In a prosecution for multiple offenses, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a stolen firearm where the State presented substantial evidence from which a rational juror could infer that defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to know that the gun discovered by law enforcement in his car was stolen, including that: defendant fled from officers in an extended high-speed car chase and then, after crashing his car, continued to flee on foot; defendant lied to police about having a gun when asked; the gun was found hidden in an empty space behind a plastic panel under the steering wheel of defendant's car; and the gun was hidden in his car even though defendant left a gun holster in plain view. Even if the evidence could also support other inferences, the State was not required to eliminate alternative hypotheses in order to overcome defendant's motion. State v. Bracey , No. 32A25 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Defenses—statutory castle doctrine—inaccurate jury instructions—plain error analysis—After a jury convicted him of second-degree murder for fatally shooting someone who was standing in the doorway outside of his home, defendant was entitled to a new trial on the murder charge because the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the castle doctrine under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 by: (1) indicating that defendant had to prove he reasonably believed the victim would kill or inflict serious bodily harm and that deadly force was necessary, where the castle doctrine automatically presumes a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm if the statutory criteria are met; (2) telling the jury that the presumption of reasonable fear could be rebutted by "any evidence to the contrary" when, in fact, it could only be rebutted by five specific circumstances listed in section 14-51.2(c); and (3) failing to instruct the jury that the curtilage of the home was protected under the castle doctrine. The court's inaccurate instructions amounted to plain error where: (1) defendant was deprived of a complete self-defense instruction–a fundamental error at trial, and (2) the error had a probable impact on the trial's outcome, since the jury could have found that defendant's actions were lawful under the correctly stated castle doctrine and therefore acquitted him. State v. Allison , No. 103PA24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Multiple counts—based on separate kisses—distinct offenses—The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss multiple counts of taking indecent liberties with a child–based on three instances of defendant having kissed the victim–where, under the distinct interruption test, there was sufficient evidence to infer that an intervening event took place between each of the kisses, when defendant (1) kissed the victim's neck outside of defendant's van, (2) kissed the victim on the mouth inside the van, and (3) kissed the victim on the mouth inside the van six to seven minutes after the first kiss inside the van. Defendant's double jeopardy rights were not violated because the three instances were sufficiently distinct to support three convictions. State v. Calderon , No. 238A23 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Multiple counts—proper standard—distinct interruption test—In a prosecution for multiple counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, based on multiple instances of defendant having kissed the victim, the Court of Appeals erred by adopting a four-factor test from another state to evaluate whether multiple "non-sexual acts" could support separate charges, because N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) does not distinguish between touching (or non-sexual acts) and sexual acts. The intermediate appellate court should have utilized the distinct interruption test to determine whether defendant was properly charged with multiple offenses or whether his conduct constituted a single ongoing, continuous attack. State v. Calderon , No. 238A23 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Qualifying acts—statutory interpretation—no distinction between touching and sexual acts—In a prosecution for multiple counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, based on multiple instances of defendant having kissed the victim, the Court of Appeals erred by imposing a threshold inquiry of distinguishing between touching and sexual acts before addressing the central issue of whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charges. Where the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) does not distinguish between touching and sexual acts, the statute does not support a threshold requirement or different analytical paths depending on the conduct at issue. State v. Calderon , No. 238A23 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Negligent retention claim—corporate medical practice—statutory definition of medical malpractice action met—barred under applicable statute of repose —In a case filed more than four years after a doctor performed unnecessary spinal surgeries on plaintiffs' teenage daughter, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendant (the orthopedic clinic that employed the doctor) on plaintiffs' negligent retention claim, which the court properly found to be time-barred under the four-year statute of repose applicable to medical malpractice actions under N.C.G.S. § 1-15(c) because the claim met the definition of a "medical malpractice action" under N.C.G.S. § 90-21.11(2). Firstly, defendant–as a corporate medical practice–met the statutory definition of a "health care provider" against whom a medical malpractice action could be filed, since said definition included "persons," which in turn included non-human corporate entities. Secondly, where plaintiffs alleged that defendant negligently exercised its clinical judgment by continuing to employ the doctor despite several internal reports of him providing substandard care to patients, plaintiffs' claim necessarily arose from defendant's delivery of "professional services in the performance of medical [...] care" as required under 90-21.11(2)(a). Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision (reversing the trial court's summary judgment order with respect to the negligent retention issue) and ruled that plaintiffs' conditional petition for discretionary review concerning additional issues in the case was improvidently allowed. Cottle v. Mankin , No. 173PA24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Motion to dismiss—existence of a business practice not a bar to obstruction—success of obstruction not an element—In a prosecution for felony obstruction of justice and felony cruelty to animals arising from defendant driving a work truck into a baby stroller containing a pedestrian's cat, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the obstruction charge (arising from the destruction of a physical copy of the schedule identifying who was driving each work truck at defendant's business on the date of the offense). The evidence was substantial, including that: (1) the existence of a business practice–such as routinely discarding old daily schedules–did not foreclose the possibility of obstruction of justice; (2) defendant initially told investigators that no such schedule existed and that he did not know who drove the truck involved; (3) defendant had access to the daily schedules; and (4) when served with a search warrant, defendant showed investigators a bin containing a week's worth of discarded schedules, missing only the date sought. Further, the fact that defendant's destruction of the physical schedule did not impair the investigation–because investigators discovered a digital copy on defendant's cellphone–was irrelevant since success of obstruction is not an element of the offense. State v. Ford , No. 31A24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Resentencing of murder convictions—scope of mandate on remand—discretion regarding ancillary convictions not limited—In a first-degree murder case in which the Supreme Court vacated defendant's sentence of two consecutive terms of life with parole (for two first-degree murders he committed as a juvenile) as unconstitutional, the trial court did not exceed its authority on remand when, after complying with the Supreme Court's mandate to resentence defendant to two concurrent sentences of life with parole for the murders, the trial court decided to have defendant's ancillary convictions (for robbery with a dangerous weapon, which were not addressed in the higher court's mandate) run consecutive to the murder convictions. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1354(a), a sentencing court has discretion to run multiple sentences either concurrently or consecutively and the mandate on remand did not divest the trial court of its de novo sentencing authority. Further, defendant's sentence did not offend the higher court's determination that a sentence requiring a juvenile defendant to serve more than forty years constituted a de facto sentence of life without parole. State v. Kelliher , No. 442PA20-2 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Sales tax—agency tax assessment—presumption of correctness—remanded for recalculation—In a contested tax case arising after the Department of Revenue conducted an audit and assessed a tax penalty against a wireless company that sold products on behalf of a mobile network brand, where the wireless company was properly assessed for real-time replenishments that qualified as "prepaid wireless calling services" under the North Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act (products that were sold during Period I of the audit, which were taxable at the point of sale), the Business Court did not err by determining that the final tax assessment properly credited the wireless company for sales taxes already remitted during Period I and, further, that the wireless company had not rebutted the presumption of correctness of the agency's assessment for that period. However, where the wireless company was not responsible for collecting and remitting sales taxes for replenishments that functioned as stored-value cards (products that were sold during Period II of the audit, which were taxable at the point of redemption), the matter was remanded for recalculation of the agency's tax assessment on Period II replenishments. N.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Wireless Ctr. of NC, Inc. , No. 272A23 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Sales tax—digital property—Sales and Use Tax Act—"retailer"—In a contested tax case arising after the Department of Revenue conducted an audit and assessed a tax penalty against a wireless company that sold products on behalf of a mobile network brand, the wireless company qualified as a "retailer" pursuant to the plain language of the North Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act and longstanding precedent, where its business involved routinely transferring title of real-time replenishments (which constituted digital property) to consumers in exchange for receiving a commission for these sales; therefore, the wireless company could be held responsible for collecting and remitting sales tax at the point of sale, depending on the type of product sold. N.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Wireless Ctr. of NC, Inc. , No. 272A23 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Sales tax—time of collection—nature of digital property—prepaid wireless calling service versus stored-value card—In a contested tax case arising after the Department of Revenue conducted an audit and assessed a tax penalty against a wireless company that sold products on behalf of a mobile network brand, since the real-time replenishments sold by the wireless company (during Period I of the audit) could only be used to purchase wireless telecommunications services–and, upon purchase, resulted in the immediate upload of the prepaid airtime units to the customer's account–those replenishments constituted a "prepaid wireless calling service" under the North Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act; therefore, the wireless company was responsible for collecting and remitting sales tax at the point of sale. However, after the replenishments were modified (Period II of the audit) so that customers could use them to purchase any of a range of products offered by the mobile network brand, and not just wireless telecommunications services, those replenishments functioned as stored-value cards that were not subject to sales tax at point of purchase; for the Period II replenishments, the tax liability lay instead with the mobile network brand at the point of redemption by the customer. N.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Wireless Ctr. of NC, Inc. , No. 272A23 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Jurisdiction—joint employment doctrine—control requirement—not satisfied—In a worker's compensation proceeding brought by plaintiff-employee–a Robeson County Sheriff's Office (RCSO) law enforcement officer (LEO) who was seriously injured while performing off-duty traffic control work for alleged-employer (a concrete services company)–the Supreme Court first clarified the distinction between the "nature of the work" element in the joint employment and lent employee doctrines. The latter doctrine requires that the employee's work "is essentially that of the special employer" to which the employee is being lent; under the joint employee doctrine, the "service for each employer is the same as, or is closely related to, that for the other." However, although two of the three elements of joint employment were satisfied–plaintiff-employee had an implied employment contract with alleged-employer and his service to alleged-employer (protecting public safety by directing traffic) was the same as his duty when working for the RCSO–the simultaneous control element was not. Alleged-employer did create a traffic control plan that designated locations and timeframes for the use of LEOs, but two RCSO employees were responsible for choosing LEOs for the project and assigning each to a specific location and shift, and they retained the authority to direct, reposition, or discharge any LEO in their sole discretion, without any input from alleged-employer. Accordingly, plaintiff-employee was not a joint employee of RCSO and alleged-employer. Lassiter v. Robeson Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't , No. 54PA24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Unified development ordinance—notice of violation—description of alleged zoning violations—insufficient—After a flea market (plaintiff) was issued a notice of violation (NOV) stating that its property violated a city Unified Development Ordinance (UDO) by failing to comply with an approved site plan, a decision by the Court of Appeals holding that the NOV was properly issued was reversed and the case was remanded with instructions that the city dismiss the NOV because it did not adequately describe the zoning violations it alleged. The UDO's plain language required that the NOV specify (1) which UDO provisions were at issue and (2) which conditions on the property violated those provisions; instead, the NOV gave no details about the site plan deviations that resulted in the NOV's issuance, and then advised plaintiff to "remove all alterations inconsistent" with the approved site plan–or face harsh civil penalties–without specifying which alterations the NOV was referring to. Furthermore, the blurry photographs attached to the NOV (including an aerial view of the market and images of certain structures on the property) did not provide sufficient insight into what the alleged UDO violations were. Durham Green Flea Market v. City of Durham , No. 8A25 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)