Review of unpreserved constitutional argument—lifetime satellite-based monitoring—no appeal filed—Rule 2—certiorari erroneously granted—After a trial court entered orders imposing lifetime satellite-based monitoring (SBM) upon defendant, and defendant neither objected at the SBM hearing nor filed a written notice of appeal of the SBM orders, the Court of Appeals' decision vacating the orders was reversed because it was error to allow defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari and to invoke Appellate Rule 2 to review defendant's unpreserved challenge to the orders. Defendant failed to demonstrate that a refusal to invoke Rule 2 would result in manifest injustice, and his petition did not show any merit where the trial court appropriately ordered lifetime SBM because of his status as an aggravated offender. State v. Ricks , 378 N.C. 737 (2021) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Termination of parental rights hearing—testimony excluded—no offer of proof made—In a termination of parental rights matter in which respondent-father's two-year-old son was placed with the child's maternal grandfather, respondent failed to make an offer of proof, as required by Evidence Rule 103(a)(2), to preserve for appeal his argument that the trial court erred by excluding respondent's testimony about the grandfather's allegedly inappropriate behaviors. Even if respondent had made an offer of proof, the trial court had wide discretion to consider which evidence, including hearsay, was relevant during disposition. Moreover, the same trial judge presided over the case since the beginning and previously heard concerns about the grandfather and determined they were without merit. In re M.Y.P. , 378 N.C. 667 (2021) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

North Carolina—general warrants—orders imposing satellite-based monitoring—Orders entered pursuant to the statutory satellite-based monitoring (SBM) program do not constitute general warrants, which are prohibited by Art. I, sec. 20 of the North Carolina constitution, and therefore do not violate the state constitution on that basis. State v. Hilton , 378 N.C. 692 (2021) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Indian Child Welfare Act—tribal notice requirements—post-termination of parental rights documentation—noncompliance cured—Where the trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights to her son without fully complying with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), but the court held post-termination proceedings and made detailed findings of fact–regarding the social services agency's due diligence in confirming the child's non-eligibility status with numerous Indian tribes and seeking assistance from the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs for a non-responsive tribe–before concluding that the minor child was not an Indian child under ICWA, the trial court cured its initial noncompliance. In re D.J. , 378 N.C. 565 (2021) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Lifetime—reasonableness balancing test—aggravated offenders—The imposition of lifetime satellite-based monitoring (SBM) on defendant after the end of his post-release supervision was not an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because defendant had been convicted of first-degree statutory rape and first-degree statutory sexual offense, making him an aggravated offender as defined by N.C.G.S. § 14-208.6(1a). Lifetime SBM as applied to aggravated offenders is reasonable in light of the State's paramount interest in protecting the public (particularly children), the SBM program's efficacy as a deterrent for recidivism, and the minimal nature of the intrusion required by SBM monitoring given the diminished expectation of privacy by aggravated offenders. State v. Hilton , 378 N.C. 692 (2021) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of the child—need for permanency—no misapprehension of the law—dispositional factors—The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that terminating a mother's parental rights was in her two-year-old child's best interests, where the mother had previously executed a relinquishment of her rights conditioned upon her sister and brother-in-law adopting the child. Because the relinquishment statutes permitted the mother to revoke her relinquishment or challenge its validity, the court reasonably considered possible hindrances to the adoption process, and therefore did not act under a misapprehension of the law in finding termination necessary to ensure the child received a permanent plan of care. Furthermore, the court properly considered the child's young age and high likelihood of adoption (dispositional factors under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)) given that two families were already willing to adopt him. In re M.R.J. , 378 N.C. 648 (2021) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Best interests of the children—statutory factors—children's bond with parent—likelihood of adoption—The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of a father's parental rights was in the best interests of his two children, where the court properly considered each dispositional factor under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). The court acknowledged the children's strong bond with their father while finding the children had also bonded with their foster family, their foster parents were willing to adopt both siblings, and the younger sibling's behavioral issues (he suffered from adjustment disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder, which resulted in sleep deprivation, tantrums, hitting, and other problematic behaviors) did not make adoption unlikely because the foster parents were willing to provide him with the necessary therapy and medical treatment to address those issues. In re K.B. , 378 N.C. 601 (2021) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Bifurcated hearing—adjudication phase—evidence of reasonable progress—necessary only up to adjudication—Where the trial court agreed to hold a bifurcated termination of parental rights hearing and the adjudication and disposition hearings were held several months apart, the court was not required, for purposes of the ground of failure to make reasonable progress (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)), to make findings regarding respondent-mother's progress on her case plan in the several months between the two hearings. Since the court concluded the adjudication phase at the end of the first hearing date when it found that grounds for termination had been established, it was respondent's obligation to move to reopen the adjudication phase if she wanted to present additional adjudication evidence at the later hearing date before the court began the dispositional phase. In re B.J.H. , 378 N.C. 524 (2021) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Dispositional stage—best interests of the child—evidentiary standard not stated—In a termination of parental rights matter in which the adjudicatory and dispositional stages were combined but the trial court did not delineate the different standards of proof for each stage, the entirety of the proceedings clearly showed that the trial court understood and applied the proper evidentiary standard before assessing whether termination of respondent-father's parental rights was in the best interests of the child, where the court considered each dispositional factor in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110. Even if the court improperly used the clear, cogent, and convincing standard at disposition, use of that heightened standard for petitioner-agency to overcome caused no prejudice to respondent. In re M.Y.P. , 378 N.C. 667 (2021) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Findings of fact—sufficiency—mere recitations of testimony—conflicting evidence—When reversing an order terminating a father's parental rights to his son on grounds of neglect, dependency, and abandonment, the Supreme Court disregarded multiple findings of fact in the order that either failed to resolve material conflicts in the evidence or constituted (or potentially constituted) mere recitations of testimony rather than proper factual determinations by the trial court, including findings regarding the father's child support payments, the father's relationship with and efforts to contact his son, and the maternal grandparents' efforts to prevent the father from communicating with the child. In re D.T.H. , 378 N.C. 576 (2021) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—abandonment—insufficiency of findings—unresolved factual disputes—An order terminating a father's parental rights to his son on grounds of abandonment (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7)) was reversed and remanded for entry of further findings, where the trial court failed to make findings addressing the father's conduct during the determinative six-month period before the termination petition was filed, and where the court's findings did not resolve key factual disputes over the amount of contact the father had had with the child and whether such contact was limited because of the father's willful relinquishment of his parental duties or because of the grandparents' efforts to prevent him from communicating with his son. In re D.T.H. , 378 N.C. 576 (2021) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—dependency—required findings—alternative care arrangement —The trial court erred in terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of dependency (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6)), where the court failed to enter any written findings addressing whether the father "lacked an alternative child care arrangement" for his son, and where the record did not contain any evidence that the father lacked an alternative child care arrangement. In re D.T.H. , 378 N.C. 576 (2021) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—findings and conclusion as to father—The trial court properly terminated respondent-father's parental rights to his two children on the basis that his failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the children's removal (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)) was willful where, although respondent did not sign the case plan prepared for him, he orally agreed to its requirements and was on notice that he needed to address issues with substance abuse, mental health, housing, employment, and parenting, as evidenced by prior orders in the case. Any discrepancy between findings in permanency planning orders, of which the trial court took judicial notice, and testimony at the termination hearing were for the trial court to resolve. Sufficient evidence was presented to support the court's findings, which in turn supported the court's conclusion that respondent's lack of progress over twenty-seven months was grounds for termination. In re B.J.H. , 378 N.C. 524 (2021) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—findings and conclusion as to mother—The trial court properly terminated respondent-mother's parental rights to her two children on the basis that she willfully failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the children's removal (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)) after making detailed findings, supported by the evidence, regarding respondent's noncompliance or lack of progress with her case plan, including aspects related to her substance abuse, mental health, housing, and employment. The trial court's determination that respondent's progress was extremely limited and not reasonable was amply supported by the facts. In re B.J.H. , 378 N.C. 524 (2021) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care—willfulness—notice of obligation—The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact supported its decision to terminate both parents' rights to their son on the basis that, for a continuous period of six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, they failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for their child although able to do so (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3)). The Supreme Court declined to revisit its holding in In re S.E., 373 N.C. 360 (2020), which interpreted this statutory provision as not requiring notice to parents regarding their obligation to provide support. In re D.C. , 378 N.C. 556 (2021) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Grounds for termination—neglect—by abandonment—insufficiency of findings—unresolved factual disputes—An order terminating a father's parental rights to his son on grounds of neglect by abandonment (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)) was reversed and remanded, where the trial court's findings failed to resolve key factual disputes over the amount of contact the father had had with the child and whether such contact was limited because of the father's willful relinquishment of his parental duties or because of the grandparents' efforts to prevent him from communicating with his son. In re D.T.H. , 378 N.C. 576 (2021) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—pattern of exposure to child sex abusers—An order terminating a mother's parental rights to her two daughters was affirmed where the trial court's findings–all of which, with one exception, were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence–showed a high likelihood of repeated neglect if the children returned home. Specifically, the court found a pattern in which the mother exposed her daughters to men with histories of child sexual abuse, those men sexually abused the daughters, the daughters were adjudicated neglected and removed from the home, the mother cooperated with social services such that the children were returned to her care, and then the cycle would recommence. Moreover, evidence showed that the mother's cognitive limitations, dependent personality, and tendency to disbelieve her children's abuse allegations rendered her incapable of protecting the children from future abuse. In re L.H. , 378 N.C. 625 (2021) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—substantial risk of impairment—sufficiency of evidence—An order terminating a mother's parental rights to her children was affirmed where the trial court's findings–supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence–showed a likelihood of future neglect if the children were returned to the mother's care, because she failed to make progress in her social services case plan; failed to address her substance abuse, mental health issues, and history of domestic violence; failed to keep a safe and stable home; and disregarded social services' concerns with her having unsupervised contact with the children. Evidence also supported a finding that the children were physically, mentally, or emotionally impaired (or at a substantial risk of such impairment) as a result of the mother's neglect, where both children suffered from adjustment disorder and various behavioral issues. In re K.B. , 378 N.C. 601 (2021) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—neglect—repetition of neglect—findings—The trial court properly determined that grounds existed to terminate respondent-father's parental rights to his child based on neglect despite a few unsupported findings, given other supported findings establishing that the child was previously neglected and that there was a likelihood of the repetition of neglect if the child were returned to respondent's care. The two-year-old was removed from the home after being left alone in an unfurnished apartment for at least several hours; respondent had a history of untreated and continuing substance abuse; respondent's lack of progress on his case plan left issues regarding domestic violence, lack of stable housing, and mental illness unresolved; and his visits with the child were sporadic. In re M.Y.P. , 378 N.C. 667 (2021) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds for termination—parental rights terminated as to another child—lack of safe home—no protection from abusive individuals—The trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her son on the basis that her parental rights had been terminated involuntarily to two of her other children and she lacked the ability to establish a safe home (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9)), after making findings, which were based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that she had a pattern of exposing her children to abusive individuals and lacked insight into her son's sexual abuse and the effect it had on him, that she had not made sufficient progress with her own mental health treatment, and that she was unable to provide safe and stable housing for her son. The court's findings in turn supported its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate and that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of her son. In re T.M.B. , 378 N.C. 683 (2021) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Grounds for termination—willful abandonment—determinative six-month period—lack of findings—The trial court's order terminating a father's parental rights to his son was vacated and the matter remanded for further findings where the court's findings did not adequately address the father's actions during the determinative six-month time period (immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition) for purposes of the ground of willful abandonment (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7)). Although the court heard evidence during adjudication from which it could have made relevant findings, and did make findings addressing this issue in the dispositional portion of the termination order, the dispositional findings were subject to a different standard of review and could not be used to support the adjudication. In re K.J.E. , 378 N.C. 620 (2021) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Jurisdiction—standing to initiate termination proceedings—"county director" of social services—Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act —Wake County Human Services (WCHS) had standing under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(3) to petition to terminate a mother's parental rights because her child–who lived in South Carolina when WCHS filed the petition in Wake County–was placed in WCHS's custody by a "trial court of competent jurisdiction" where the Wake County District Court met the jurisdictional prerequisites under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and where the petition had been properly verified. Furthermore, neither the definition of "director" found in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(10) nor the county-specific allocation of social services under N.C.G.S. § 153A-257(a) imposes a geographical limit on which "county director" may initiate termination proceedings under N.C.G.S § 7B-401.1(a). Therefore, the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the termination matter. To the extent the mother's appellate arguments addressed venue rather than jurisdiction, those arguments were unpreserved and lacked merit. In re M.R.J. , 378 N.C. 648 (2021) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Motion to continue—to secure witness testimony—insufficient offer of proof—no prejudice—In a termination of parental rights matter, respondent-mother's motion to continue the hearing in order to secure a witness–who was expected to relate the services respondent was engaged in at a local health center–was properly denied where the offer of proof by respondent's counsel was vague and did not forecast what the witness's testimony would be, and where there was no dispute that respondent received services at the health center. Respondent waived any constitutional argument by not raising the issue before the trial court, and did not demonstrate she was prejudiced by the court's decision. In re D.J. , 378 N.C. 565 (2021) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Multiple grounds for termination—adjudicatory stage—statements of trial court—no misapprehension of law—In a termination of parental rights hearing in which four grounds for termination were alleged, the trial court's statement at the end of adjudication that "We're here for – not for [respondents]. We're here for this child." did not reflect a misapprehension of the law by viewing the parents and child as adversaries. The court's full statement indicated its understanding that the parents' constitutionally protected rights as parents were paramount until grounds for termination were proven, at which point the matter would move to disposition. In re D.C. , 378 N.C. 556 (2021) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

No-merit brief—termination on multiple grounds—The termination of a mother's parental rights to her two children on multiple grounds was affirmed where her counsel filed a no-merit brief, the trial court's findings of fact had sufficient record support, those findings both supported termination on at least one ground and adequately addressed the dispositional issues delineated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and the trial court had a rational basis for concluding that termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interests. In re J.D.D.J.C. , 378 N.C. 593 (2021) (Author: Justice Per Curiam)

Standard of proof—clear, cogent, and convincing evidence—not stated in open court or in written findings—insufficient evidence to support grounds—The order terminating a father's parental rights to his child was reversed where the trial court did not state the standard of proof (clear, cogent, and convincing) either in open court or in its written findings, as required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109, and where insufficient evidence was presented to support the alleged grounds of failure to make reasonable progress (there was no evidence that the child had been in a court-ordered placement for at least twelve months prior to the termination petition being filed), failure to pay support (there was no evidence that the child's mother had been awarded custody or that the father was required by decree or custody agreement to pay support), or failure to legitimate (there was no evidence that the child was born out of wedlock). Where petitioner (the child's maternal grandmother) did not allege neglect or abandonment or seek a ruling on those grounds, her arguments pertaining to them were not properly considered on appeal. In re M.R.F. , 378 N.C. 638 (2021) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)