Appellate jurisdiction—discretion to issue writ of certiorari—not limited by Rules of Appellate Procedure—The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the trial court's order terminating a mother's parental rights where, although the mother filed a pro se notice of appeal addressed to the Supreme Court rather than to the Court of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court and opposing parties received notice of the appeal and all parties filed briefs in the correct court. The Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c) in issuing a writ of certiorari in aid of its jurisdiction, which was not limited by the Rules of Appellate Procedure or by any statute. In re R.A.F. , 384 N.C. 505 (2023) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Facial challenge—restoration of felon voting rights—Free Elections Clause—In a declaratory action challenging the facial constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 13-1 (regarding felon voting rights, particularly for convicted felons on felony supervision), the trial court erred by concluding that the statute violated the Free Elections Clause (Article I, Section 10) of the state constitution by prohibiting a large number of people from voting. Since Article VI, Section 2(3) of the constitution prohibits felons from voting, the exclusion of felons whose voting rights have not been restored from the electoral process does not implicate the concerns that the Free Elections Clause was enacted to address. Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore , 384 N.C. 194 (2023) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Facial challenge—restoration of felon voting rights—property qualifications—In a declaratory action challenging the facial constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 13-1 (regarding felon voting rights, particularly for convicted felons on felony supervision), the trial court erred by concluding that the statute violated the Property Qualifications Clause (Article I, Section 11) of the state constitution by conditioning felons' eligibility to vote on their ability to comply with the financial obligations of their sentences such as the payment of court costs, fines, or restitution. Since Article VI, Section 2(3) of the constitution prohibits felons from voting, the requirement of felons fulfilling the financial terms of their sentences before having their voting rights restored by statute does not implicate the Property Qualifications Clause, which affects how people may exercise their right to vote or seek office, nor does the requirement equate to a ban on requiring property ownership before exercising those rights. Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore , 384 N.C. 194 (2023) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Facial challenge—restoration of felon voting rights—wealth-based classification—standard of review—In a declaratory action challenging the facial constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 13-1 (regarding felon voting rights, in particular for convicted felons on felony supervision), the trial court erred by applying strict scrutiny to the question of whether the statute created an impermissible wealth classification in violation of the Equal Protection Clause (Article I, Section 19) of the state constitution by conditioning felons' eligibility to vote on their ability to comply with the financial obligations of their sentences such as the payment of court costs, fines, or restitution. Where the statute did not burden a fundamental right, since felons have no right to vote pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(3) of the constitution, or particularly burden a suspect class, the appropriate standard was rational basis review, under which the statute passed constitutional muster because the conditions placed on felons related to a legitimate government interest–ensuring that felons take responsibility for their crimes and exercise their voting rights responsibly. Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore , 384 N.C. 194 (2023) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

North Carolina—equal protection—facial challenge to state law—analytical framework—A facial challenge to a state law under the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution will overcome the presumptive validity of an act of the General Assembly only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature enacted the law with discriminatory intent and that the law actually produces a meaningful disparate impact along racial lines. Holmes v. Moore , 384 N.C. 426 (2023) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

North Carolina—equal protection—voter ID law—discriminatory intent—disparate impact—On rehearing of a facial challenge to a voter ID law, the trial court abused its discretion when it acted under a misapprehension of the law–by using an incorrect legal standard and improperly shifting the burden of proof of constitutional validity to the legislature–to conclude that the voter ID law was unconstitutional in that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution. Under the proper framework for evaluating a facial challenge under the state constitution, plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to meet their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature enacted the law with discriminatory intent and that the law actually provides disparate impact along racial lines by disproportionately impeding black voters from voting; therefore, plaintiffs failed to overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to legislative acts. The prior opinion issued in this case was withdrawn, the trial court's order was reversed, and the matter was remanded for entry of an order dismissing plaintiffs' claim with prejudice. Holmes v. Moore , 384 N.C. 426 (2023) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

North Carolina—equal protection—voter ID law—presumption of legislative good faith—In a facial challenge to a voter ID law, the trial court erred by concluding that the law was unconstitutional on the basis that it was enacted with discriminatory intent and that it therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution, and by permanently enjoining implementation of the law. Although the trial court applied the federal framework set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), which is not binding on state courts interpreting the constitutionality of a state law under a state constitution, plaintiffs' claim failed under even this analysis because the trial court relied too heavily on past discrimination in the historical record and its own speculation regarding additional measures the legislature could have taken during the legislative process rather than on the presumption of legislative good faith, and thus improperly shifted the burden of proving constitutional validity to the General Assembly. Holmes v. Moore , 384 N.C. 426 (2023) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

North Carolina—facial challenge—felon voting rights statute—discriminatory intent—disparate impact—In a declaratory action challenging the facial constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 13-1 (regarding felon voting rights, in particular for convicted felons on felony supervision), the trial court erred by failing to apply the presumption of legislative good faith and by assuming that past discrimination infected the legislative process that led to the enactment of the current law, which led it to erroneously conclude that the legislature enacted the law with discriminatory intent; therefore, the court's findings made under these misapprehensions of the law were not binding on appellate review. The trial court reached its decision by misapplying the analytical framework contained in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), to determine whether the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause (Article I, Section 19) of the state constitution and by adopting unreliable statistical evidence regarding the alleged disparate impact of the law on African Americans. Where plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of overcoming the presumptive validity of section 13-1, the trial court should have entered judgment for defendants on this claim. Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore , 384 N.C. 194 (2023) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Right to be present at criminal trial—waiver—voluntariness of absence—suicide attempt—competency—The trial court's decision to proceed with a criminal trial in defendant's absence, without conducting further inquiry into defendant's capacity to proceed with the trial after defendant made an apparent suicide attempt partway through the trial by jumping off a balcony at the county jail, did not violate defendant's statutory protections with regard to competency to stand trial (pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1002 and 15A-1443) or his constitutional due process rights. Based on evidence taken by the trial court regarding the incident and defendant's mental health as well as arguments from defense counsel and the State, there was not substantial evidence that defendant may have lacked competency at the time of his apparent suicide attempt. The trial court's determination that defendant's absence from trial was voluntary because he committed an intentional act was supported by the court's prior colloquies with defendant (during which defendant waived his right to testify or to present evidence on his own behalf), the court's own direct observation of defendant's demeanor, and the court's review of evidence–including surveillance footage–of defendant's actions and demeanor at the time he jumped. State v. Flow , 384 N.C. 528 (2023) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Separation settlement agreement—terms—naming of insurance policy beneficiaries—no ambiguity—In a declaratory judgment action regarding a separation settlement agreement–the terms of which defendant interpreted as requiring the proceeds from his deceased ex-wife's life insurance policy to be paid to him and not to her trust (which had been established for the benefit of their four children)–the Court of Appeals erred when it determined that the settlement agreement's terms regarding the ex-wife's ability to change the beneficiary of her life insurance policies were ambiguous. The agreement's plain language was clear and unambiguous; therefore, the trial court properly awarded summary judgment in favor of the trust. Galloway v. Snell , 384 N.C. 285 (2023) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Bodies of water—permits to third parties—scope of authority—plain and unambiguous language—Based on the plain and unambiguous language of an easement purchased decades ago by Duke Power Company (Duke) in order to create Lake Norman (by constructing a dam and flooding the land), including language granting Duke "absolute water rights" and the right to "treat [the land] in any manner deemed necessary or desirable by Duke Power Company," Duke acted within the scope of its broad authority and discretion when it granted permits to third-party homeowners to build lake access structures and to use the lake for recreational purposes. Further, the easement's language was consistent with Duke's federal licensing obligations regarding the lake and the authority granted to Duke was confirmed by the parties' practice over many years in seeking permission from Duke to build shoreline structures over and into the submerged property. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Kiser , 384 N.C. 275 (2023) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Legislative redistricting—claims of partisan gerrymandering—equal protection clause—not applicable—Plaintiffs' claims that partisan gerrymandering will diminish the electoral power of members of a particular political party did not implicate the equal protection clause in the state constitution's Declaration of Rights (Article I, Section 19). Partisan gerrymandering has no impact upon the right to vote on equal terms under the one-person, one-vote standard; therefore, partisan gerrymandering claims do not trigger review under the state's equal protection clause. Harper v. Hall , 384 N.C. 292 (2023) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Legislative redistricting—claims of partisan gerrymandering—free elections clause—not applicable—The free elections clause in the state constitution's Declaration of Rights–"All elections shall be free." (Article I, Section 10)–does not limit or prohibit partisan gerrymandering, or even address redistricting at all. Based on its plain meaning, its historical context, and our Supreme Court's precedent, the free elections clause means that voters are free to vote according to their consciences without interference or intimidation. Harper v. Hall , 384 N.C. 292 (2023) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Legislative redistricting—claims of partisan gerrymandering—free speech and freedom of assembly clauses—not applicable—The free speech and freedom of assembly clauses in the state constitution's Declaration of Rights (Article I, Sections 12 and 14) do not limit the General Assembly's presumptively constitutional authority to engage in partisan gerrymandering. Nothing in the history of the clauses or the applicable case law supported plaintiffs' expanded interpretation of them. Harper v. Hall , 384 N.C. 292 (2023) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Legislative redistricting—claims of partisan gerrymandering—petition for rehearing—previous opinions overruled and withdrawn—It was proper for the Supreme Court to allow the legislative defendants' petition for rehearing pursuant to Appellate Procedure Rule 31 to revisit the issue of whether claims of partisan gerrymandering are justiciable under the state constitution, where the four-justice majority in Harper v. Hall (Harper I), 380 N.C. 317 (2022), expedited the consideration of the matter over the strong dissent of the other three justices, with no jurisprudential reason for doing so, and where Harper I and the same four-justice majority's opinion in Harper v. Hall (Harper II), 383 N.C. 89 (2022), were wrongly decided. Furthermore, Harper I did not meet any criteria for adhering to stare decisis. Upon rehearing, Harper I was overruled, and Harper II was withdrawn. Harper v. Hall , 384 N.C. 292 (2023) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Legislative redistricting—claims of partisan gerrymandering—political questions—nonjusticiable—Claims of partisan gerrymandering present political questions and therefore are nonjusticiable under the state constitution. Plaintiffs' claims of partisan gerrymandering were nonjusticiable political questions because: The state constitution explicitly and exclusively commits redistricting authority to the General Assembly subject only to express limitations, leaving only a limited role for judicial review; the state constitution provides no judicially discernible or manageable standards for determining how much partisan gerrymandering is too much; and any attempt to adjudicate claims regarding partisan gerrymandering would require the judiciary to make numerous policy determinations for which the state constitution provides no guidance. Each factor on its own would be sufficient to render the claims nonjusticiable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court overruled Harper v. Hall (Harper I), 380 N.C. 317 (2022), withdrew Harper v. Hall (Harper II), 383 N.C. 89 (2022), and dismissed plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. Harper v. Hall , 384 N.C. 292 (2023) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Legislative redistricting—claims of partisan gerrymandering—prior opinions overruled and withdrawn—racially polarized voting analysis—In a redistricting case, the Supreme Court overruled a prior opinion issued by a four-justice majority in Harper v. Hall (Harper I), 380 N.C. 317 (2022), and withdrew the same majority's subsequent opinion in Harper v. Hall (Harper II), 383 N.C. 89 (2022). The Court also specifically overruled the holding from Harper I that required the General Assembly to perform a racially polarized voting (RPV) analysis before drawing any legislative districts. Harper v. Hall , 384 N.C. 292 (2023) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Legislative redistricting—claims of partisan gerrymandering—prior opinions overruled and withdrawn—remedy—Upon rehearing a redistricting case and concluding that plaintiffs' claims of partisan gerrymandering were nonjusticiable–thus overruling and withdrawing prior opinions in the matter–the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate remedy. The Court granted the legislative defendants the opportunity to enact a new set of legislative and congressional redistricting plans, guided by federal law, the objective constraints in the state constitution located in Sections 3 and 5 of Article II, and this opinion. Neither the original redistricting plans nor the remedial plans, which were created during the course of the litigation and used in the 2022 election cycle, were "established" within the meaning of Article II, Sections 3(4) and 5(4), because both plans were a product of a misapprehension of North Carolina law, and the original plans were never used in an election. Harper v. Hall , 384 N.C. 292 (2023) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Legislative redistricting—standard of review—presumption of constitutionality—political question doctrine—Legislation passed by the General Assembly, which serves as the "agent of the people for enacting laws," is presumed constitutional, and the judiciary may declare an act of the General Assembly in violation of the state constitution only when the act directly conflicts with an express provision of the constitution. Therefore, when considering the constitutionality of redistricting plans drawn by the General Assembly, the judiciary must presume the plans' constitutionality and ask whether the plans violate an express provision of the constitution beyond a reasonable doubt. When the judiciary cannot locate an express textual limitation on the legislature, the issue may present a political question that is inappropriate for resolution by the judiciary. To respect the separation of powers, courts must refrain from adjudicating a claim where there is: a textually demonstrable commitment of the matter to another branch of government, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, or the impossibility of deciding the case without making a policy determination of a kind clearly suited for nonjudicial discretion. Harper v. Hall , 384 N.C. 292 (2023) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Standing—facial constitutional challenge—felon voting rights statute—direct injury—redressability—In a declaratory action challenging the facial constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 13-1 (regarding felon voting rights), the six individual plaintiffs–convicted felons who were unable to vote while on felony supervision–had standing to bring their action because they sufficiently alleged a direct injury and the redressability of the alleged violations if they were to prevail. Only one of the four nonprofit organization plaintiffs (N.C. NAACP), however, had standing to sue on behalf of its members, where the complaint alleged that some of its members were ineligible for re-enfranchisement under the law and that the interest of those members in regaining the franchise was tied to the organization's mission, and where the organization could obtain relief for those members without their participation in the lawsuit. The remaining three nonprofit organization plaintiffs did not allege that they had members who were directly injured by the statute but instead referenced vague harms such as the need to divert resources to educate members about how the law might affect their voting rights. Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore , 384 N.C. 194 (2023) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Amendment of juvenile petition—additional allegations—harmless error—In a termination of parental rights proceeding, where the trial court properly terminated a mother's rights to her daughter on the ground of willful failure to make reasonable progress, any error by the trial court in allowing the department of social services to amend the juvenile petition during the termination hearing in order to add allegations in support of a different ground (that the parent's rights to another child had been involuntarily terminated and the parent lacked the ability or willingness to establish a safe home) was harmless. In re H.B. , 384 N.C. 484 (2023) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Best interests of the child—statutory factors—bond between mother and child—The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the disposition phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding by concluding that termination of a mother's parental rights to her daughter was in the daughter's best interests. The court's findings reflected its consideration of the relevant statutory factors contained in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), including its finding that there was no bond between the mother and her daughter, and the findings were supported by competent evidence. Any discrepancies in the evidence were within the trial court's province to resolve based on its assessment of the credibility and weight to be given to the evidence. In re H.B. , 384 N.C. 484 (2023) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Findings of fact—reference to timeline report—independent determination of credibility and reliability—The trial court's order terminating respondent mother's rights to her daughter based on willful failure to make reasonable progress was supported by sufficient findings of fact, including the court's finding that it relied on and accepted into evidence a timeline that was introduced by the department of social services without objection, which was signed and notarized by a social worker and which summarized the department's interactions with respondent. The finding was more than a mere recitation of the evidence and constituted a proper evidentiary finding reflecting the court's independent evaluation of the evidence where the court stated specifically that it determined the timeline to be "both credible and reliable." In re H.B. , 384 N.C. 484 (2023) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Grounds for termination—neglect—willful abandonment—sufficiency of evidence—In a private termination of parental rights action, the trial court's determination that grounds were not established to terminate respondent father's parental rights to his daughter based on neglect or willful abandonment (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (7)) was affirmed where there was no record evidence demonstrating that respondent had previously neglected the child, that there was a likelihood of future neglect if she were to be placed in his care, or that respondent showed an intention to give up all parental rights to her, particularly where there was evidence that petitioner mother actively prevented respondent from forming a relationship with the child. In re S.R. , 384 N.C. 516 (2023) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—willful failure to pay child support—sufficiency of findings—correct standard of review—In a private termination of parental rights action, the trial court's determination that grounds were not established to terminate respondent father's parental rights to his daughter based on willful failure to pay child support (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4)) was affirmed where the trial court made no findings that an order existed requiring respondent to pay support–despite evidence that respondent had paid support but that his payments stopped after petitioner mother elected to stop garnishment of his wages through centralized collections–or that respondent's failure to provide support was willful. The correct standard of review at the adjudication stage is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and whether the findings support the conclusions of law; to the extent the Court of Appeals' opinion affirming the trial court's decision could be read to instead apply the abuse of discretion standard, that portion of its opinion was modified. In re S.R. , 384 N.C. 516 (2023) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Parental right to counsel—failure of respondent to appear—dismissal of provisional counsel—statutory requirements met—The trial court acted in accordance with N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1108.1(a)(1) and 7B-1101.1(a)(1) in a termination of parental rights matter when it dismissed respondent mother's provisional counsel after respondent failed to appear at a pretrial hearing. Respondent did not challenge the court's determination that all service and notice requirements had been met and did not argue that she lacked notice of the hearing in her arguments to the Court of Appeals, which erred by addressing the notice issue without first being presented with that issue. In re R.A.F. , 384 N.C. 505 (2023) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)