Multiple charges—distinct interruption—beating—The State presented sufficient evidence that defendant committed two assaults where defendant beat his girlfriend in a trailer and then beat her in her car. The distinct interruption between the assault in the trailer and the assault in the car–when defendant ordered the victim to clean the bloody bed and help pack the car–allowed the reasonable conclusion that there were two distinct assaults. However, one of defendant's three assault convictions was vacated because there was insufficient evidence of two distinct assaults occurring in the trailer, where the beating in the trailer was one continuous assault, and different injuries or different methods of attack alone are insufficient evidence of multiple assaults. State v. Dew , 379 N.C. 64 (2021) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Sanctions—notice and opportunity to be heard—evidentiary support—receivership—The trial court's order denying a court-appointed receiver's request for authorization to pay an attorney's fees for work done for the receivership, when construed as an order imposing sanctions against the attorney for failure to obey a previous order dictating how invoices should be submitted to the court, was legally deficient where the trial court failed to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to the attorney being sanctioned, and where the order's finding that the attorney had disobeyed the prior order was unsupported by the evidence. Bandy v. A Perfect Fit For You, Inc. , 379 N.C. 1 (2021) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Jury instructions—self-defense—request for modification—prejudice analysis—Even assuming the trial court erred by declining to give defendant's requested modified self-defense instruction in his trial for murder–that defendant must have believed it necessary "to use deadly force" against the victim, rather than "to kill" the victim–defendant failed to show that the alleged error was prejudicial. Under either instruction, the jury would have needed to find that defendant's belief was reasonable and that he did not use excessive force when he stabbed the victim, and uncontradicted evidence strongly suggested that defendant's use of deadly force was excessive and not reasonable. State v. Leaks , 379 N.C. 57 (2021) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Objection to class certification—after summary judgment granted—waived —In an action filed against a town (defendant), where defendant consented to and joined in plaintiff's motion for continuance, which indicated that the parties had agreed to file cross-motions for summary judgment first and then address class certification if the matter was not resolved during the summary judgment stage, defendant waived any objection it may have had to the trial court granting plaintiff's motion for class certification after it had granted plaintiff's summary judgment motion. Plantation Bldg. of Wilmington, Inc. v. Town of Leland , 379 N.C. 55 (2021) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Attorney fees—authorization—denial—impermissible basis—The trial court abused its discretion in denying a court-appointed receiver's request for authorization to pay an attorney's fees for work performed for the receivership, where the sole basis of the denial was the receiver's and the attorney's failure to obey the trial court's prior order concerning how invoices should be submitted to the court. Bandy v. A Perfect Fit For You, Inc. , 379 N.C. 1 (2021) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Attorney fees—authorization—denial—sufficiency of findings—After the trial court denied a court-appointed receiver's request for authorization to pay outside counsel for certain work performed on behalf of the receivership, the trial court erred by denying the receiver's requests for authorization to pay outside counsel for work performed in prosecuting the appeal of that order, where the trial court's denial was based solely on the finding that the fees incurred for the appeal would diminish the receivership's assets. Bandy v. A Perfect Fit For You, Inc. , 379 N.C. 1 (2021) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Lifetime—reasonableness—imposition after lengthy term of imprisonment—aggravated offenders—The imposition of lifetime satellite-based monitoring (SBM) on defendant upon the completion of his sentence for kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and rape (for which he received an active sentence of thirty to forty-three years) did not violate defendant's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches, where the legitimate and compelling governmental interest in preventing and prosecuting future crimes of sex offenders outweighed the narrowly tailored intrusion into defendant's expectation of privacy. State v. Strudwick , 379 N.C. 94 (2021) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Lifetime—reasonableness—imposition after lengthy term of imprisonment—current factors—safeguards—The imposition of lifetime satellite-based monitoring (SBM) on defendant after he pled guilty to kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and rape, for which defendant received an active sentence of thirty to forty-three years, was constitutionally permissible despite the lengthy passage of time before SBM could be effectuated, because the reasonableness determination was appropriately based on factors as they existed at the time of the SBM hearing. If at some point in the future the imposition of lifetime SBM were to become unreasonable, statutory avenues of relief provided sufficient safeguards of defendant's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. State v. Strudwick , 379 N.C. 94 (2021) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Prior record level calculation—parallel offense from another state—comparison of elements—substantially similar—For purposes of calculating defendant's prior record level calculation (after he was convicted of sexual offense with a child by an adult), defendant's conviction of statutory rape in Georgia was properly deemed to be equivalent to a North Carolina Class B1 felony where the statutory rape statutes in both states were substantially similar, despite variations in the age of the victim and the age differential between the perpetrator and victim. In applying the "comparison of the elements" test to determine whether an out-of-state criminal statute is substantially similar to a North Carolina criminal statute (pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.14(e)), there is no requirement that the statutes use identical language or that all conduct prohibited by one statute must also be prohibited by the other. State v. Graham , 379 N.C. 75 (2021) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—no findings—In a private termination of parental rights action, the trial court's decision to terminate a mother's parental rights to her son on the ground of neglect (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)) was not supported by any findings regarding the likelihood of repetition of neglect if the son were returned to his mother's care. The termination order was reversed and the matter remanded for further factual findings. In re B.R.L. , 379 N.C. 15 (2021) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—willful abandonment—visitation requests by parent—In a private termination of parental rights action, the trial court's findings of fact did not support its conclusion that a mother willfully abandoned her son pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7), where the mother's actions–by requesting visits with her son multiple times, visiting with him twice, and filing a pro se motion for review seeking increased visitation–did not demonstrate an intent to forego all parental claims to her son. In re B.R.L. , 379 N.C. 15 (2021) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Ineffective assistance of counsel—failure to show prejudice—On appeal from an order terminating a mother's parental rights, the mother's ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacked merit because, even assuming her counsel's performance was deficient (where counsel may have failed to ensure the mother received notice of the date and time of the termination hearing, and where counsel did not cross-examine the department of social services' witnesses, offer any witnesses on the mother's behalf, or offer a closing argument at the termination hearing), the mother failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced as a result. The mother neither challenged the trial court's findings and conclusions of law in the termination order nor argued on appeal that, but for counsel's deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability of a different result. In re Z.M.T. , 379 N.C. 44 (2021) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Motion in the cause—verification requirement—N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104—subject matter jurisdiction—The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate a father's parental rights to his son based on an unverified motion in the cause, which was filed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1102 after the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, because the requirement in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 that a petition or motion to terminate parental rights "shall be verified" was jurisdictional in nature–a result compelled by In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588 (2006), which interpreted the same language in N.C.G.S. § 7B-403(a) to be jurisdictional. Nothing in section 7B-1104 distinguished between a petition and a motion in the cause, the statutory requirements served important constitutional interests, and a trial court could not derive its jurisdiction in a termination matter from a prior abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding. In re O.E.M. , 379 N.C. 27 (2021) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)