Contested case petition—timeliness—Civil Procedure Rule 6(e)—inapplicable—After a corporation (petitioner) filed a petition for a contested case sixty-three days after the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (NCDHHS) mailed notice of its decision to revoke petitioner's licenses to operate two mental health facilities, the Office of Administrative Hearings properly dismissed the petition as untimely. Petitioner, citing an administrative code provision (26 N.C. Admin. Code 3.0116) stating that "time computations in contested cases" are governed by Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, contended that its petition was timely because NCDHHS gave notice by mail and, therefore, the prescribed sixty-day deadline (under N.C.G.S. § 150B-23(f)) for filing the petition was extended by an additional three days under Rule 6(e). However, because a contested case does not exist until it is commenced through the filing of a petition, the sixty-day deadline did not constitute a time limitation "in" a contested case; consequently, Rule 6(e) did not apply. Further, Rule 6(e) only applies to "service" of papers, which does not include delivery of an agency decision before any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding has commenced. Bradley Home v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 220PA24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Guilty plea—limited right of appeal—statutory exception inapplicable—appellate jurisdiction improper—After the defendant in a prosecution for embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses pleaded guilty to attaining habitual felon status, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that defendant had a right of appeal from the entry of her guilty plea under one of the exceptions to the general limitation on such appeals: specifically, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2)(3), which allows an appeal as of right where the duration of a prison sentence is not statutorily authorized for the defendant's class of offense and prior record level. This exception did not apply to defendant's appeal, which challenged the factual basis for the guilty plea rather than the duration of defendant's sentence. Consequently, the Court of Appeals–having dismissed defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari as moot–lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of defendant's appeal, prompting the Supreme Court to reverse that court's decision and to remand the case for further proceedings. State v. Mincey , No. 68A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Preservation of issues—general rate case—transmission cost allocation stipulation—no opposition or objection raised—In a pair of general rate cases where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC), intervenor-appellant Carolina Industrial Group for Fair Utility Rates (CIGFUR) failed to preserve for review its challenge to the Commission's approval of a transmission cost allocation (TCA) stipulation approved by DEP, DEC, and the Public Staff. No party opposed the TCA stipulation during the DEP or DEC evidentiary hearings or raised any objection to it in post-hearing briefing and, additionally, CIGFUR only challenged the TCA stipulation in its appeal in the DEC rate case, yet asked that the stipulation be vacated in both the DEP and DEC matters. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Preservation of issues—insufficiency of evidence—two separate assault charges—general motion to dismiss—In a prosecution for multiple crimes arising from a domestic violence incident between defendant and his wife, defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his argument that insufficient evidence supported two separate charges of assault by strangulation rather than a single charge arising from one, continuous offense. Under Appellate Rule 10(a)(3), which precludes defendants from raising sufficiency of the evidence issues on appeal unless a motion to dismiss is made at trial, a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence is offense specific, meaning that a motion to dismiss one offense preserves all sufficiency issues with respect to that offense alone. Consequently, defendant's general motion to dismiss at trial did not preserve his argument regarding the two assault charges, especially where he announced to the trial court that he was excluding those specific charges from his motion. State v. Tadlock , No. 191PA25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Class certification—conflict between class definition and court's analysis—ascertainability—In a class action lawsuit arising from an allegedly deceptive promotional flyer that a car dealership sent to plaintiffs–who were led to believe that they had won either a large cash prize or a free car when, in fact, they had won only two dollars–the trial court's class certification order (entered on remand from a prior appeal) was vacated where the court defined the class to include people who received the flyer, called the promotional hotline number shown on the flyer, and then visited the dealership to claim their prize. This definition conflicted with the court's analysis, wherein the court found that one of the named plaintiffs did not call the hotline–rather, her grandmother did–but nevertheless allowed her to remain a named plaintiff representing the class; in turn, this inconsistency prevented meaningful appellate review. Additionally, the proposed class was not ascertainable where there were no records identifying which of the 2,118 people who called the hotline number were among the 927 who also visited the dealership during the promotional period. Surgeon v. TKO Shelby, LLC , No. 198A22-2 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Enforceability of employment agreement—prior lawsuit—issue not actually litigated—resolved by settlement—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including breach of contract for allegedly breaching the non-solicitation provisions of an employment agreement, plaintiffs were not collaterally estopped from seeking enforcement of those provisions despite a finding from a trial court in a prior lawsuit (which plaintiffs had brought against one of the defendants) determining that those provisions were unenforceable. The enforceability issue was not actually litigated and necessary to the judgment because the prior lawsuit was resolved by a settlement agreement, and there was no statement indicating the parties' intent to incorporate the unenforceability finding into the settlement agreement. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Effective assistance of counsel—defense counsel's purported concessions of guilt—defendant's stipulations—Harbison inapplicable—In defendant's appeal from his convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, the Court of Appeals' determination that the record failed to show whether defendant knowingly consented in advance to his trial counsel's admission of guilt–and its resulting remand of the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on that issue–was reversed. There was no deficiency in defense counsel's performance regarding concessions–let alone per se prejudicial error pursuant to State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 (1985), and State v. McAllister, 375 N.C. 455 (2020), which together provide the appropriate framework when a client's autonomy, not counsel's competence, is in issue–where defendant stipulated on the record to his counsel's purported concessions in two separate colloquies with the trial court and, moreover, counsel did not actually concede defendant's guilt, either explicitly or implicitly. State v. Nunnally , No. 216A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Business dispute—breach of settlement agreement—non-solicitation provision—application of adverse inference—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including breach of a settlement agreement from a prior lawsuit–which included a non-solicitation-of-employees provision–where the Business Court had properly granted plaintiffs' motion for adverse inference due to defendants' extensive spoliation of evidence, plaintiffs' claim for breach of settlement agreement was remanded for the Business Court to fulfill its discretionary function regarding the application of the adverse inference to this claim. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Employment agreement—non-solicitation provisions—reasonableness—blue pencil doctrine inapplicable—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including breach of contract–alleging that defendants breached the non-solicitation provisions of their employment agreements (barring them from soliciting clients and employees)–although plaintiffs argued in the alternative for the application of the blue pencil doctrine to save any unenforceable provisions, the equitable doctrine could only be applied to an unreasonable provision that was separable from the rest of the agreement. Here, the doctrine did not apply because plaintiffs' suggestion on appeal that a particular term be blue-pencilled out of the agreement would require striking the term from at least forty-six separate clauses and not merely removing a separable, divisible provision from an otherwise enforceable contract. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Employment agreement—non-solicitation provisions—reasonableness—size and scope of company—remand required—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including breach of contract–alleging that defendants breached the non-solicitation provisions of their employment agreements (barring them from soliciting clients and employees)–although the Business Court had determined that the non-solicitation provisions were unreasonable, the issue was remanded for consideration of the size and scope of the company, since there was a factual dispute as to the meaning and identity of the main company and its affiliated members. On remand, the burden was on plaintiffs to prove the reasonableness of the restrictive provisions. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Enforceability—employment agreement—ownership interest provision—void for indefiniteness—In an action to enforce an employment agreement provision, under which plaintiff sought to exercise an option to purchase ten percent of the company after five years of employment (with the remaining ninety percent to be owner-financed over a period of years after that), the decision of the North Carolina Business Court granting summary judgment to defendants–based on its determination that the agreement between the parties was illusory–was modified and affirmed. The agreement could not be enforced due to it being void for indefiniteness where the ownership provision was not severable from its sub-division parts and where the agreement lacked material terms regarding the parties' respective rights and obligations, including those necessary for enforcement and, more particularly, a price or formula upon which a price could be calculated. Langley v. Autocraft, Inc. , No. 304A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Enforceability—provision of employment agreement—equitable defenses—quasi-estoppel—mend the hold—In an action to enforce an employment agreement provision, under which plaintiff sought to exercise an option to purchase ten percent of the company after five years of employment (with the remaining ninety percent to be owner-financed over a period of years after that), where the parties' agreement was void for indefiniteness, plaintiff's arguments in the alternative for relief pursuant to equitable principles of quasi-estoppel and mend the hold were unavailing. Since the ownership provision lacked material terms of enforcement, there was no meeting of minds regarding the parties' purported obligations and, thus, the agreement's indefiniteness precluded relief on a quasi-estoppel basis. The doctrine of mend the hold did not apply where defendants' counterclaim–in which they asserted that plaintiff owed a fiduciary duty to the company–was a separate claim stated in the alternative and did not constitute a new justification for nonperformance that would trigger the doctrine. Langley v. Autocraft, Inc. , No. 304A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Expenditures—scope of authority—net proceeds of occupancy tax—"tourism-related expenditures"—public safety services—Pursuant to the plain language of a legislative enabling statute that allows Currituck County to collect a room occupancy tax and spend the net proceeds from that tax on "tourism-related expenditures," the county's decision to use the occupancy tax revenues to enhance certain public safety services (including police, fire, and emergency response services) was within its discretionary authority, not taken in bad faith, not arbitrary or capricious, and not in disregard of the law. The county commissioners made a reasoned decision that the expenditures were necessary to promote and develop tourism based on the substantial population increase during peak tourist season and related year-round costs to provide public safety services during that period. Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants (the county and its tourism development agency) on plaintiffs' (county property owners) action for declaratory judgment; the decision by the Court of Appeals to the contrary was reversed and the matter was remanded for proceedings consistent with the holding of the Supreme Court. Costanzo v. Currituck County , No. 101PA24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Capital case—executive clemency—death sentence commuted to life imprisonment without parole— effect on right of direct appeal to Supreme Court —In a capital case, where defendant applied for clemency while his appeal from a judgment sentencing him to death for first-degree murder was still pending in the Supreme Court, which resulted in the governor commuting defendant's death sentence to life imprisonment without parole, the Supreme Court granted defendant's motion to remand the appeal to the Court of Appeals on the ground that, because he no longer faced execution, he did not retain his statutory right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court under N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(a)(1) and 15A-2000(d), since the legislative purpose under those statutes for allowing direct Supreme Court review–to prevent arbitrary or unjust executions–no longer applied to his case, which had become a non-capital felony case requiring appellate review in the Court of Appeals under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1). State v. Robinson , No. 142A12 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Misappropriation of trade secrets—spoliation of evidence—widespread deletion of electronic data—scope of adverse inference—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including misappropriation of trade secrets (specifically, client lists), although the Business Court properly granted plaintiffs' motion for adverse inference–based on evidence that defendants intentionally destroyed or failed to preserve electronic data and materials despite being aware of the litigation and having been sent cease-and-desist letters with a preservation notice–that court failed to identify where and how the inference would be drawn. The Supreme Court remanded the issue of spoliation for the Business Court to fulfill its discretionary function by clarifying with greater precision the application of the inference as to each claim. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Murder trial—victim's prior felony convictions—to show defendant's state of mind—exclusion under Rule 404(b)—prejudicial—In a prosecution for first-degree murder arising from an altercation in a cornfield about the victim hunting too close to defendant's horse rescue farm, where defendant claimed that he acted in self-defense when he fatally shot the victim as he appeared to reach into his vest after angrily pushing defendant to the ground, the trial court prejudicially erred in excluding evidence of the victim's prior felony convictions under Evidence Rule 404(b). This evidence was not offered to show that the victim acted in conformity with his past crimes, but rather to show defendant's state of mind during the altercation–and the reasonableness of his fear during the incident, which was essential to his self-defense claim–where defendant knew that the victim was a convicted felon who illegally carried a firearm. State v. Hague , No. 225A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Text messages—voluminous and un-redacted—admitted without limiting instruction—plain error analysis—Where defendant was convicted of second-degree murder–upon evidence that: the victim (a married co-worker with whom defendant had been engaged in a sexual affair and significant drug use) was found face-down in defendant's bedroom doorway, shot twice in the back and with a key to defendant's home lying nearby; defendant was the only person armed when the encounter that led to the victim's death began; and defendant's accounts of the encounter were materially inconsistent–defendant could not demonstrate that, but for the trial court's admission of voluminous and un-redacted text messages and photos, some sexually explicit, sent from defendant's phone to the victim and other persons, the jury probably would have returned a different verdict. State v. Hicks , No. 136PA22-2 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—"exceeds authorized access"—post-employment computer access—remand for adverse inference consideration—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims involving the alleged misappropriation of client lists, the Business Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on three of plaintiffs' computer trespass claims made pursuant to the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. With regard to one defendant, there was sufficient evidence that she "exceed[ed] authorized access" by accessing a vendor portal post-employment and after plaintiffs sent her a cease-and-desist letter. For another defendant, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether, when he took client expiration lists prior to resigning from employment with plaintiffs, he knowingly violated an established company rule. For a third claim, although plaintiffs failed to sufficiently support their allegation that all defendants emailed confidential documents to their personal email accounts and took screenshots of confidential information from their work computers prior to resigning, the matter was remanded for the Business Court to fulfill its discretionary function regarding the application of a previously-granted adverse inference (based on defendants' extensive spoliation of evidence) to this claim. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Business Court—issuance of clarifying order—summary dismissal of claims—lack of written basis—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including misappropriation of trade secrets, after both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the Business Court entered an initial summary judgment order, the presiding Business Court Judge erred by issuing a "Clarifying Order" a few weeks later–which modified the first order by granting defendants' summary judgment motion pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 56–without legal analysis or legal basis as required by N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.3. The court's order summarily granting summary judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded for entry of a written, reasoned opinion as to defendants' motion. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Judicial standards—censure recommendation adopted—factual findings supported—The Supreme Court accepted the Judicial Standards Commission's recommendation for the censure of respondent (a superior court judge) for violations of Canons 1, 2A, and 5F of the Code of Judicial Conduct–which amounted to conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice, brought the judicial branch into disrepute, and constituted willful misconduct in office. The Commission's findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence, including that respondent had asked a court employee in his jurisdiction to put forth to the senior resident superior court judge respondent's deficient motions to withdraw as an attorney from cases and continued to appear as an attorney while a sitting judge, but also that respondent was otherwise cooperative with the Commission's investigation, eventually took appropriate remedial measures, and had no prior disciplinary history with the Commission. In re J.C. , No. 86A26 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Per Curiam)

Traffic stop—warrantless search—probable cause—totality of circumstances—marijuana odor only one factor—The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during a traffic stop where law enforcement officers had probable cause under the totality of the circumstances to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's person and vehicle. Relevant factors included: the excessive speed of the vehicle (a traffic violation which provided the officers with legal justification to initiate the stop); a marijuana odor; a cover scent (which, based on the officers' experience, was a common tactic used to mask the scent of marijuana); the criminal history of the vehicle's occupants; and a background check that revealed defendant had serious pending charges. Although the presence of a handgun on the car's dashboard was not a factor in the inquiry–because the driver provided her credentials as a probation and parole officer–the remainder of the circumstances collectively supported an inference that evidence of criminal activity would be discovered in the car; thus, the searches of defendant's person and vehicle were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Dobson , No. 190PA24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Traffic stop—warrantless search—reasonable suspicion—probable cause—totality of circumstances—marijuana odor—The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence where law enforcement officers had, under the totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry search of defendant's person and probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's vehicle. Relevant factors included: defendant's failure to pull over in response to a police vehicle's blue lights and sirens; defendant's presence in a "high crime area"; a marijuana odor coming from defendant's vehicle; defendant's evasive behavior during questioning; and defendant's prior criminal history. These circumstances, including the subsequent discovery of a marijuana "blunt" in defendant's pants pocket, were sufficient to create an inference that evidence of criminal activity would be discovered in the car; thus, the searches of defendant's person and vehicle were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Rowdy , No. 300PA24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Client lists—definition of "trade secret"—six-factor inquiry—summary judgment improper—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including misappropriation of trade secrets (specifically, client lists) under both federal and state law, the Business Court erred by determining at the summary judgment stage that two client lists (one containing names and addresses of clients serviced by one defendant; the other containing clients and their associated insurance policy renewal dates for various types of policies) did not qualify as protectable trade secrets. With regard to the two compilations, even if certain information about individual clients could be obtained publicly, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the lists' public availability, the extent to which other employees and those involved in the business knew about or could recreate the lists, the extent of measures taken to safeguard the lists' secrecy, the lists' value to plaintiffs, and the time and effort taken to acquire the information contained in each list. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Misappropriation—prima facie case—statutory criteria—absence of consent—remand for adverse inference consideration—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including misappropriation of trade secrets (specifically, client lists) under both federal and state law, a prima facie case of misappropriation under N.C.G.S. § 66-155(2) requires a claimant to show not only that a specific opportunity to acquire a trade secret existed but also that the opportunity occurred absent consent or authority of the owner. Here, plaintiffs' evidence did not demonstrate that a production analysis document taken by one of the defendants had been obtained or used without defendants' consent or authority. However, where the Business Court had granted plaintiffs' motion for adverse inference due to extensive spoliation of evidence by defendants, the trade secret claim regarding the production analysis document was reversed and remanded for the Business Court to fulfill its discretionary function regarding the application of the adverse inference to this claim. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Business dispute—solicitation of employees and clients by former employees—lack of conferring of a benefit—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims, the decision of the Business Court to grant summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment was affirmed, although on alternative grounds. Where the basis of plaintiffs' claim was that defendants wrongfully retained plaintiffs' confidential information, clients, and employees, there was no evidence that plaintiffs conferred a benefit on defendants, a necessary element of an unjust enrichment claim, since defendants acted without plaintiffs' permission. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

General rate case—different returns on equity authorized based on similar evidence—not arbitrary and capricious—In a pair of general rate cases where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) under the performance-based regulation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 62-133.16–enacted to provide an alternative to traditional ratemaking with the aim of reducing the carbon emissions of electric public utilities–the Commission's authorization of a return on equity (ROE) (the return earned on a utility's capital investment by charging rates to customers) of 9.8% for DEP and 10.1% for DEC was upheld. Although DEP and DEC presented substantially similar evidence, it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to approve a higher ROE for DEC than it did for DEP. The Commission's ROE decisions involved the exercise of discretion and the application of subjective judgment to voluminous, complex, and sometimes contradictory evidence. Additionally, the customer interest portion of the DEC order demonstrated that the Commission duly considered that issue before approving DEC's ROE. The Commission followed the law and based its decision on competent, material, and substantial evidence. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

General rate case—performance-based regulation—electric vehicle charging—In a pair of general rate cases where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) under the performance-based regulation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 62-133.16 (the PBR statute)–enacted to provide an alternative to traditional ratemaking with the aim of reducing the carbon emissions of electric public utilities–the Commission's approval of the exclusion of revenue generated by residential electric vehicle (EV) charging from DEP's and DEC's decoupling mechanisms, which attempt to eliminate the incentive of electric public utilities to encourage greater energy consumption in order to increase revenue and are required in PBR applications, was upheld. The PBR statute allows such exclusions, and the Commission's approval of the estimation of revenue attributable to EV charging under existing residential schedules, rather than requiring DEC and DEP to develop rate schedules or riders specifically for EV charging, was permitted by the statute's plain language. Further, findings regarding the reasonableness of the costs was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

General rate case—performance-based regulation—fuel cost allocation—In a pair of general rate cases where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) under the performance-based regulation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 62-133.16–enacted to provide an alternative to traditional ratemaking with the aim of reducing the carbon emissions of electric public utilities–the Commission's prohibition on the utilities' continued use of the equal percentage fuel cost allocation method in fuel rider proceedings governed by N.C.G.S. § 62-133.2 was upheld. While section 62-133.2 includes a detailed definition of "cost of fuel and fuel-related costs," the statute leaves to the Commission's discretion how to allocate the cost adjustment among a utility's customer classes, and nothing in the record evidence indicated that the Commission acted (1) under a misapprehension of law regarding the applicability of the cost causation principle to fuel rider proceedings or (2) in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Instead, the Commission's findings of fact were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

General rate case—performance-based regulation—future capital projects—hazardous tree removal—In a general rate case where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) under the performance-based regulation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 62-133.16 (the PBR statute)–enacted to provide an alternative to traditional ratemaking with the aim of reducing the carbon emissions of electric public utilities, including by allowing a multiyear rate plan (MYRP) to be approved with second- and third-year rate increases based upon certain cost projections–where DEC identified capital spending projects for hazardous tree removal in its application but later reduced its cost estimates, the revised cost estimates were "known and measurable" as required by the PBR statute where that phrase was understood to apply to projected (future) capital investments. Moreover, there was no legal error in the Commission's assumption that hazardous tree removal could qualify as a capital spending project for MYRP purposes even though some project costs might be classified as maintenance expenses under accounting rules promulgated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which were mandatory for DEC to employ. Further, record evidence established that the Commission's decision rested on competent, material, and substantial evidence. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

General rate case—performance-based regulation—interclass subsidization—In a pair of general rate cases where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) under the performance-based regulation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 62-133.16 (the PBR statute)–enacted to provide an alternative to traditional ratemaking with the aim of reducing the carbon emissions of electric public utilities–the Commission's approval of a 10% reduction in the utilities' interclass subsidies was upheld. The PBR statute required adherence "to the greatest extent practicable" with: (1) the cost causation principle (establishing a causal link between a customer class, its use of the electric system, and the costs incurred by the public utility) and (2) the minimization of interclass subsidies (where a customer class pays more than its share of the utility's cost to produce power for all customers); the 10% reduction in interclass subsidies was an appropriate balance of those directives with gradualism–adjusting rates incrementally to avoid "rate shock" to customers, a mandatory consideration under the PBR statute–and was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in the entire record. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)