Motion to dismiss own appeal—denied—legislative redistricting plans—constitutionality—applicability to future elections—In a case involving legislative redistricting plans, where legislative defendants appealed to the Supreme Court from the trial court's ruling regarding the constitutionality of remedial redistricting maps, but then filed a motion to dismiss their own appeal on the basis that the election to which the remedial maps primarily applied had already taken place, the Supreme Court denied the motion–after noting that it had been filed just after legislative defendants' petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was granted–in order to resolve an issue of great significance to the jurisprudence of this state. Harper v. Hall , 383 N.C. 89 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Preservation of issues—no opportunity to object—trial court acting on own motion—incorporation of report into findings—Respondent's challenge to the trial court's incorporation of a non-testifying physician's examination report into the findings of facts in its involuntary commitment order was preserved for appeal because the trial court acted on its own motion without informing the parties and respondent had no opportunity to object. In re R.S.H. , 383 N.C. 334 (2022) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Parental right to counsel—motion to withdraw—lack of notice to parent—no forfeiture of right—The trial court in a neglect case erred by allowing respondent-father's counsel to withdraw at a permanency planning hearing–in which respondent-father had a statutory right to counsel–and by subsequently eliminating reunification as a permanent plan in respondent-father's absence, where the record reflected no notice to respondent-father that his counsel intended to withdraw and no inquiry by the trial court into the basis for his counsel's motion to withdraw. Although respondent-father had consistently failed throughout the case to appear at prior hearings and to communicate with his counsel, this failure was not so "egregious, dilatory, or abusive" as to constitute a forfeiture of his right to counsel. In re L.Z.S. , 383 N.C. 309 (2022) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Permanency planning order—eliminating reunification—achievement of revised permanent plan—required factual findings—In a permanency planning matter involving a neglected child, the trial court did not err by eliminating reunification with the juvenile as a permanent plan, where the court entered a permanency planning order changing the primary permanent plan from custody with a relative to custody with a "court-approved caretaker" (in this case, the juvenile's grandparents by marriage), found that the revised primary plan had been achieved through entry of the order, and made the required written findings pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-906.1(d)(3) and 7B-906.2(b) that reunification efforts clearly would be inconsistent with the juvenile's health or safety. In re K.P. , 383 N.C. 292 (2022) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Permanency planning—custody to non-relatives—verification—The trial court in a neglect case properly verified under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(j) that the juvenile's court-approved caretakers (in this case, the juvenile's grandparents by marriage) understood the legal significance of the juvenile's placement with them and that they possessed adequate resources to care appropriately for him. Although the court did not enter any specific findings regarding the verification process, the record showed that the court considered reliable evidence, including testimony from the grandfather and from a social worker in the case, that the grandparents were willing to accept legal custody of the juvenile, had discussed the possibility of custody with the department of social services, and had adequately cared for the juvenile for seven months without any financial difficulty. In re K.P. , 383 N.C. 292 (2022) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Removal of Confederate statue—challenged by private association—state and federal laws—no merit—In an appeal from the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action, which was filed by an association commemorating Confederate Civil War soldiers (plaintiff) after a city and its mayor (defendants) communicated plans to remove a Confederate statue from a former county courthouse, the Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's arguments challenging defendants' action under various state and federal laws where: plaintiff raised some of its contentions for the first time on appeal, and therefore those arguments were not properly preserved for appellate review; plaintiff lacked standing to assert its challenges, either because the statutes it relied upon did not create a private right of action or because plaintiff failed to allege that it had a cognizable legal right (such as ownership of the Confederate monument) under those statutes; and where none of the statutes applied to the facts of the case. United Daughters of the Confederacy, N.C. Div. v. City of Winston-Salem , 383 N.C. 612 (2022) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Dismissal with prejudice—Rule 12—lack of subject matter jurisdiction—failure to state a claim —In a declaratory judgment action regarding the removal of a Confederate statue from a former county courthouse, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where it did so under both Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1)(lack of subject matter jurisdiction) and Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6)(failure to state a claim). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) operates as a final adjudication on the merits barring future lawsuits based on the same claims, but dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) does not; therefore, where the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) because plaintiff lacked standing to sue, the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the case precluded it from entering a final adjudication on the merits by dismissing the complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). United Daughters of the Confederacy, N.C. Div. v. City of Winston-Salem , 383 N.C. 612 (2022) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

North Carolina—equal protection—voter ID law—racial discrimination—The trial court correctly determined that a photo voter ID law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution where the court's findings of fact, supported by competent evidence, showed the law was enacted with racially discriminatory intent against African American voters in state elections. The court properly analyzed the factors set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), noting evidence that African Americans disproportionately lacked the forms of ID required under the law, the legislature's history of enacting facially neutral laws that tended to dilute African American votes, the rushed passage of the law during a post-election lame duck session over the governor's veto, and other aspects of the law's legislative history indicating a discriminatory intent. Further, the law's defenders (including state legislators) could not show the law would have been enacted regardless of any discriminatory intent. Holmes v. Moore , 383 N.C. 171 (2022) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

North Carolina—right to jury trial—waiver—statutory requirements—The trial court complied with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1201(d)(1) and did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant fully understood and appreciated his decision to waive his right to a trial by jury for attaining habitual felon status where the trial court addressed defendant personally ("you can waive your right to a jury trial"), allowed defendant to consult with defense counsel about the waiver, and allowed defense counsel to answer on behalf of defendant; where defendant signed under oath a waiver of jury trial form; and where the trial court had previously conducted a longer colloquy with defendant on the first day of trial regarding his waiver of his right to a jury trial for the underlying drug and assault offenses, at which time defendant himself responded to each of the trial court's questions. State v. Rollinson , 383 N.C. 528 (2022) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Right to an impartial tribunal—involuntary commitment—no counsel present for the State—trial court questioning witnesses—For the reasons stated in In re J.R., 383 N.C. __ (2022), the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the trial court in an involuntary commitment hearing did not deprive respondent of his due process right to an impartial tribunal where counsel for the State did not appear at the hearing and the trial court questioned the witnesses. Nothing about the manner in which the trial court conducted the hearing tended to cast doubt upon its impartiality; rather, the court simply presided over the hearing, asking questions to increase understanding of the case and illuminate relevant facts to determine whether respondent required continued involuntary commitment. In re C.G. , 383 N.C. 224 (2022) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Right to appointed counsel—forfeiture—egregious misconduct—relinquishing attorneys—support in record—In defendant's prosecution for attempting to purchase a firearm in violation of a domestic violence protective order, the trial court erred by concluding that defendant had forfeited her right to appointed counsel by engaging in egregious misconduct intended to delay her criminal proceedings. Although the trial court found that defendant had filed four waiver of counsel forms, relinquished five different court-appointed attorneys, filed multiple pro se motions to continue to obtain private counsel, and finally sought to have counsel appointed for her for the sixth time, nothing in the record permitted the conclusion that defendant was engaging in egregious misconduct intended to delay her case; rather, the delays in moving the case to trial appeared attributable to the State or to the usual occurrences that are common in criminal proceedings. State v. Atwell , 383 N.C. 437 (2022) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Medical review privilege—statutory elements—findings of fact—no request by parties—An interlocutory order compelling discovery in a wrongful death action, over defendants' argument that the requested document was protected by the medical review privilege (N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A), was not required by Civil Procedure Rule 52 to contain findings of fact regarding the statutory elements of the medical review privilege where no party specifically requested findings of fact. Williams v. Allen , 383 N.C. 664 (2022) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Legislative redistricting—constitutional compliance—whether fundamental right to substantially equal voting power is protected—The Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional standard articulated in Harper v. Hall, 380 N.C. 317 (2022), that, in order for redistricting maps to satisfy constitutional requirements, they must uphold voters' fundamental rights to vote on equal terms and to have substantially equal voting power. Assessment of evidence under this standard requires a broad consideration of constitutionality rather than a narrow focus on any particular statistical datapoints. Harper v. Hall , 383 N.C. 89 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Legislative redistricting—remedial congressional plan—lacking constitutional compliance—remedy—The trial court's determination that the legislature's proposed remedial congressional redistricting plan (RCP) did not meet the constitutional standard of protecting voters' fundamental rights to vote on equal terms and to substantially equal voting power–and therefore failed strict scrutiny–was supported by the court's findings of fact, which were in turn supported by competent evidence regarding the plan's partisan asymmetry. The trial court's adoption of the appointed Special Masters' proposed modified RCP was an appropriate remedy pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 120-2.4(a1), and the court's determination that the modified RCP satisfied the constitutional standard was supported by its findings of fact and competent evidence. Harper v. Hall , 383 N.C. 89 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Legislative redistricting—remedial plans—equal protection challenge—threshold constitutional standard—In a legislative redistricting case in which, after remand, the trial court approved the legislature's proposed remedial house redistricting plan (RHP), an equal protection challenge to that plan–on the grounds that the plan would lead to vote dilution for Black voters–had no merit because the trial court's determination that the RHP satisfied the constitutional standard of upholding voters' fundamental right to vote on equal terms–which involved equal protection principles–was supported by the court's findings of fact, which were in turn supported by competent evidence, including that the legislature conducted a racially polarized voting analysis which demonstrated that the remedial plan was constitutionally sufficient. Harper v. Hall , 383 N.C. 89 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Legislative redistricting—remedial state house plan—satisfaction of constitutional standards—The trial court's approval of the legislature's proposed remedial state house redistricting plan (RHP)–after determining that the RHP complied with constitutional standards by protecting voters' fundamental rights to vote on equal terms and to substantially equal voting power and was therefore presumptively constitutional–was supported by the court's unchallenged findings of fact, which were in turn supported by competent evidence. Harper v. Hall , 383 N.C. 89 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Legislative redistricting—remedial state senate plan—lacking compliance with constitutional standards—remand required—The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order approving the legislature's proposed remedial state senate redistricting plan (RSP) where certain of the trial court's findings were not supported by competent evidence and other findings served to undermine, rather than support, the trial court's conclusion that the RSP was presumptively constitutional. The matter was remanded to the trial court to oversee the creation of a modified RSP that satisfies the constitutional standard regarding partisan symmetry. Harper v. Hall , 383 N.C. 89 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Legislative redistricting—special masters and advisors—denial of motion to disqualify—abuse of discretion analysis—After the Supreme Court determined that redistricting maps constituted illegal partisan gerrymanders and remanded to the trial court to oversee the redrawing of those maps, and after the trial court appointed special masters to assist it in evaluating the legislature's proposed remedial maps, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the legislative defendants' motion to disqualify two of the special masters' advisors, who had a limited role in shaping the special masters' recommendations and whose ex parte communications with the special masters were due to expediency and involved only publicly available information. Harper v. Hall , 383 N.C. 89 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Vouching for credibility of witness—description of police questioning technique—plain error analysis—In defendant's prosecution for the murder of his next-door neighbor, the challenged portion of a police officer's testimony was inadmissible where the officer described statements made by the victim's wife and engaged in an extensive discussion of a questioning technique that he utilized to determine whether the wife was telling the truth, thereby impermissibly vouching for the wife's credibility. The unobjected-to error did not rise to the level of plain error, however, given the strength of the State's case against defendant. State v. Caballero , 383 N.C. 464 (2022) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Jury instructions—lesser-included offense—involuntary manslaughter—malice—prejudice analysis—In defendant's murder prosecution for the death of his wife, the trial court erred by declining defendant's request to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter because, when viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, the evidence permitted the rational conclusion that he acted with culpable negligence in assaulting his wife and leaving her in their motel room while she suffered a drug overdose or heart attack–but that he acted without malice. The error was prejudicial where the jury's only options were to convict defendant of murder or acquit him, and where the jury asked to review certain evidence that could have supported a finding of involuntary manslaughter. State v. Brichikov , 383 N.C. 543 (2022) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Product liability—multiple insurers—defense and indemnification costs—allocation—pro rata—In a declaratory judgment action to determine the duties and obligations of multiple insurers–from whom a chemical company purchased standard-form product liability policies–for product liability claims related to benzene-containing products, the proper allocation of the costs of defense and indemnification was pro rata rather than an "all sums" approach where the policies at issue limited coverage to injuries resulting from occurrences that took place during the policy period–in this case, actual exposure to the defective product–and this determination was not affected by the policies that contained non-cumulation and continuing coverage provisions. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co. , 383 N.C. 387 (2022) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Product liability—multiple insurers—trigger of coverage—"bodily injury"—period of benzene exposure—In a declaratory judgment action to determine the duties and obligations of multiple insurers–from whom a chemical company purchased standard-form product liability policies–for product liability claims related to benzene-containing products, claimants experienced "bodily injury" caused by an "occurrence" pursuant to the insurance policies, thereby triggering insurance coverage, during their period of actual exposure to the defective product and not when a cognizable injury-in-fact became known. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co. , 383 N.C. 387 (2022) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Product liability—multiple insurers—umbrella policy—duty to defend—exhaustion of limits—horizontal versus vertical exhaustion—In a declaratory judgment action to determine the duties and obligations of multiple insurers–from whom a chemical company purchased standard-form product liability policies–for product liability claims related to benzene-containing products, one insurer's duty to defend another insurer under an umbrella policy was triggered by vertical and not horizontal exhaustion according to the terms of the policy, such that the duty to defend arose when there was no other valid and collectible policy available to cover damages from benzene exposure during a concurrent policy period. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co. , 383 N.C. 387 (2022) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Standing—legally enforceable right—removal of Confederate statue—motion to dismiss—In a declaratory judgment action filed after a city and its mayor (defendants) informed an association commemorating Confederate Civil War soldiers (plaintiff) of its plans to remove a Confederate statue from a former county courthouse, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing where plaintiff failed to allege any ownership or contractual interest in the statue, which was located on private property, and therefore failed to allege the infringement of a "legally enforceable right" sufficient to establish standing under North Carolina law (which does not enforce the "injury in fact" test used in federal courts). Further, plaintiff's complaint did not include the requisite factual allegations for establishing taxpayer standing or associational standing, and the mere fact that defendants contacted plaintiff about removing the statue did not automatically confer standing upon plaintiff. United Daughters of the Confederacy, N.C. Div. v. City of Winston-Salem , 383 N.C. 612 (2022) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

First-degree—to facilitate rape—movement after the rape concluded—fatal variance between indictment and evidence—In a prosecution for two counts of first-degree kidnapping, where the evidence showed that defendant entered an elderly woman's home, moved her from the kitchen to her bedroom, raped her, then moved her to a closet inside an adjacent bedroom, took a shower, and fled the scene, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the kidnapping charge that was based on defendant moving the woman into the adjacent bedroom. A fatal variance existed between the allegation in the indictment that defendant moved the woman to the adjacent bedroom closet "for the purpose of facilitating the commission of" first-degree rape and the evidence showing that the rape had already concluded before defendant moved the woman to that location. State v. Elder , 383 N.C. 578 (2022) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Involuntary commitment—danger to self—insufficiency of findings to support conclusion—An involuntary commitment order was reversed where the trial court's findings of fact–including that respondent suffered from schizoaffective disorder, hallucinations, and disorganized thoughts; was noncompliant with medications when outside the hospital; was unable to sufficiently tend to his dental and nourishment needs; and lived with a physically abusive roommate–failed to support its conclusion that respondent posed a danger to himself. Although the court's findings regarding respondent's symptoms demonstrated that respondent was mentally ill (a required conclusion under N.C.G.S. § 122C-268(j) to support involuntary commitment), these findings, without more, were insufficient to establish that respondent faced a reasonable probability of future physical debilitation absent involuntary commitment (which, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 122C-3(11)a, is one definition of "dangerous to self," which is also a conclusion required under section 122C-268(j)). In re C.G. , 383 N.C. 224 (2022) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Involuntary commitment—private facility—no counsel for petitioner—trial court questioning witnesses—due process—In a bench trial on an involuntary commitment petition filed by a private medical facility, respondent's due process right to an impartial tribunal was not violated when the trial court, in the absence of counsel for the petitioning physician, called witnesses and elicited testimony. The trial court did not take on the role of prosecutor but rather merely asked neutral and clarifying questions of witnesses based upon the contents of the petition. In re J.R. , 383 N.C. 273 (2022) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Involuntary commitment—private facility—no counsel for petitioner—trial court questioning witnesses—due process—In a bench trial on an involuntary commitment petition filed by a private medical facility, for the reasons stated in In re J.R., 383 N.C. __ (2022), respondent's due process right to an impartial tribunal was not violated when the trial court proceeded with the hearing even though the petitioning physician was not represented by counsel. In re R.S.H. , 383 N.C. 334 (2022) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Involuntary commitment—right to confront witnesses—non-testifying physician's report—prejudice analysis—In an involuntary commitment matter, although the trial court violated respondent's right to confront witnesses by incorporating a non-testifying physician's report into its findings of fact after the hearing concluded, the error was not prejudicial because the trial court's remaining findings were supported by a testifying physician's testimony, and those findings supported the trial court's conclusion that respondent was dangerous to herself. In re R.S.H. , 383 N.C. 334 (2022) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Body camera recordings—release to city council members—motion to modify restrictions—arbitrary ruling—Where the trial court abused its discretion by summarily denying a city's motion to modify restrictions that the court had previously placed on the city council's use and discussion of police body camera recordings from a particular incident of arrest, the order was vacated and the matter remanded for a new hearing. The trial court's denial was arbitrary because the court failed to provide any factual basis to support its decision, and there was no competent evidence in the record which would have supported a finding that the restrictions did not constitute a substantial impediment to the council members' discharge of their duties. In re Custodial Law Enf't Recording , 383 N.C. 261 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Revocation—probationary period expired—required finding of good cause—jurisdiction—The trial court had jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation where it complied with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) by making an oral and written finding that good cause existed to do so. Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause to revoke defendant's probation over a year after the probationary period had expired, where the court also found that defendant had incurred new criminal charges during his probation and that the State had intentionally delayed his probation violation hearing to allow defendant's pending charges to be resolved first (the violation reports alleged that defendant had committed new criminal offenses, and therefore resolution of the pending charges would impact the hearing). State v. Geter , 383 N.C. 484 (2022) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Real Property Marketable Title Act—exception under section 47B-3(13)—covenants restricting property to residential use—In a declaratory judgment action regarding residential subdivision lots subject to a set of nine covenants recorded in the 1950s, where the first of the covenants restricted the lots to residential use only while the remaining covenants governed the number, size, location, and type of structures or activities permitted on each lot, only the first covenant survived under N.C.G.S. § 47B-3(13)'s exception to the Real Property Marketable Title Act. Although the nine covenants provided for a general or uniform scheme of development, by the plain language of section 47B-3(13) only the covenant restricting the lots to residential use was shielded from extinguishment by the Act. C Invs. 2, LLC v. Auger , 383 N.C. 1 (2022) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Multiple drug trafficking charges—substantial assistance—departure from mandatory minimum—discretionary decision—Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 90-95(h)(5), a trial court's decision to reduce a sentence for a drug-related conviction below the statutory mandatory minimum for substantial assistance is entirely discretionary, no matter the scope or value of that assistance. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or act under a misapprehension of the law when, after consolidating defendant's convictions for two drug trafficking offenses and one offense of possession of a firearm by a felon into a single judgment, it declined to make a downward departure from the statutory minimum even though the court found that defendant had provided substantial assistance in one of the drug trafficking cases. State v. Robinson , 383 N.C. 512 (2022) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Failure to register—misreporting address—insufficient evidence of deceptive intent—Where defendant, a registered sex offender, was charged under N.C.G.S. § 14-208.11(a)(4) with "willfully" misreporting his place of residence "under false pretenses," the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge where there was insufficient evidence that defendant intended to deceive the sheriff's office by listing the wrong apartment building number on a change of information form. For one thing, defendant, who was facing eviction from an apartment where he had lived for only a few days, signed the homeless check-in log at the sheriff's office on the same day that he submitted the change of information form reporting his apartment address; therefore, the evidence did not support the State's theory that defendant listed the wrong apartment address to avoid having to report as a homeless offender. Further, because the change of information form did not have a space to indicate the last effective date for any address, no deceptive intent could be inferred from defendant registering as homeless on the same day that he reported living in an apartment. State v. Lamp , 383 N.C. 562 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Registered offender—statutory reporting requirement—"new address"—Where North Carolina law requires registered sex offenders who change address to report the "new address" pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-208.9(a), any address that has not already been reported constitutes a "new address" under the statute. Thus, in a case where a registered sex-offender was homeless, then moved into an apartment, then became homeless again a few days later, he was still required to report his old apartment address as a "new address" even though he no longer lived there. State v. Lamp , 383 N.C. 562 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Sales tax—imposed on purchase of out-of-state goods—goods received by North Carolina purchasers—The assessment of a sales tax by the Department of Revenue on the sales of printed materials that were produced by plaintiff, an out-of-state company–and that were purchased by and shipped to North Carolina customers–did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The factual circumstances were not governed by McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944), but by subsequent decisions Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), and South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018), which implicitly overruled Dilworth in relevant aspects. Plaintiff's sales were subject to taxation because its activities had a substantial nexus with North Carolina; the sales tax was imposed in accordance with North Carolina's sourcing statute; and the tax was fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, and sufficiently related to state-provided taxpayer services. Quad Graphics, Inc. v N.C. Dep't of Revenue , 383 N.C. 356 (2022) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

State agency—regulatory action—adult care home—The claims of an adult care home and its owner (plaintiffs) against the N.C. Department of Health and Human Services (defendant) seeking damages pursuant to the State Tort Claims Act for defendant's allegedly negligent inspection of and regulatory action against the adult care home were barred because the State Tort Claims Act did not waive the state's sovereign immunity for "negligent regulation" and, by its plain language, the Act did not apply because private persons do not exercise regulatory power. Furthermore, plaintiffs' claims should have been dismissed for the additional reason that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for negligence, as state regulators do not owe a duty of care to regulated entities. Cedarbrook Residential Ctr., Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. , 383 N.C. 31 (2022) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Death benefits—beneficiaries—dependency status—unmarried partner—claim properly dismissed—The Industrial Commission properly dismissed a claim for death benefits that was filed by decedent's alleged cohabitating fiancee who, because she lacked a legally recognized relationship with the deceased, did not qualify as a dependent pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-39. West v. Hoyle's Tire & Axle, LLC , 383 N.C. 654 (2022) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Death benefits—timeliness of claim—jurisdiction established by prior workers' compensation claim—The Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to hear a widow's claim for death benefits that she filed nearly three years after the death of her husband (a state university employee) because her husband had timely filed a workers' compensation claim regarding his workplace injury ten days before his death. The husband's filing constituted "a claim" for purposes of meeting the two-year filing deadline set forth in N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a) and, therefore, sufficiently met the statute's condition precedent to invoke the Commission's jurisdiction over that claim and the subsequent death benefits claim related to the same injury. Based on the statute's plain language and legislative history, separate and distinct filings for workers' compensation and death benefits were not required to establish the Commission's jurisdiction. McAuley v. N.C. A&T State Univ. , 383 N.C. 343 (2022) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)