Accessory after the fact—sexual abuse of child—not reported—The trial court erred by not dismissing the charge of being an accessory after the fact where defendant mother did not report the sexual abuse of her daughter by her adopted father. The superseding indictment alleged only that defendant became an accessory after the fact by not reporting a specific incident on or about a specific date, and the mere failure to give information about a crime is not sufficient to establish the crime of accessory after the fact. State v. Ditenhafer, 373 N.C. 116 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Case relied upon by Court of Appeals—inapposite—In its decision limiting the trial court's jurisdiction to enforce its own order under N.C. Rule of Civil Procedure 70, the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on an inapposite case from the N.C. Supreme Court–a case that involved the law of the case doctrine rather than a motion to enforce a court order. Pachas v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 372 N.C. 12 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Claims dismissed—claims based on same conduct dismissed—Where the N.C. Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' antitrust claims, the Court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' unfair trade practices claims that were based on the same conduct. Sykes v. Health Network Sols., Inc., 372 N.C. 326 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Claims dismissed—related Chapter 75 claims also dismissed—Where the N.C. Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' antitrust and unfair trade practices claims, the Court also affirmed the denial of declaratory relief to the extent that claim related to those Chapter 75 claims. Sykes v. Health Network Sols., Inc., 372 N.C. 326 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Criminal record expunction—appeal by State—not provided in statute—Where petitioner was granted an expunction of records from a prior criminal conviction and from previously dismissed charges pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-145.5 and 15A-146, the State did not have a right to appeal the order granting expunction. Neither N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5 nor 15A-1445 provided the State a right to appeal. State v. J.C., 372 N.C. 203 (2019) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Equally divided vote of Supreme Court—no precedential value—The N.C. Supreme Court, by an equally divided vote, affirmed the Business Court's dismissal of plaintiff's antitrust claims in a case arising from insurer conduct affecting chiropractic services. The Business Court's opinion as to those claims accordingly stood without precedential value. Sykes v. Health Network Sols., Inc., 372 N.C. 326 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Evenly divided Supreme Court—Court of Appeals opinion stands without precedential value—A Court of Appeals decision that the State did not present sufficient evidence of possession of cocaine stood without precedential authority where the vote of the Supreme Court was evenly divided. State v. Royster, 373 N.C. 157 (2019) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Jury verdict—invited error—The Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument that the jury's verdict finding him liable for securities fraud was contrary to law. Defendant requested the jury instruction of which he complained on appeal. Piazza v. Kirkbride, 372 N.C. 137 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Objection below—constitutional issue—Rule 2—Defendant did not preserve for appeal the question of whether the search imposed by satellite-based monitoring was reasonable where defendant's objection below questioned the sufficiency of the evidence and did not clearly raise the constitutional issue. However, the State conceded that the trial court committed an error relating to a substantial right and the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion by invoking Appellate Rule 2. State v. Bursell, 372 N.C. 196 (2019) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Preservation of issues—failure to raise issue at trial—-no automatic preservation—An alleged violation of N.C.G.S. § 122C-266(a), concerning examination of an involuntarily committed patient by a physician, was not preserved for appellate review where respondent did not raise it during the district court hearing on her involuntary commitment. There was not automatic preservation of the issue because the statute did not require a specific act by a trial judge and did not place any responsibility on a presiding judge. In re E.D., 372 N.C. 111 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Preservation of issues—sufficiency of evidence—differing theories at trial and on appeal—The defendant in a cocaine trafficking prosecution preserved for appeal the issue of the sufficiency of evidence of possession where a black box that was later determined to contain cocaine was the basis of the charge. Defendant argued at trial that there was insufficient evidence both that he knew cocaine was in the box and that there was cocaine in the box at the time the box was in his possession. State v. Royster, 373 N.C. 157 (2019) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Driving while impaired—probable cause for arrest—de novo review—The unchallenged evidence found by the district and superior courts was sufficient as a matter of law to support defendant's arrest for impaired driving. Defendant admitted that he had consumed three beers before driving; there was a moderate odor of alcohol about him; his eyes were red and glassy; and defendant passed but performed imperfectly on the field sobriety tests. Whether an officer had probable cause to arrest a defendant for impaired driving contains a factual component, and the proper resolution of the issue requires the application of legal principles and constitutes a conclusion of law subject to de novo review. State v. Parisi, 372 N.C. 639 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Demarcation—ambiguity—intent of parties—factual question for jury—Where conveyances of adjoining lots referenced only lot numbers and a recorded map and not metes and bounds descriptions, the map's ambiguity regarding where the boundary existed between the lots presented a question of fact about the grantor's intention that must be decided by a jury. Daughtridge v. Tanager Land, LLC, 373 N.C. 182 (2019) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Previous cases of neglect—present risk to child—The Court of Appeals correctly determined that clear and convincing evidence and the trial court's findings of fact supported its conclusion that infant juvenile J.A.M. was neglected pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15). While a previous closed case involving neglect of other children cannot, standing alone, support an adjudication of neglect, the trial court here found other factors indicating a present risk to J.A.M. The Supreme Court also noted the trial court's statement that respondent-mother's "testimony was telling today," emphasizing the trial court's unique position in observing witness testimony first-hand and make credibility determinations. In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Breach of contract claim—previous order—not raised in pleadings—The trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim based upon its conclusion that the claim was barred by a previous order under the doctrine of res judicata. The previous order was not a final judgment on the merits of plaintiff's breach of contract claim because that claim is a separate cause of action which plaintiff's pleadings did not raise in those proceedings. Intersal, Inc. v. Hamilton, 373 N.C. 89 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Two class actions on appeal—same claims and theories—relitigation of issues barred by outcome of the other appeal—Where plaintiff chiropractors filed two separate putative class actions against two different sets of defendants for claims arising from insurer conduct affecting chiropractic services, plaintiffs were barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating the issues in one of the two cases because the N.C. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court in the other case, Sykes v. Health Network Solutions, Inc., 372 N.C. 326 (2019), and both cases presented essentially the same claims and relied on the same theories. Sykes v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 372 N.C. 318 (2019) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Confrontation Clause—cross-examination of State's principal witness—plea negotiations for pending charges—potential bias—The trial court violated the Confrontation Clause in a murder trial by significantly limiting defendant's cross-examination of the State's principal witness concerning plea negotiations for pending charges against her and her possible bias for the State. Because this witness was crucial to the State's case–she was the only witness to provide direct evidence of defendant's presence at the crime scene, and no physical evidence linked defendant to the crime–the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bowman, 372 N.C. 439 (2019) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Double jeopardy—hung journey—dismissal by State—Defendant's second prosecution for second-degree murder violated his Double Jeopardy rights where a first trial ended in a hung jury, the State took a voluntary dismissal, and defendant was retried and convicted after new DNA evidence emerged. Jeopardy continued after the mistrial, and the State could have retried defendant again without violating his double jeopardy rights; however, the State made a binding decision not to retry the case when it made the unilateral choice to enter a final dismissal. That decision was tantamount to an acquittal. State v. Courtney, 372 N.C. 458 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Surrender of Fifth Amendment right to assert Sixth Amendment right—admission to affidavit of indigency to prove defendant's age—element of charges—In defendant's trial for abduction of a child and statutory rape charges, the trial court erred by allowing defendant's affidavit of indigency to be admitted to prove his age, which was an element of the charges. The trial court's decision impermissibly required defendant to surrender one constitutional right–his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination–to assert another–his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel as an indigent defendant. State v. Diaz, 372 N.C. 493 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Breach—common law—subject matter jurisdiction—exhaustion of administrative remedies—Where plaintiff marine research company sued the N.C. Department of Natural and Cultural Resources (DNCR) for breach of contract by violating plaintiff's media rights connected to the recovery of the pirate Blackbeard's flagship, the trial court erred by dismissing the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff's claim was a common law breach of contract claim, and defendants failed to demonstrate that plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim in superior court. Intersal, Inc. v. Hamilton, 373 N.C. 89 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Novation—effect on earlier contract—plain wording—By its plain wording, a 2013 settlement agreement was a novation of a 1998 agreement regarding eighteenth-century ships uncovered off the coast of North Carolina, and plaintiff's breach of contract claims arising from the 1998 agreement were extinguished. Intersal, Inc. v. Hamilton, 373 N.C. 89 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Tortious interference—elements—intentional inducement—The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff marine research company's tortious interference with contract claim against defendant nonprofit under plaintiff's contracts with the N.C. Department of Natural and Cultural Resources (DNCR) concerning media rights connected to the recovery of the pirate Blackbeard's flagship. Plaintiff failed to allege that defendant nonprofit intentionally induced DNCR not to perform on its contract with plaintiff. Intersal, Inc. v. Hamilton, 373 N.C. 89 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Prosecutor's arguments—clarifying issues of mental state—permissible hyperbole—The trial court did not err by declining to intervene ex mero motu during the State's closing argument in defendant's trial for attempted first-degree murder. The challenged statements served to clarify issues regarding defendant's mental state and also contained permissible hyperbole. State v. Tart, 372 N.C. 73 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Self-defense—aggressor instruction—There was no plain error in a trial court giving an aggressor instruction in a domestic second-degree murder prosecution in which defendant claimed self-defense. Defendant's claim rested on his otherwise unsupported testimony and the record contained ample justification for questioning the credibility of defendant's account of events. State v. Mumma, 372 N.C. 226 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Sufficiency of evidence—all evidence considered—clarification of prior case law—The Supreme Court clarified that its opinion in State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 133 (2010), involved the issue of admissibility rather than sufficiency of evidence. When considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, it does not matter whether any (even all) of the record evidence should not have been admitted. In other words, all of the evidence–regardless of its admissibility–must be considered when determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction. In addition, the Supreme Court disapproved of the portion of the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion adopted by the Supreme Court in State v. Llamas-Hernandez, 363 N.C. 8 (2009), that suggested that the lack of expert testimony identifying the substance in this case as heroin means that the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. State v. Osborne, 372 N.C. 619 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Equitable distribution—distributive award—separate property—The trial court erred in an equitable distribution action by making a distributive award of separate property to pay a marital debt where the trial court noted that both parties were in their seventies and might not be able to pay their debts before their deaths. While N.C.G.S. § 50-20(e) neither explicitly allowed or excluded the use of separate property to satisfy a distributive award, the rest of the equitable distribution statute allowed for the distribution only of marital and divisible property. It would be inconsistent to read into this section the authority to use separate property to satisfy a distributive award. Crowell v. Crowell, 372 N.C. 362 (2019) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Sufficiency of evidence—possession of heroin—all admitted evidence considered—The trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to dismiss a charge of possession of heroin for insufficiency of the evidence where the evidence admitted at trial showed that defendant told an investigating officer that she had ingested heroin, that several investigating officers identified the substance seized in defendant's hotel room as heroin, and that the substance field-tested positive for heroin twice. This and all other record evidence, when considered in its entirety and without regard to the admissibility of any evidence, was sufficient to show that the substance at issue was heroin. State v. Osborne, 372 N.C. 619 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Erroneously admitted in violation of defendant's constitutional rights—proof of age at trial—victim's opinion testimony—The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the trial court's erroneous admission of defendant's affidavit of indigency to prove his age in his trial for abduction of a child and statutory rape was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and granting defendant a new trial. The State was not required to prove defendant's exact date of birth; the victim's opinion testimony was competent as to the issue of defendant's age; and other evidence admitted at trial–the testimony of the victim (who had attended high school with defendant and had engaged in an intimate relationship with him for several months) that defendant was born in November 1995–left no reasonable possibility that the jury would have unduly relied on defendant's affidavit of indigency to convict him. State v. Diaz, 372 N.C. 493 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Photographs—reviewed in jury room—no prejudicial error—While the trial court erred in a domestic second-degree murder prosecution by allowing the jury to examine in the jury room without defendant's consent 179 photographs that had been admitted into evidence, that error was not prejudicial given the extensive evidence of defendant's guilt and the weakness of defendant's claim of self-defense when considered in conjunction with the other evidence in the record. The relevant inquiry was not the impact of the photographs on the jury, but whether viewing the photographs in the jury room adversely affected defendant's chances for a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Mumma, 372 N.C. 226 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Self-defense instructions—not supported by evidence—The trial court did not err by declining defendant's request to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense or imperfect self-defense in his trial for murder. The evidence failed to establish that defendant was being attacked by the victim such that he feared great bodily harm or death, or that he stabbed the victim to protect himself from such harm. State v. Harvey, 372 N.C. 304 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Impermissibly suggestive identification procedures—photographs and video of defendant—likelihood of misidentification—independent origin—The State employed impermissibly suggestive identification procedures with two murder eyewitnesses by showing them photographs and a police interview video of defendant just days before defendant's murder trial. But one of those witnesses had identified defendant as the shooter long before the impermissible identification procedures, so those procedures did not create the risk of misidentification, and that witness's in-court identification of defendant was properly admitted and did not violate defendant's due process rights. State v. Malone, 373 N.C. 134 (2019) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Attempted first-degree murder—kill and murder—malice aforethought—A short-form indictment was sufficient to charge defendant with attempted first-degree murder even though it replaced the statutory language "kill and murder" with "kill and slay." The "malice aforethought" language provided certainty of the offense charged. State v. Tart, 372 N.C. 73 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Bill of indictment—identity of child victim—name required—A bill of indictment alleging that defendant committed a sex offense against "Victim #1" was fatally defective on its face for failing to state the child victim's name as required by N.C.G.S. § 15-144.2(b). State v. Corey, 373 N.C. 225 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Manufacture of marijuana—intent to distribute—The indictment charging defendant with manufacture of marijuana was sufficient where it alleged that defendant manufactured marijuana by "producing, preparing, propagating and processing" but did not allege that defendant acted with an intent to distribute. While one of the alleged means of manufacture required a showing of intent to distribute, the other three did not. State v. Lofton, 372 N.C. 216 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Superseding indictment—identify of child victim—A superseding indictment charging defendant with a sexual offense against a seven-year old child did not sufficiently name the victim under N.C.G.S § 15-144.2(b) where it referred to her as "Victim # 1. To "name" someone is to identify them in a unique way that enables others to distinguish between the named person and all other people. State v. White, 372 N.C. 248 (2019) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Superseding indictment—identity of victim—reference to outside material—A superseding indictment did not sufficiently identify the victim in a prosecution for a sexual act against a child by an adult where the child was named only as Victim # 1 and could not be identified without looking outside the four corners of the indictment. A court may not look to extrinsic evidence to supplement a missing or deficient allegation in an indictment. State v. White, 372 N.C. 248 (2019) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Alleged failure to comply with provisions of Chapter 58—no private cause of action—In a case arising from insurer conduct affecting chiropractic services, the N.C. Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff chiropractors' claims for declaratory relief relating to defendants' alleged failure to comply with the state's insurance laws. Chapter 58 of the N.C. General Statutes did not provide a private cause of action for plaintiffs' claims. Sykes v. Health Network Sols., Inc., 372 N.C. 326 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Judicial conduct—violations—censure—Where a district court judge, without a contempt hearing, ordered a party into temporary custody and threatened her teenage children in order to achieve compliance with a visitation order, the Supreme Court ordered that the judge be censured for violation of Canons 1, 2A, 3A(3), and 3A(4) of the N.C. Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brought the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. In re Foster, 373 N.C. 29 (2019) (Author: Justice Per Curiam)

Trial court's authority to enforce its own order—new factual and legal issues—The trial court had jurisdiction under N.C. Rule of Civil Procedure 70 to find new facts and determine whether the N.C. Department of Health and Human Services had disobeyed the trial court's previous order to reinstate petitioner's Medicaid benefits. The Court of Appeals erred by holding that new factual and legal issues deprived the superior court of jurisdiction. Pachas v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 372 N.C. 12 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Delinquency—disorderly conduct—sufficiency of evidence—There was sufficient evidence to withstand a juvenile's motion to dismiss a charge of disorderly conduct where the State presented evidence tending to show that the juvenile threw a chair at his brother across a high school cafeteria where other students were present; the juvenile then ran out of the cafeteria; the juvenile cursed at the school resource officer, who handcuffed him; other students became involved and cursed at the officer; and the officer arrested another student during the confrontation. In re T.T.E., 372 N.C. 413 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Delinquency—petition—disorderly conduct—sufficient allegation—Where the delinquency petition charging a juvenile with disorderly conduct substantially tracked the language of the statute, N.C.G.S. § 14-288.4, the juvenile and his parents had sufficient notice of, and the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over, the charged offense. In re T.T.E., 372 N.C. 413 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Sufficiency of evidence—direct link between defendant and stolen property—opportunity alone—The State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict defendant of felony larceny where the evidence showed that while defendant had an opportunity to take audio equipment from a church which was left unlocked over a four-day time span, it did not establish a link between defendant and the stolen property or that defendant was in the church when the property was stolen. State v. Campbell, 373 N.C. 216 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Sufficiency of evidence—denial of access to child sexual abuse victim—There was sufficient evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, to support defendant mother's conviction for felonious obstruction of justice where she denied officers and social workers access to her child after the child alleged that she had been sexually assaulted by her adoptive father. State v. Ditenhafer, 373 N.C. 116 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Doctrine of recent possession—possession two weeks after items stolen—The evidence presented of defendant's possession of stolen goods was sufficient to support her convictions for felonious breaking and entering and felonious larceny under the doctrine of recent possession. Defendant acknowledged that she had control and possession of the stolen items, in the bed of her pickup truck, on a date two weeks after the items allegedly were stolen. State v. McDaniel, 372 N.C. 594 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Revocation—after expiration—no finding of good cause—The trial court erred by revoking defendant's probation without a finding that good cause for doing so existed. The trial court's judgment contained no findings referencing the existence of good cause, and the record was devoid of any indication that the trial court was aware that defendant's probationary term had expired when it entered its judgments. The case was remanded for a determination of good cause because the Supreme Court was unable to determine from the record that no evidence existed that would allow a determination of good cause. State v. Morgan, 372 N.C. 609 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Mandatory lifetime SBM monitoring—Fourth Amendment balancing test—bodily integrity and daily movements—North Carolina's satellite-based monitoring (SBM) program, N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40A(c) and 14-208.40B(c), was held unconstitutional as applied to individuals in defendant's category–those who were subject to mandatory lifetime SBM based solely on their statutorily defined status as a "recidivist" who also had completed their prison sentences and were no longer supervised by the State through probation, parole, or post-release supervision. Recidivists, as defined in the SBM statute, did not have a greatly diminished privacy interest in their bodily integrity or their daily movements; the SBM program constituted a substantial intrusion into those privacy interests; the State failed to demonstrate that the SBM program furthered its interest in solving crimes, preventing crimes, or protecting the public. State v. Grady, 372 N.C. 509 (2019) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Probable cause—warrant—probable cause—Probable cause for a warrant to search a vehicle did not exist where the officer had the necessary information but did not include it in the affidavit. Some of that information was contained in an unsworn attachment listing the property to be searched. State v. Lewis, 372 N.C. 576 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Thumb drive—multiple files—one opened—expectation of privacy in remaining files—A detective's search of a thumb drive was not authorized under the private-search doctrine in a prosecution for multiple counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. Defendant's girlfriend found an image of her granddaughter on defendant's thumb drive while looking for something else. She took the thumb drive to the sheriff's department, and a detective, while looking for the image the grandmother had reported, found other images that he believed might be child pornography. He then applied for a search warrant for the thumb drive and other property of defendant. The mere opening of a thumb drive and the viewing of one file does not automatically remove Fourth Amendment protections from the entirety of the contents. Digital storage devices organize information essentially by means of containers within containers. The detective here did not have a virtual certainty that nothing else of significance was in the thumb drive and that its contents would not tell him anything more that he had already been told. State v. Terrell, 372 N.C. 657 (2019) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Warrant—search of residence—probable cause—A search warrant did not establish probable cause to search a residence where it did not connect defendant with the residence and provided no basis for the magistrate to conclude that evidence of the robberies being investigated would likely be found inside the home. State v. Lewis, 372 N.C. 576 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Fraud—jury instruction—written request—The trial court did not err by rejecting defendant's request for a "safe harbor" jury instruction in his trial for securities fraud. Defendant failed to submit an adequate written request for the instruction. Piazza v. Kirkbride, 372 N.C. 137 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Fraud—jury verdicts—consistency—Where a jury found defendant liable for securities fraud, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury's verdicts were impermissibly inconsistent. The record contained sufficient justification to support the jury's conclusion that defendant, and not his co-defendant, made materially false and misleading statements to investors. Piazza v. Kirkbride, 372 N.C. 137 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Aggravating factor—taking advantage of position of trust and confidence—insufficient evidence—There was insufficient evidence to support the aggravating factor of taking advantage of a position of trust or confidence when sentencing defendant for engaging in a sex offense with a three-year-old child. Defendant was engaged in a relationship with the victim's mother; there was no relationship between defendant and the victim. Although the State relied on an acting in concert theory based on the victim's relationship of trust or confidence with her mother, the jury was not instructed on the theory. State v. Helms, 373 N.C. 41 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Jury instruction conference—aggravating factor—position of trust or confidence—The trial court erred by failing to conduct a jury instruction conference as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1231(b) prior to allowing the jury to determine whether the State proved the aggravating factor that defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence when he committed a sex offense against a child. Any prior case law indicating that a complete failure to conduct the necessary jury instruction conference necessitates a new proceeding without a showing of material prejudice was overruled. Material prejudice was not shown here where the jury made its determination that defendant violated a position of trust or confidence after being presented with undisputed evidence that defendant and the victim had a parent-child relationship. State v. Corey, 373 N.C. 225 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Best interest of the child—statutory factors—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it would be in a child's best interest for his mother's parental rights to be terminated. Even assuming that the findings of fact challenged by the mother were erroneous, any such error would not support a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion where the court properly considered the appropriate factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and found that the child was almost nine years old and termination of his mother's parental rights would aid in achieving the permanent plan of adoption. In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Best interests of child—evidence weighed—The trial court's decision in a termination of parental rights case was not arbitrary and capricious where it concluded that termination of a father's parental rights was not in the children's best interests. The trial court carefully weighed the evidence and considered the statutory factors set out in N.C.G.S. 7B-1110(a). In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Competency of parent—intellectual disability—In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an inquiry into a mother's competency where the mother had a mild intellectual disability but had been able to work and attend school. In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Disposition—not an abuse of discretion—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of two children. The trial court appropriately considered the factors stated in N.C.G.S. § 78-1110(a) when determining their best interests, and the determination that respondent's strong bond with the children was outweighed by other factors was not manifestly unsupported by reason. In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432 (2019) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Evidence—guardian ad litem—In a termination of parental rights case, the mere fact that the trial court chose not to follow the recommendation of the children's guardian ad litem did not constitute error. In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Failure to make reasonable progress—direct or indirect factors leading to removal—The Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court's order terminating respondent-mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) for failure to make reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to her daughter's removal from her home. "Conditions of removal," as contemplated by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), includes all of the factors that directly or indirectly contributed to causing the juvenile's removal from the parental home. Where an act of domestic violence and the discovery of an unexplained bruise on the daughter's arm led to her removal from her home, respondent-mother's failure to make reasonable progress to comply with her court-ordered case plan–for example, by abusing her Adderall prescription, failing to pass or submit to drug tests, and failing to complete a neuro-psychological examination or participate in therapy–supported the trial court's termination of her parental rights. In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Findings—best interests of the child—not written—uncontested issues—In a private termination of parental rights case initiated by an adoption agency, the trial court's failure to make written findings as to certain of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)'s statutory factors–likelihood of adoption, whether termination of parental rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan, and the bond between the juveniles and the parent–was not reversible error. These were uncontested factual issues, and remand for written findings would have served only to delay final resolution of the matter. In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Findings—discrepancy between oral and written findings—An adoption agency appealing a decision by the trial court not to terminate a father's parental rights to his children failed to show existence of error in the mere fact that there were differences between the findings orally rendered at the hearing and those in the written order. A trial court's oral findings are subject to change before the final written order is entered. In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—findings of fact—Where the trial court terminated a mother's parental rights to her three children for failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to the removal of her children, the findings challenged by the mother on appeal were supported by competent evidence. As the trier of fact, the trial court properly passed upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony and drew reasonable inferences from the evidence. In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—sufficiency of findings—In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court's findings supported its conclusion that a mother failed to make reasonable progress under the circumstances toward correcting the conditions that led to the removal of her children, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Although the mother argued that she complied with court-ordered services and therefore made reasonable progress, her argument failed to acknowledge that the primary reason for the removal of her children was the presence of the father–who had assaulted several of the children and the mother–in the home. The mother had voluntarily placed the children in foster care so that she could live with the father, and he remained in the home throughout the termination hearing. In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—The trial court's conclusion that a father's parental rights were subject to termination based on neglect was supported by the evidence where the father was willing to leave the child alone with her mother even though the mother was unfit for such responsibility, the parents exhibited marital discord during supervised visits with their child, and the parents intended to remain together. In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—neglect—sufficiency of findings—willfulness—The trial court's findings of fact were insufficient to support its termination of a father's parental rights in his daughter on the grounds of neglect by abandonment where the trial court made no findings concerning the father's ability to contact his daughter's legal custodian, exercise visitation, or pay any support. In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—willful abandonment—sufficiency of findings—willfulness—The trial court's findings of fact were insufficient to support its termination of a father's parental rights in his daughter on the grounds of willful abandonment where the trial court made no findings concerning the father's ability to visit his daughter, to contact his daughter's legal custodian, or to pay support during the relevant time period. In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds—neglect and willful abandonment—The trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights on the grounds of willful abandonment where the father made no effort to pursue a relationship with his daughter during the six months preceding the filing of the petition. Although the trial court may consider conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a parent's credibility and intentions, the determinative period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six months preceding the petition. In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Impartiality of trial court—questioning of witnesses—clarification—The trial court's questioning of witnesses during a termination of parental rights hearing did not go beyond the need to clarify matters addressed during testimony and did not show bias against the father. In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Judicial bias—permanent plan—adoption—child's best interest—The Supreme Court rejected an argument that the trial court was unfairly biased against parents in a termination of parental rights case where the trial court made a statement regarding its previous decision to send the child to live with her out-of-state aunt. At the time of that decision, the district court had already changed the primary permanent plan to adoption, and the statement in question was merely an explanation that the court had decided those steps were in the child's best interest at the time–rather than a definitive decision to terminate the parents' rights months before the termination hearing. In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Neglect and willful abandonment—case plan compliance—limited progress—The trial court's order terminating a mother's parental rights to her children on the basis of neglect and willful abandonment was affirmed where the court's findings that the mother did not maintain stable employment or housing for at least six months and that she did not complete the recommended treatment for substance abuse and domestic violence were supported by competent evidence, and where the mother admitted to not feeling comfortable being reunified with her children until a much later date for fear of suffering a relapse. The findings of fact supported the trial court's conclusion that the mother had not made reasonable progress on her case plan, which in turn supported the grounds for termination of parental rights. In re I.G.C., 373 N.C. 201 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Neglected juvenile—sufficiency of evidence—The trial court's conclusion that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9) was sufficient in and of itself to support termination of respondent's parental rights. Furthermore, the trial court made sufficient findings in determining that termination was in the best interests of the child. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403 (2019) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

No-merit brief—abandonment and neglect—The trial court's termination of a father's parental rights for abandonment and willful neglect was affirmed where the father's counsel filed a no-merit brief. The trial court's order was based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination. In re J.B.S., 373 N.C. 67 (2019) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

No-merit brief—error by Court of Appeals—review of merits by Supreme Court—goal of resolving case expeditiously—After determining that the Court of Appeals erred in a termination of parental rights case by failing to conduct an independent review of the issues set out in a no-merit brief, the Supreme Court elected to conduct its own review of those issues in the interest of expeditiously resolving the case. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order was supported by competent evidence and based on proper legal grounds. In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. 396 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

No-merit brief—independent review of issues by appellate court—The Court of Appeals erred by dismissing respondent-father's appeal from an order terminating his parental rights where respondent's attorney filed a no-merit brief pursuant to N.C. Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.1(d). The Supreme Court concluded that Rule 3.1(d) mandates an independent review on appeal of the issues contained in a no-merit brief, and it overruled the Court of Appeals decision to the contrary in In re L.V., 814 S.E.2d 928 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. 396 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

No-merit brief—neglect and felony assault against another child—The termination of a mother's parental rights was affirmed where her counsel filed a no-merit brief and the termination was based on substance abuse and felony assault against another child. The termination order was based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supporting statutory grounds for termination. In re T.H., 373 N.C. 85 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

No-merit brief—neglect and leaving child in placement—The termination of a mother's parental rights for neglect and for leaving her child in outside placement for twelve months without showing reasonable progress was affirmed where her counsel filed a no-merit brief and the order was based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination. In re J.E., 373 N.C. 69 (2019) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

No-merit brief—neglect and willful abandonment—The trial court's termination of a father's parental rights to his children for neglect and willful abandonment was affirmed where the father's counsel filed a no-merit brief. The trial court's order was supported by competent evidence and based on proper legal grounds. In re I.G.C., 373 N.C. 201 (2019) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

No-merit brief—neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress—The termination of a mother's parental rights was affirmed where the mother had a history of substance abuse and her counsel filed a no-merit brief. The termination order was based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and was based on proper legal grounds. In re Z.O.M., 373 N.C. 87 (2019) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Notice of appeal—designation of appellate court—brief treated as writ of certiorari—The Supreme Court treated a father's brief as a certiorari petition and issued a writ of certiorari authorizing review of his challenges to the trial court's termination of his parental rights where the father noted his appeal from the trial court's order in a timely manner but erroneously designated the Court of Appeals as the judicial body to which the appeal would lie. In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Orders—signed by judge who did not preside over hearing—nullity—Where the adjudication and disposition orders in a termination of parental rights case were signed by a judge who did not preside over the hearing and the mother subsequently noted appeal from those orders, those orders were a nullity, and the mother's notice of appeal did not divest the district court of the authority to enter further orders in the case. The judge who signed the orders did not err by vacating them, and the trial court that presided over the hearing then had the authority to enter the orders terminating the mother's parental rights. In re C.M.C., 373 N.C. 24 (2019) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Willful abandonment—due consideration of dispositional factors—Sufficient evidence existed to support the termination of respondent's parental rights based upon the willful abandonment and willful failure to pay child support. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination would be in the children's best interests. In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388 (2019) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Learned profession exemption—chiropractors—In a case arising from insurer conduct affecting chiropractic services, plaintiff chiropractors' unfair trade practices claim was barred by the learned profession exemption in N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(b). All individual defendants and all members of defendant Health Network Solutions, Inc., which served as an intermediary between chiropractors and insurance companies, were licensed chiropractors, and the alleged conduct at the heart of the action was directly related to providing patient care. Sykes v. Health Network Sols., Inc., 372 N.C. 326 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Attorney fees—appeal to superior court—consideration of additional evidence not presented to Commission—discretionary authority—Where the N.C. Industrial Commission declined to award certain attorney fees to plaintiff's attorneys, the superior court on appeal acted within its authority under N.C.G.S. § 97-90(c) when it considered additional evidence not presented to the Commission. The superior court exercised its statutory discretion in ordering attorney fees to be paid to plaintiff's attorneys from the reimbursement for retroactive attendant care medical compensation. Saunders v. ADP TotalSource Fi Xi, Inc., 372 N.C. 29 (2019) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)