Eighth Amendment—juvenile offender—life imprisonment without parole—separate review of state constitutional claim not required—The decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without parole–for two first-degree murders committed when defendant was seventeen years old–was affirmed where, contrary to defendant's assertion, the appellate court properly analyzed each of defendant's challenges to his sentences under federal and state constitutional provisions. Even so, since the sentences did not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides greater protections for juvenile offenders than Art. I, sec. 27 of the North Carolina Constitution, and since the Eighth Amendment and section 27 have been interpreted in lockstep, a separate review of defendant's state constitutional claim was unnecessary. Further, defendant's sentences did not implicate–and thus were not in violation of–State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), because he was not a member of the narrow class of juvenile offenders to which that case applied. State v. Tirado , No. 267PA21 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

North Carolina—separation of powers—child sexual abuse claims—dismissed in prior final judgments—not revived by legislation—In a pair of consolidated cases involving claims of child sexual abuse by Catholic priests, which plaintiffs originally raised over a decade earlier and which were dismissed with prejudice because they were time-barred, plaintiffs' new lawsuits were properly dismissed on the ground that their claims were now barred by principles of res judicata. Although plaintiffs had filed their new suits after the General Assembly had passed the SAFE Child Act, which revived previously time-barred claims of child sexual abuse by extending the applicable statute of limitations, the Act did not override the earlier final judgments dismissing plaintiffs' claims. Under the North Carolina Constitution and separation of powers principles, the judicial power–which includes the powers to enter and set aside judgments–belongs to the judicial branch alone; therefore, an act of the legislative branch cannot set aside a final judgment entered by the judicial branch. Doe 1K v. Roman Cath. Diocese , No. 167PA22 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

North Carolina—tort claims—child sexual abuse—retroactive alteration of expired statutes of limitations—no vested right—In considering a facial challenge to a provision of the SAFE Child Act allowing victims of child sexual abuse to file otherwise time-barred tort claims during a specified two-year period, the Supreme Court construed the Law of the Land and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the North Carolina Constitution to affirm, as modified, the Court of Appeals' lead decision holding that an action–brought against a county board of education (defendant) by three men (plaintiffs) who, as minors, were sexually abused by their high school wrestling coach–did not implicate any constitutionally protected vested right. The statute of limitations applicable to plaintiffs' tort claims fell outside the scope of the vested right doctrine because it affected procedural remedies–rather than property of the sort protected by the Law of the Land Clause–and, having been created by legislation, could be altered by legislation. Further, the text and history of the Ex Post Facto Clause–along with pertinent caselaw–revealed that retroactive civil laws which do not impose taxes are constitutionally permissible. Finally, the Court noted that the lower appellate court's tiered substantive due process framework analysis was immaterial to defendant's argument, and thus, unnecessary. McKinney v. Goins , No. 109PA22-2 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Limited liability companies—grounds for judicial dissolution—managerial deadlock—continued operations not practicable—factors adopted—In a case involving two family-owned limited liability companies (LLCs), which together owned 68 acres of undeveloped land (the Property), the North Carolina Business Court did not abuse its discretion by judicially dissolving the LLCs pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 57D-6-02(2)(i) where undisputed evidence showed that, because the only two managers of the LLCs were at a complete impasse regarding operating decisions–resulting in no development or active use of the Property for its intended purpose for several years, even though there was some continued financial feasibility of the LLCs–and the LLCs' Operating Agreements did not provide a mechanism for breaking the deadlock, it was "not practicable" for the LLCs to continue operating. The Supreme Court defined the statutory term "not practicable" as "unfeasible" rather than "impossible," and adopted a six-factor balancing test for determining whether it was not practicable for an LLC to continue in accord with its operating agreement. James H.Q. Davis Tr. v. JHD Props., LLC , No. 32PA24 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Cell phone records—strictly computer-generated data—neither hearsay nor testimonial—Confrontation Clause—inapplicable—In a prosecution for multiple sexual offenses against a minor, the trial court did not violate the Confrontation Clause or the rule against hearsay by admitting defendant's cell phone records along with a derivative record showing communications between his and the victim's phones. First, the records consisted of strictly computer-generated data, created without any human judgment or input; therefore, they did not constitute hearsay, which necessarily refers to statements made by a human "declarant" capable of making assertions. Second, even though law enforcement later accessed the records with the primary purpose of producing evidence for defendant's trial, the computer systems that generated the cell phone data as part of the phone company's day-to-day operations could not have created the records for that same primary purpose, especially since machines, by their nature, cannot act with intent at all; therefore, the records were not testimonial either. State v. Lester , No. 293PA23-2 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Tort claims—child sexual abuse—retroactive alteration of expired statutes of limitations—applicable to enablers of abuse—The Supreme Court, having held in a companion case (McKinney v. Goins) that the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act–allowing victims of child sexual abuse to file otherwise time-barred tort claims during a specified two-year period–was facially constitutional, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals that the provision resuscitated claims against parties who allegedly enabled abuse, as well as direct abusers. Given that North Carolina has not recognized a distinct child sexual abuse tort, instead permitting victims to sue for common law torts–such as those grounded in negligence, the statute of limitations for which is found in N.C.G.S. § 1-52–the provision's plain text ("reviv[ing] any civil action for child sexual abuse otherwise time-barred under G.S. 1-52") applied to negligence-based causes of action brought against a Roman Catholic order and diocese (together, defendants) by a man who alleged he suffered sexual abuse as a child by a clergyman employed and supervised by defendants. The revival provision's use of the phrase "for child abuse" identified only the category of tort addressed and did not restrict the theory of tort liability a plaintiff could pursue. Cohane v. Home Missioners of Am. , No. 278A23 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)