Ineffective assistance of counsel—claim apparent from the record—not raised on direct appeal—improperly raised in motion for appropriate relief—In a criminal case where the defendant, after unsuccessfully appealing his convictions for first-degree murder and arson to the Court of Appeals, filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR) alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) at trial, the Supreme Court affirmed the subsequent denial of defendant's MAR on the ground that his IAC claims were procedurally barred under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3), which prohibits defendants from raising any post-conviction claims in an MAR that could have been adequately raised in a previous appeal. Here, defendant's IAC claims relied exclusively on information available from the record on direct appeal from his convictions; thus, he was in a position to adequately raise those claims in that prior appeal, and his failure to do so meant that he was barred from raising them in his MAR. Further, defendant failed to argue that either of the exceptions (listed under section 15A-1419(b)) to the procedural bar under section 15A-1419(a)(3) applied to his MAR. State v. Gupton , No. 444PA19-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Interlocutory order—constitutional Corum claim—substantial right—risk of inconsistent verdicts—In a civil action brought by a student against a teacher and the county school district arising from the teacher's physical assault of the student in a classroom, although the trial court's order granting the school board's Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the student's constitutional claim was interlocutory, the Supreme Court had subject matter jurisdiction to review the matter. Not only did the student sufficiently allege a Corum claim that her rights under the North Carolina Constitution to a sound basic education were infringed–based on the school board's decision to first suspend her, and then to transfer her to another school without her input or consent–but, further, the trial court's dismissal of the student's constitutional claim against the board–while allowing her separate tort claims against the teacher to go forward–created a risk of inconsistent verdicts and, therefore, affected a substantial right. K.H. v. Dixon , No. 290A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Preservation of issues—Fourth Amendment search—ankle monitor data—failure to object at trial after denial of motion to suppress—In a prosecution for charges arising from a drive-by shooting at a Raleigh convenience store, where law enforcement officers obtained (without a warrant) location data from an ankle monitor defendant wore as a condition of post-release supervision for other crimes, defendant waived his objection to the alleged search because, although defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress and renewed that objection at trial when the State's witness referenced the ankle monitor and when the State sought to introduce a spreadsheet containing machine-generated monitoring data, defendant did not object when the State introduced maps showing defendant's ankle monitor location at various points in time, superimposed over aerial or street maps. State v. Thomas , No. 248PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Preservation of issues—preservation issue not raised by appellee until additional briefing requested—not waiver—In an appeal by a criminal defendant who sought review of the standard applicable to searches of ankle monitor data collected as a condition of his post-release supervision, the Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument: that it should not reach the question of whether defendant had preserved the issue for review because the State did not raise preservation until supplemental briefing was requested. The State's failure to initially argue defendant's failure to preserve was not waiver because the State was the appellee, and a reviewing court is not constrained to uphold a lower court ruling solely on the legal grounds presented by the appellee. State v. Thomas , No. 248PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Scope of appellate review—single issue in lower court's dissent—additional issue not inherently intertwined—The Supreme Court limited its review of defendant's criminal case–in which he was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping–to the single ground stated by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals' decision; namely, whether the State presented substantial evidence of the victim's restraint beyond that inherent in the murder to support the kidnapping charge. Where the State did not petition for discretionary review of additional issues but nevertheless argued that a governing line of cases should be overruled, the State's challenges to precedential case law was not inherently intertwined with the issue stated in the dissent. State v. Moore , No. 285A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Writ of certiorari—prior petition dismissed without prejudice to refile—second petition properly granted—Where one panel of the Court of Appeals disposed of defendant's first petition for a writ of certiorari–to review his criminal judgment based on his counsel's failure to timely file notice of appeal–by dismissing it without prejudice to refile with the inclusion of possible issues of merit, the discretionary decision by a different panel to issue a writ of certiorari upon defendant's second petition did not constitute an impermissible overruling of the first panel. State v. Martinez , No. 101PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Writ of certiorari—two-part test—loss of right to direct appeal—criminal case—counsel's deficient performance—discretionary decision—Where the Court of Appeals properly applied the two-part test set forth in Cryan v. Nat'l Council of YMCAs, 384 N.C. 569 (2023), for determining whether to issue a writ of certiorari, it acted within its discretion when it granted defendant's petition for writ of certiorari to review his criminal judgment. First, defendant's petition established merit or that probable error was committed below because it was accompanied by his counsel's affidavit acknowledging that, although he understood defendant wanted to appeal his judgment, counsel failed to speak with defendant or take any steps to timely file notice of appeal. Second, extraordinary circumstances existed to justify issuance of the writ where defendant lost the right to appeal due to his counsel's constitutionally deficient performance. State v. Martinez , No. 101PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Joinder—Rule 19—failure to join—subject matter jurisdiction not implicated—In a matter involving the question of whether Civil Procedure Rule 19 requires a revocable trust to be joined in an equitable distribution matter, the Supreme Court reiterated that any failure to join a necessary party pursuant to Rule 19 does not result in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. While a Rule 19 challenge may be deemed waived–unlike a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction–the appellate court declined to deem the joinder issue waived in this instance despite defendant's failure to raise it at his first opportunity, in order to identify the property subject to distribution. Face v. Face , No. 333PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—standard of review—documents outside of complaint—incorporation-by-reference doctrine—In an appeal regarding an order granting a Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss claims raised against a private school by parents whose children were expelled from the school after the parents complained about controversial changes to the curriculum, the Supreme Court expressly endorsed the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, which states that a court reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may consider documents that are not attached to the complaint but are submitted by the movant if: (1) the document is referenced in the complaint, (2) the document is central to the factual allegations or the claims asserted, and (3) there is no dispute about the document's authenticity. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Effective assistance of counsel—admission of defendant's guilt without consent—Harbison per se prejudice rule—narrowed—In a prosecution on charges including second-degree murder and felony hit and run, brought after defendant walked away from the fatal collision of his vehicle with a motorcycle carrying a married couple–where defendant had admitted that he was driving the vehicle and that people were killed in the crash, and he pled guilty to driving while license revoked–defendant did not receive ineffective assistance when his counsel conceded his guilt to the lesser-included offenses of misdemeanor death by vehicle and misdemeanor hit and run without defendant’s consent. The expansive per se rule established in State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 (1985)–that a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment is established in every case where counsel admits his client’s guilt without the defendant’s consent–was narrowed in light of the holding of Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004): that prejudice is presumed only where counsel entirely fails to function as a defendant's advocate, a criterion which can be, but is not always, met by unconsented-to concessions of guilt. Here, because defense counsel did not admit any elements of the charges for which defendant was convicted that defendant had not already conceded, defendant could not demonstrate prejudice. State v. Farook , No. 457PA20-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

North Carolina—colorable Corum claim—student assaulted by teacher—right to sound basic education—sufficiency of facts—In a civil action brought by a student against a teacher and the county school district arising from the teacher's physical assault of the student in a classroom, the trial court erred by granting the school board's Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the student's constitutional claim, which she raised directly under the North Carolina Constitution pursuant to Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761 (1992). The student alleged sufficient facts to support a colorable constitutional claim that the Board's actions after she was assaulted–including by first suspending her, and then by transferring her to another school without her input or consent–constituted deliberate indifference to the conduct of others that infringed on her right to a sound basic education and, further, the student lacked another adequate state law remedy. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the trial court's order was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. K.H. v. Dixon , No. 290A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Right to counsel—waiver—knowing, intelligent, and voluntary—course of conduct—sufficiency of colloquy—In a prosecution for multiple sexual offenses, the trial court's determination that defendant clearly and unequivocally expressed his desire to proceed pro se and that defendant's waiver of his right to appointed counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary was supported by the totality of the circumstances; therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals granting defendant a new trial after finding otherwise was reversed. Over the course of the case defendant cycled through five appointed attorneys and twice filed handwritten waivers of counsel in which he asked to represent himself with the assistance of standby counsel. Further, the trial court conducted a colloquy with defendant that substantially complied with the requirements set forth in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242; although the trial court's statement of the range of permissible punishments was not precise, its miscalculation and the actual range of possible punishments both amounted to more than defendant's natural life. State v. McGirt , No. 91A25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Breach—private school enrollment contract—termination by school—sufficiency of complaint—notice pleading standard met—In a lawsuit filed against a private school and its leadership (defendants) where, after plaintiffs–the parents of two students at the school–complained about the addition of polarizing political issues into the curriculum, the school terminated plaintiffs' enrollment contracts and expelled their children, the trial court improperly granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) where plaintiffs alleged a narrow set of facts that, if taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, stated a proper breach of contract claim. Specifically, the complaint alleged that: a clause in the enrollment contracts permitted the school to terminate enrollment if certain criteria were satisfied; the school expelled plaintiffs' children for reasons not permitted under the contract and then used the termination clause as a false pretext; and, as a result, the school violated the termination clause and, therefore, breached the enrollment contracts. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Deposition—request for production of documents—timeliness of objections—misstatement of law—abuse of discretion—In a suit against two automotive companies (defendants), in which plaintiff, as administratrix of her son's estate, asserted that the faulty design of her son's vehicle contributed to his death by a post-collision fire, the trial court committed an error of law when it held that defendants failed to timely object to plaintiff's request for production of documents prior to a scheduled deposition. Defendants' separate objections–filed ten days and seven days, respectively, prior to the deposition–were made within the deadlines set forth in Civil Procedure Rule 30(b)(5) (requiring that objections be served at least seven days prior to the taking of a deposition) and, despite plaintiff's request that objections be made earlier, one party cannot unilaterally impose tighter deadlines than those provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court's misstatement of the deadline caused prejudicial harm because the court improperly waived defendants' objections to both the Rule 30(b)(5) notice and to plaintiff's other Rule 34 requests; therefore, the error constituted an abuse of discretion. The opinion of the Court of Appeals upholding this aspect of the trial court's order was reversed, and the matter was remanded with instructions to vacate the discovery order and for further proceedings. Sessoms v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. , No. 23PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Deposition—scope of topics—preservation of objections—protective order not required—legal error—In a suit against two automotive companies (defendants), in which plaintiff, as administratrix of her son's estate, asserted that the faulty design of her son's vehicle contributed to his death by a post-collision fire, the trial court erred by holding that defendants' objections to the scope of deposition topics were waived or overruled for failure to seek a protective order to limit the scope of Civil Procedure Rule 30(b)(6) deposition topics. Pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants here preserved their objections to the deposition topics by serving them directly on plaintiff in advance of the deposition and were not required to seek a protective order. The decision of the Court of Appeals upholding this aspect of the trial court's order was reversed, and the matter was remanded with instructions to vacate the discovery order and for further proceedings. Sessoms v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. , No. 23PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Equitable distribution—personal goodwill—distinguished from enterprise goodwill—separate property—prospective—In an equitable distribution proceeding where the parties agreed on the division of all assets except the law firm started by plaintiff after the parties wed but before they separated (and where plaintiff was a sole practitioner), the Supreme Court for the first time distinguished enterprise goodwill from personal goodwill for equitable distribution purposes. Enterprise goodwill is marketable and stays with a professional practice, while personal goodwill is tied to, and thus goes with, the practitioner; accordingly, personal goodwill cannot qualify as marital property pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-20(a) because the statute assumes that all such property can be distributed. In addition, the Court emphasized that, because personal goodwill is prospective and concerns only future earnings, a trial court may still classify the income generated by a professional practice, even one with a sole practitioner, as marital property on the same basis as other “real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of the separation of the parties” under N.C.G.S. § 50-20(b)(1b). Sneed v. Johnston , No. 130PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Keeping or maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling controlled substances—keeping versus selling—sufficiency of evidence—In a prosecution for keeping or maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling controlled substances (N.C.G.S. § 90-108(a)(7)), the State failed to offer substantial evidence that defendant kept or maintained his vehicle for the keeping of controlled substances, an offense which applies to using a vehicle for the storage of illegal drugs. While a defendant does not need to store drugs in a vehicle for any minimum time period, it is not sufficient for him to merely have drugs in a vehicle, since a keeping or maintaining a vehicle charge is distinct from a possession of controlled substances charge. Here, the totality of the circumstances failed to demonstrate storage: the drugs and drug paraphernalia at issue were in a bookbag–entirely self-contained and meant to facilitate transportation into and out of the vehicle–in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. However, the matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the State met its burden to prove that defendant used his vehicle to sell (rather than keep) controlled substances. State v. Garmon , No. 329A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Expert testimony—sexual offenses against a child—impermissible vouching for victim's credibility—no plain error—In a prosecution for multiple charges of taking indecent liberties with a child and first-degree statutory sexual offense, where the evidence consisted solely of witness testimony, the trial court's admission of two expert witnesses' testimonies did not constitute plain error because, even if both experts had impermissibly vouched for the victim's credibility when testifying, nothing in the record suggested that the jury probably would have reached a different verdict absent those testimonies. Firstly, the victim's uncorroborated testimony, even standing alone, was legally sufficient to convict defendant where it established each element of the charged offenses. Additionally, the State introduced other evidence–namely, the expert testimony of a child abuse evaluation specialist who conducted a forensic interview with the victim, and the testimony of the social worker who conducted the victim's initial intake and the investigation that followed–that supported the jury's finding of guilt independent of the alleged vouching testimony. State v. Wingate , No. 184A25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Possession of a firearm by a felon—constructive possession—evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State—In reviewing the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon–for insufficient evidence that he constructively possessed a firearm–the Court of Appeals erred by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, resolving evidentiary conflicts in defendant's favor, and, as a result, reversing the judgment entered upon defendant's conviction. Properly considered (that is, in the light most favorable to the State), the evidence–that defendant shared nonexclusive possession of the bedroom where the firearm was found; had a key to the house and, upon seeing law enforcement approach, hurried inside; and was arrested a few steps away from the dresser where the firearm was discovered–showed defendant's occupation of the house, control of the premises, proximity to the firearm, and suspicious conduct, which in turn supported an inference that defendant constructively possessed the firearm. State v. Norris , No. 177PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Private school enrollment contract—termination by school—sufficiency of complaint—notice pleading standard met—In a lawsuit filed against a private school and its leadership (defendants) where, after plaintiffs–the parents of two students at the school–complained about the addition of polarizing political issues into the curriculum, the school terminated plaintiffs' enrollment contracts and expelled their children, the trial court improperly granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint, in accordance with the applicable "notice pleading" standard of review, alleged a narrow set of facts sufficiently stating a claim of fraud. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that: defendants promised there would be no "blowback" or "retaliation" against plaintiffs or their children if they met with school leadership to discuss their concerns; this promise was false, made with the intent to deceive and lure plaintiffs into the meeting to create a pretext for expelling the children; plaintiffs believed defendants' promise and therefore spoke openly during the meeting; and the school, at the same meeting, expelled the children, resulting in damage to plaintiffs. Importantly, taking the allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the promise of "no blowback" included a promise not to terminate the enrollment contracts and expel plaintiffs' children. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Jury instruction—castle doctrine—occupant of motor vehicle—need not be physically inside—presumption—In a prosecution where defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing a man during an altercation–the exact facts of which were disputed at trial, but that began with the victim approaching defendant while defendant was inside his car and ended with defendant exiting his vehicle and fatally shooting the victim–defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the castle doctrine. Under the plain language of the relevant statute (N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b)), although defendant chose to exit his vehicle during the incident, he was an "occupant" for purposes of the castle doctrine instruction. Further, the doctrine’s presumption (that a lawful occupant had a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or others) applied to defendant despite the victim's discontinuation of efforts to enter defendant's vehicle, which went toward rebutting the presumption rather than the statute's applicability. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' decision–remanding for a new trial–was affirmed, but was modified as it pertained to the interpretation of the statute, which was not ambiguous in its application to the matter at bar. State v. Williams , No. 21PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Habitual felon indictment—filed prior to commission of principal felony and filing of indictment—not untimely—The Court of Appeals erred in allowing defendant's motion for appropriate relief, in which he argued that his habitual felon indictment was untimely because it was filed prior to the commission of the principal felony and, thus, prior to the filing of the indictment for the principal felony; the plain language of the Habitual Felon Act (specifically, N.C.G.S. § 14-7.3) did not prohibit this practice. A habitual felon indictment need only include: (1) the dates of the prior felony offenses; (2) the state of the prior felonies; (3) the dates on which defendant pled guilty to, or was convicted of, the prior felonies; and (4) the court where the convictions occurred–all requirements which relate to and depend on the prior felonies, not the principal felony. State v. Garmon , No. 329A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult—lesser-included offense listed on indictment—not fatally flawed—In the prosecution of a father accused of sexually abusing his twelve-year-old son, where defendant was ultimately sentenced for committing statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult under N.C.G.S. § 14-27.28, but where his indictment expressly charged him with the lesser-included offense of first-degree statutory sexual offense under N.C.G.S. § 14-27.29, the indictment was not fatally flawed such that defendant was entitled to a new trial. The factual allegations in the indictment addressed all elements required for the more serious charge, including that defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the abuse, thereby rendering the incorrect statutory reference a harmless scrivener's error. Furthermore, both the allegations in the indictment and the frequent references to the more serious offense throughout the proceedings put defendant on constructive notice of the offense with which he was actually being charged. State v. Wingate , No. 184A25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Juror replacement during deliberations—N.C.G.S. § 15A-1215(a)—application of Chambers test—In reviewing convictions (including for second-degree murder) arising from a drive-by shooting at a Raleigh convenience store, where a juror was replaced with an alternate during deliberations and the resulting jury was instructed to start their deliberations afresh, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' grant of a new trial to defendant by applying the holding of State v. Chambers, 387 N.C. 521 (2025). Chambers upheld the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1215(a)–which authorizes trial courts to replace a juror with an alternate after deliberations have begun–in light of statutory safeguards of the right to a twelve-person jury: (1) substituting an alternate juror only after a sitting juror is excused, and then (2) instructing the newly composed jury to begin deliberations anew. After employing the special preservation rule from Chambers to reach the merits of defendant's argument despite his failure to object to the juror substitution at trial, the court declined defendant’s request to frame the Chambers test as a case-by-case inquiry into how long the jury deliberated, how recently the jury was instructed to begin deliberations anew, or what additional instructions the court provided. State v. Thomas , No. 248PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Restraint—independent from restraint inherent in murder by suffocation—sufficiency of evidence—In a prosecution for first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping, the State presented substantial evidence that the victim was restrained beyond the restraint that was inherent in the murder, which defendant perpetrated by suffocating the victim. Defendant not only bound his wife's hands, knees, and feet in such a manner as to prevent her from removing the plastic bags and duct tape over her head and mouth that caused her to suffocate, but he used additional restraints–including cables and zip ties–that were not inherent in the murder and, thus, supported a separate conviction for kidnapping. The decision of the Court of Appeals vacating the kidnapping conviction was therefore reversed. State v. Moore , No. 285A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Defamation—private school curriculum dispute—school characterization of parents' concerns—sufficiency of complaint—In a lawsuit filed against a private school and its leadership (defendants) by parents (plaintiffs) whose children were expelled from the school after plaintiffs complained about controversial changes to the curriculum, the trial court improperly dismissed plaintiffs' defamation per quod claim pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint alleged that defendants circulated an email to the greater school community accusing plaintiffs of making racist comments during a presentation at a parental focus group meeting. On appeal, the Supreme Court clarified that statements critiquing Critical Race Theory in education or advocating for meritocracy over race-conscious hiring and admissions were not legally equivalent to racist remarks; thus, the alleged defamatory statements–that the presentation referred to minority students and faculty as not having "earned their positions and honors" at the school and being "not up to the merit of the school" when compared to their white peers–did not accurately characterize the presentation, and therefore plaintiffs adequately pleaded that the statements were materially false. Additionally, the complaint adequately alleged the statements were "of and concerning" plaintiffs, since they were identifiable members of the focus group. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Negligent misrepresentation—private school enrollment contract—termination by school—forward-looking promise—improper basis for claim—In a lawsuit filed against a private school and its leadership (defendants) where, after plaintiffs–the parents of two students at the school–complained about the addition of polarizing political issues into the curriculum, the school terminated plaintiffs' enrollment contracts and expelled their children, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs' allegations–namely, that the school promised plaintiffs there would be "no blowback" or "retaliation" against them if they met with school leadership to discuss their concerns, and that this promise was false at the time it was made–were based on the type of forward-looking promise that, according to the relevant case precedent, could not serve as the basis of a negligent misrepresentation claim. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Sufficiency—negligent infliction of emotional distress—negligent retention—discretionary review improvidently allowed—In an appeal about an order granting a Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss claims raised against a private school by parents whose children were expelled from the school after the parents complained about controversial changes to the curriculum, the Supreme Court held that discretionary review was improvidently allowed with respect to their dismissed claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent retention, since neither claim involved matters over which there was any conflict in current jurisprudence, or issues sufficiently significant to meet the standard for discretionary review. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Sex offender registration—successive petitions to terminate—issue preclusion—tier level—law of the case—In a criminal case where defendant–who pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual activity by a substitute parent–filed three successive petitions for removal from the sex offender registry, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's order denying his third petition on the ground that he was a Tier II offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) and, therefore, was ineligible to seek removal before the applicable twenty-five-year waiting period. Successive petitions to terminate sex offender registration are part of the same underlying case; therefore, they are subject to the law of the case doctrine, meaning that any ruling made as to one petition concerning a legal question–such as a defendant's tier status under SORNA–is binding on subsequent petitions. Consequently, because the trial court had already held in a prior order–denying defendant's second petition–that defendant had committed a Tier II offense, and because defendant failed to appeal that ruling, defendant was precluded from challenging his tier designation on appeal from the subsequent order denying his third petition. State v. Lingerfelt , No. 38A25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Revocable—all settlors named as parties in equitable distribution proceeding—Rule 19 joinder not required—In an issue of first impression, the Supreme Court held that Civil Procedure Rule 19 does not compel the joinder of a revocable trust to an equitable distribution (ED) proceeding when all of the trust's settlors are named parties in the ED proceeding because settlors retain complete, exclusive control over a revocable trust's property for life and, therefore, a judgment against settlors pertaining to property held in a revocable trust will effectively bind the revocable trust without interfering with the rights of anyone else. Face v. Face , No. 333PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Unfair and deceptive trade practices—private school enrollment contract—termination by school—sufficiency of complaint—In a lawsuit filed against a private school and its leadership (defendants) where, after plaintiffs–the parents of two students at the school–complained about the addition of polarizing political issues into the curriculum, the school terminated plaintiffs' enrollment contracts and expelled their children, plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently stated a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices (UDTP) under the applicable "notice pleading" standard of review, where: the allegations, which concerned the regular activities of a private school that charges fees in exchange for its educational services, established that defendants' conduct was "in or affecting commerce;" and, because plaintiffs properly plead a fraud claim, as determined on appeal before the Supreme Court, the complaint also satisfied the unfair or deceptive element of the UDTP claim. Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' UDTP claim pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)