State employee retirement—contribution-based cap factor—exemption from Administrative Procedure Act—implicit—The adoption of a contribution-based cap factor by the Retirement Systems Division of the Department of the State Treasurer's Board of Trustees was subject to the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) where there was no indication that the General Assembly intended to implicitly exempt adoption of the cap factor from the APA. The cap factor adopted in this case was void for the Board's failure to utilize the provisions of the APA. Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Dep't of State Treasurer, 374 N.C. 3 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Elements—sufficiency of evidence—falsification of court documents—The State presented sufficient evidence that defendant aided and abetted a county clerk's office employee in a scheme to falsify court documents to secure remission of bail bond forfeitures where defendant met with the clerk's office employee and agreed to participate in the scheme, sent text messages instructing him to enter the fraudulent motions, and paid him for entering the motions. Defendant failed to support his argument that distinct evidence was required to satisfy each element of aiding and abetting. State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Discretionary review—issues not presented in petitions—The Supreme Court declined to address defendant's argument on an issue that was not presented in either of the parties' petitions for discretionary review. State v. Alonzo, 373 N.C. 437 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Interlocutory appeal—discovery order—In an appeal from a trial court's order certifying two classes of plaintiffs whose suit challenged local development impact fees, defendants' additional appeal from an order compelling discovery of fee receipts was dismissed as interlocutory where defendants advanced no basis for appellate review. Zander v. Orange Cnty., 376 N.C. 513 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Mootness—public interest exception—immigration-related arrest or detainment—habeas corpus petitions—The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied to an otherwise moot appeal, where the issue was whether state courts–specifically, those sitting in counties where the sheriff had entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government–lack authority to grant habeas corpus petitions for and order the release of aliens held pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers. Chavez v. McFadden, 374 N.C. 458 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Notice of appeal—timeliness—termination of parental rights—adjudication order—not a final order—A mother's appeal from an adjudication order in a termination of parental rights case was not untimely, even though it was filed more than thirty days after entry of the order, because an adjudication order finding at least one ground for termination is not a final order appealable under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001, since the case must proceed to disposition before parental rights can be terminated. The mother's notice of appeal, timely filed after entry of the disposition order which concluded that termination was in the best interests of the child, was sufficient to appeal from both the adjudication and disposition orders. In re A.B.C., 374 N.C. 752 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Plain error review—instructional and evidentiary errors in criminal cases—not sufficiency of the evidence—The Court of Appeals' statement that "defendant has not argued plain error" did not amount to announcement of a new rule that sufficiency of the evidence issues could be reviewed under the plain error standard. The Supreme Court reiterated that plain error applies to unpreserved instructional and evidentiary errors in criminal cases and that Appellate Procedure Rule 10(a)(3) governs the preservation of sufficiency of the evidence issues, to the exclusion of plain error review. State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Preservation of issues—automatic preservation—statutory mandate—acceptance of guilty plea—Defendant's argument that the trial court erred by rejecting his guilty plea was automatically preserved for appellate review because the trial court acted contrary to the statutory mandate in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1023(c), which required a specific act by the trial court–that the "judge must accept the plea if he determines that the plea is the product of the informed choice of the defendant and that there is a factual basis for the plea." State v. Chandler, 376 N.C. 361 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Preservation of issues—challenges to sufficiency of the evidence—criminal cases—Defendant preserved each of his challenges to the sufficiency of the State's evidence–regarding aiding and abetting and obtaining a thing of value–by making a motion to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence and again at the close of all evidence in accordance with Appellate Rule 10(a)(3). The Supreme Court emphasized that merely moving to dismiss at the proper time in a criminal case under Rule 10(a)(3) preserves all sufficiency of the evidence issues, and the Court overruled a line of Court of Appeals cases that attempted to categorize motions to dismiss based on the specificity of the motions. State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Preservation of issues—constitutional rights—continuance—termination of parental rights hearing—A father in a termination of parental rights case waived his argument that a continuance was necessary to protect his constitutional rights where he failed to make his constitutional arguments before the trial court. In re S.M., 375 N.C. 673 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Preservation of issues—motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence—specific argument at trial—all sufficiency issues preserved—A criminal defendant's timely motion to dismiss and renewal of the motion preserved for appellate review any and all sufficiency of the evidence challenges; thus, even though defendant argued at trial that the evidence was insufficient to support allegations that sexual activity had occurred, he was entitled to argue on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the allegation that he was a "teacher" under the charging statute (N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7). State v. Smith, 375 N.C. 224 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Preservation of issues—termination of parental rights—child's due process rights—In a termination of parental rights action, respondent-father failed to preserve for appellate review an argument that the trial court failed to protect his fifteen-year-old son's procedural rights–by providing notice and an opportunity to appear and give testimony independent of the court-appointed guardian ad litem, protections not specifically granted in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110–where respondent did not raise the issue for the trial court's consideration. In re B.E., 375 N.C. 730 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Habitual misdemeanor assault—felony assault—arising from same act—The trial court erred by entering judgment on convictions of habitual misdemeanor assault and felony assault where the convictions arose from the same assaultive act because the relevant statutes (sections 14-33, -33.2, and -32.4), when read together, prohibited punishment for misdemeanor assault based upon conduct that was subject to a higher punishment (here, for felony assault). Where the conduct could not be punished as misdemeanor assault, it could not form the basis for habitual misdemeanor assault. State v. Fields, 374 N.C. 629 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Affidavits—person residing outside the state—signed under penalty of perjury—notarization not required —In a child support case, the trial court erred by declining to admit into evidence the affidavit of plaintiff-mother, who resided outside of the United States, on the basis that the affidavit was not notarized and plaintiff was not present to be examined. Pursuant to the special evidentiary rule in N.C.G.S. § 52C-3-315(b) (part of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act), the affidavit was admissible because plaintiff signed it under penalty of perjury, and notarization was not required. Gyger v. Clement, 375 N.C. 80 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Dispute between two parents—denial of visitation—best interests of child—statutory requirement—In a child custody dispute between two biological parents, the trial court did not err by granting full custody to the father and denying visitation to the mother where it entered a written finding of fact, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-13.5(i), that visitation with the mother was not in the best interests of the children. By the plain language of the statute, the trial court was not required to find that the mother was an unfit person to visit the children, and Moore v. Moore, 160 N.C. App. 569 (2003), which the Court of Appeals relied upon to hold otherwise, was expressly overruled. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Dispute between two parents—denial of visitation—delegation of discretion to one parent—In a child custody dispute between two biological parents, the trial court did not err by denying visitation to the mother yet also giving the father discretion to allow some visitation by the mother. In light of the trial court's authority to deny visitation pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-13.5(i), the trial court could delegate discretion to the father to allow some visitation. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Extraterritorial jurisdiction—expansion—statutory requirements—A town lacked authority to extend its extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) into certain proposed areas because N.C.G.S. § 160A-360(e) prohibited ETJ extensions where counties were enforcing zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, and the State Building Code–unless the county approved the extension, which did not occur in this case. The Supreme Court rejected the town's argument that there was an irreconcilable conflict between the subsections of N.C.G.S. § 160A-360 as modified by Session Law 1999-35. Town of Pinebluff v. Moore Cty., 374 N.C. 254 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Crossclaims—dismissal of original action—dismissal of crossclaims not required—The Business Court erred by concluding that a defendant's crossclaims against a co-defendant were automatically subject to dismissal simply because plaintiff's claims were being dismissed. The dismissal of an original action does not, by itself, require the dismissal of crossclaims that meet the requirements of Civil Procedure Rule 13(g) (with the exception of certain types of crossclaims that require the continued litigation of the original claim in order to remain viable). Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Alliance Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 375 N.C. 140 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Dismissal with prejudice—discretion of trial court—protracted litigation—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing defendant's crossclaims with prejudice–rather than without prejudice–where Civil Procedure Rule 41(b) vests trial courts with such discretion and dismissal with prejudice brought some measure of finality to the protracted litigation involving defendant's debts to plaintiff and his membership interests in co-defendant-company. Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Alliance Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 375 N.C. 140 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Joinder—crossclaims—qualifying claims dismissed—remaining claims must be dismissed—Where defendant asserted 18 crossclaims against a co-defendant, and the only crossclaims that met the requirements of Civil Procedure Rule 13(g) were barred by res judicata, the remaining crossclaims were properly dismissed. The Supreme Court adopted the federal approach–that if a qualifying claim asserted by a defendant is dismissed, then all claims joined under Rule 18 must also be dismissed. Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Alliance Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 375 N.C. 140 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Summary judgment—hog farm agreement—intention of parties—There was no issue of fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment in an action that involved the issue of whether monies from a hog farm agreement between the Attorney General and Smithfield Foods were civil penalties that should have gone to the schools. Each of the alleged factual issues focused on questions such as the subjective intent of the parties at the time the agreement was executed and the purpose sought to be achieved. There were no credibility determinations and no additional evidence to shed light on the substantive legal issue in dispute. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Stein, 374 N.C. 102 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Certification—impact fee ordinance—action for refund of fees paid—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by certifying a class in an action to recover a portion of impact fees paid pursuant to an ordinance passed in 2008. Plaintiffs' claim was not time-barred by a provision in the enabling legislation stating that any claim to recover an impact fee must be brought within nine months after payment of the fee where the claim included the right to a partial refund with interest as provided by a subsequent ordinance passed in 2016. Even if the time limitation constituted a bar, the repeal of the enabling legislation (after plaintiffs' suit was initiated) rendered moot any arguments to that effect. Zander v. Orange Cnty., 376 N.C. 513 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Certification—impact fee ordinance—challenge to fees—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by certifying a class in an action challenging the legality of local development impact fees, which were imposed pursuant to an ordinance passed in 2008. Plaintiffs' claims were not time-barred by a provision in the enabling legislation, which required that any claim contesting the validity of the ordinance must be brought within nine months of the ordinance's effective date, because their claims included allegations that the fees themselves were illegal. Even if the time limitation constituted a bar, the repeal of the enabling legislation (after plaintiffs' suit was initiated) rendered moot any arguments to that effect. Zander v. Orange Cnty., 376 N.C. 513 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Mootness—relation back rule—named plaintiff's claim moot—before fair opportunity to pursue class certification—no undue delay—Where plaintiff-patient filed a class action alleging that defendant-hospital had overcharged the class members for emergency services, the hospital's subsequent waiver of plaintiff's bill–before discovery or a ruling on plaintiff's motion for class certification–did not render the entire class action moot. The Supreme Court adopted a rule allowing relation back of the claim to the date of the filing of the complaint for mootness purposes, where the named plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot before the plaintiff has had a fair opportunity to pursue class certification and has otherwise acted without undue delay in pursuing class certification. The matter was remanded to the trial court for application of the new legal standard. Chambers v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 374 N.C. 436 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Res judicata—identity element—crossclaims—failure to obtain ruling in prior action—Several of defendant's crossclaims related to his percentage ownership in co-defendant-company were subject to dismissal based on res judicata where those crossclaims required a determination of the total number of membership units in co-defendant-company, for which defendant failed to obtain a ruling in a prior action. Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Alliance Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 375 N.C. 140 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Criminal—robbery with a dangerous weapon—sufficiency of evidence—felonious intent—Where defendant (with the help of two other people) broke into a woman's home and ordered her at gunpoint to return the money he had previously paid her for illegal drugs, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss a charge of criminal conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon because there was substantial evidence of felonious intent. Although defendant believed he had a bona fide claim of right to the money, the law did not permit him to "engage in self-help" to forcibly recover personal property from an illegal transaction. Additionally, because there was sufficient evidence of felonious intent, the trial court properly refused to dismiss a charge for felony breaking and entering based on the same incident. State v. Cox, 375 N.C. 165 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

To commit juror harassment—agreement—sufficiency of evidence—Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to harass jurors was reversed where the State presented insufficient evidence of an agreement to threaten or intimidate jurors following the conviction of defendant's brother for assault. Although defendant, his brother, and his brother's girlfriend all interacted with multiple jurors in the hallway outside of the courtroom, most of defendant's contact with the jurors occurred in a relatively brief amount of time when defendant was alone, and there was almost no evidence that defendant's group communicated with each other or that they synchronized their behavior to support an inference, beyond mere suspicion, that they had reached a mutual understanding to harass the jurors. State v. Mylett, 374 N.C. 376 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Due process—Brady violation—exculpatory evidence—materiality —In a trial for first-degree murder, the State violated defendant's due process rights by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence–including a witness interview, unidentified hairs found on the victim, and forensic lab notes regarding blood residue–which would have allowed defendant to impeach the State's principal witness and undermine the persuasiveness of the State's forensic evidence. Given the lack of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt presented by the State at trial, combined with the materiality of some of the previously undisclosed evidence, there was a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the jury's verdict would have been different. State v. Best, 376 N.C. 340 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Due process—competency to stand trial—mental illness—duty to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte—In a prosecution for various sexual offenses, substantial evidence existed creating a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency to stand trial, and therefore the trial court's failure to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte violated defendant's due process rights. Specifically, in addition to a lengthy history of mental illness (including periods of incompetence to stand trial), a five-month gap between trial and defendant's last competency hearing, and warnings from physicians that defendant's mental health could deteriorate, defense counsel expressed concerns on the third day of trial about defendant's competency because defendant suddenly did not know what was going on and seemingly did not know who defense counsel was. State v. Hollars, 376 N.C. 432 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Eighth Amendment—opportunity for parole—not ripe for review—Defendant's argument that he had no opportunity for parole was not ripe for review where he had not yet reached parole eligibility. State v. Seam, 373 N.C. 529 (2020) (Author: Justice Per Curiam)

Ex post facto analysis—Racial Justice Act (RJA)—amendments—motion pending under original RJA—Where defendant had a pending motion under the original Racial Justice Act (RJA), substantive amendments to the RJA consisting of evidentiary changes could not be applied to him because they violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. However, an amendment granting trial judges discretion to determine whether to hold a hearing was a procedural change that did not implicate constitutional concerns. State v. Ramseur, 374 N.C. 658 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Ex post facto analysis—Racial Justice Act—repeal—amendments—For the reasons stated in State v. Ramseur, 374 N.C. 658 (2020), the retroactive application of the repeal of the Racial Justice Act (RJA) was unconstitutional as applied to defendant under both the state and federal constitutions. Further, only the procedural amendments made to the original RJA, under which defendant filed a claim, could be applied to defendant–substantive amendments to the evidentiary standards could not be applied. State v. Burke, 374 N.C. 617 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Ex post facto analysis—Racial Justice Act—repeal—retroactive application—The legislature violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws by mandating that the repeal of the Racial Justice Act (RJA) be applied retroactively so as to void any pending RJA motions filed by a capital defendant. The RJA provided a new, substantive basis for challenging a death sentence intended to alleviate harm from racial discrimination in capital cases, and its repeal increased the severity of the measure of punishment connected to first-degree murder. State v. Ramseur, 374 N.C. 658 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

North Carolina—Anti-Monopoly Clause—claim against local hospital authority—judgment on the pleadings—In a class action suit brought by North Carolina residents against a local hospital authority, which had been including provisions in its contracts encouraging insurers to steer patients toward the hospital authority's services while forbidding insurers from allowing competitors to enforce similar contract provisions, the trial court improperly denied the hospital authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiffs' monopolization claim under Article I, Section 34 of the North Carolina Constitution. Plaintiffs' complaint, which alleged that the hospital authority had only a fifty percent share of the local market for acute inpatient hospital services and faced formidable competitors within that market, failed to allege that the hospital authority had the ability to control prices in that market. DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 376 N.C. 63 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

North Carolina—double jeopardy—Racial Justice Act—death sentence vacated—judgment not appealed—In a case involving the Racial Justice Act (RJA)–which, before its repeal, allowed a defendant to challenge a death sentence on the basis that racial bias infected the prosecution–review of the trial court's judgment and commitment order resentencing defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was precluded pursuant to double jeopardy principles. Although the State did seek appellate review of the trial court's accompanying order finding that defendant was entitled to relief under the RJA (an order which was previously vacated by the Supreme Court on non-substantive grounds), its failure to petition for and obtain review of the separate judgment and commitment order rendered that judgment final. State v. Robinson, 375 N.C. 173 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Right to be present at criminal trial—waiver—voluntariness—suicide attempt—need for competency hearing—In a prosecution for felony embezzlement, where defendant attempted suicide before the fourth day of trial and was involuntarily committed, the trial court erred by failing to conduct a competency hearing to determine whether defendant had the mental capacity to voluntarily waive her constitutional right to be present at trial. Substantial evidence created a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency where her medical records and recent psychiatric evaluations showed she suffered from depression, a long-term mood disorder requiring medication, and suicidal thoughts; she was assessed at a "high" risk level for suicide; and she required further treatment and immediate psychiatric stabilization after her suicide attempt. State v. Sides, 376 N.C. 449 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Right to counsel—forfeiture—egregious conduct by defendant—The Supreme Court recognized that a criminal defendant may forfeit the right to counsel by committing egregious acts that frustrate the legal process. In a case involving charges related to a defendant's failure to maintain a valid driver's license, defendant's conduct was not so egregiously disruptive as to forfeit his right to counsel, and the failure of the trial court to conduct the colloquy in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242 before allowing defendant to proceed pro se violated defendant's constitutional right to counsel, entitling him to a new trial. State v. Simpkins, 373 N.C. 530 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Right to speedy trial—Barker balancing test—no prejudice from delay—A five-year delay between an indictment and trial (for a first-degree sex offense with a child and indecent liberties with a child) did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial where the Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), four-factor balancing test showed that although the length of delay was unreasonable, the reason for the delay was crowded court dockets rather than negligence or willfulness by the State, defendant waited nearly five years to assert his right to a speedy trial, and defendant failed to present evidence establishing any actual prejudice. State v. Farmer, 376 N.C. 407 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

State budget process—federal block grants—legislative appropriation—Where the state constitution grants to the General Assembly exclusive power over the state's expenditures, the General Assembly's appropriation of federal block grants as part of the state budget process was a proper exercise of its constitutional authority and was not a violation of the separation of powers provision in Art. I, Section 6. Contrary to the Governor's contention, the block grant funds were not "custodial funds" (as defined in the State Budget Act, Ch. 143C) exempt from legislative control and were subject to allocation by the legislature as part of the State treasury. Cooper v. Berger, 376 N.C. 22 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Commercial development—negligence in designing or manufacturing trusses—economic loss —In a negligence action brought by the developer of several apartment buildings alleging that subcontractor defendant supplied defective construction materials, the Business Court did not err by granting defendant's motion for summary judgment under the economic loss rule because the alleged damages were monetary, and the economic loss rule prohibits recovery in tort for purely economic losses in commercial transactions. Crescent Univ. City Venture, LLC v. Trussway Mfg., Inc., 376 N.C. 54 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Breach of consent order—disclosure of proprietary information—summary judgment—In a dispute over trade secrets involving specialty adhesives, the trial court did not err by entering summary judgment for plaintiff on a breach of contract claim against defendant chemist (plaintiff's former employee) for violating a consent order by disclosing proprietary components in a European patent application. SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Consent order—breach—trade secrets—genuine issue of material fact—The trial court properly declined to grant summary judgment for plaintiff (the prior employer of a chemist) on a breach of contract claim (arising from breach of a consent order) against defendant chemist. There was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the component defendant used in developing a similar product for his later employer was equivalent to a proprietary component developed by defendant for use in plaintiff's products. SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Writ of prohibition issued—delivery of opinion to Judicial Standards Commission and Disciplinary Hearing Commission—unnecessary—In a habeas case involving undocumented immigrants where the Court of Appeals issued a writ of prohibition, which precluded the trial court from ruling on habeas corpus petitions of individuals held under immigration-related detainers or arrest warrants, the Court of Appeals erred by ordering that a certified copy of its opinion in the case be delivered to the Judicial Standards Commission and to the Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina State Bar. Concern that the trial court may not have followed the writ in similar habeas cases was unwarranted. Chavez v. McFadden, 374 N.C. 458 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Guilty plea—rejection by trial court—error—prejudice analysis—remedy—The trial court's error in rejecting defendant's guilty plea (based on defendant's refusal to admit his factual guilt) was prejudicial because the maximum sentence defendant could have received under the plea was 59 months and when he was convicted at trial he was sentenced to a minimum of 208 months and a maximum of 320 months imprisonment. The matter was remanded with instruction to the district attorney to renew the plea that the trial court erroneously rejected and for the trial court to consider the plea if defendant accepts it. State v. Chandler, 376 N.C. 361 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Guilty plea—rejection by trial court—refusal to admit factual guilt—The trial court erred by rejecting a defendant's guilty plea based on defendant's refusal to admit his factual guilt where the plea was based on defendant's informed choice, a factual basis existed for the plea, and the sentencing was left to the trial court's discretion. There is no requirement that a defendant admit to factual guilt in order to enter a guilty plea. State v. Chandler, 376 N.C. 361 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Habitual felon status—proof of prior convictions—evidentiary requirements—statutory methods nonexclusive—ACIS printout—In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court determined that where the methods of proof listed in N.C.G.S. § 14-7.4 were not the exclusive means by which the State could prove prior convictions to establish habitual felon status, the State's use of a printout from the Automated Criminal/Infraction System (ACIS)–where the original judgment was not available–was admissible to prove a prior felony at defendant's habitual felon trial. There was a split among the justices regarding whether Evidence Rule 1005 applied, and if so, whether its application would allow the admission of the ACIS printout in this case. State v. Waycaster, 375 N.C. 232 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Jury instructions—possession of a firearm by a felon—requested instruction—justification defense—Defendant was entitled to his requested jury instructions on the defense of justification for possession of a firearm by a felon where each required factor was satisfied by the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to defendant: Defendant arrived home from a job interview and found that another family had approached his family's home seeking a fight with him; defendant grabbed his cousin's gun only after he heard the other family's guns cocking and witnessed his cousin struggling with his own gun; and defendant relinquished possession of the gun when it jammed and he was able to flee. The trial court's error in failing to instruct on the justification defense was prejudicial where the jury sent a note to the trial court asking about the availability of the defense. State v. Mercer, 373 N.C. 459 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Jury instructions—requested defense—entrapment—In a prosecution for solicitation by computer of a person fifteen years or younger for the purpose of committing a sexual act, defendant presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that he did not have a willingness or predisposition to engage in sexual activity with a minor when communicating with an undercover officer in an online chat room, rendering erroneous the trial court's denial of defendant's request for a jury instruction on entrapment. State v. Keller, 374 N.C. 637 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Jury instructions—requested defense—entrapment—inconsistent theories—In a prosecution for solicitation by computer of a person fifteen years or younger for the purpose of committing a sexual act, defendant's claim that he was entrapped by an undercover officer with whom he communicated in an online chat room was not inconsistent with his denial of having the intent to commit the criminal act. Defendant did not deny the acts he committed–that he communicated with the officer online or that he drove to meet up with the person he thought he had been conversing with–and he should have been allowed to assert the defense of entrapment. State v. Keller, 374 N.C. 637 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Jury instructions—requested defense—entrapment—prejudice—In a prosecution for solicitation by computer of a person fifteen years or younger for the purpose of committing a sexual act, defendant demonstrated he was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to grant him a jury instruction on entrapment where the jury's questions during deliberations about defendant's intent indicated a possibility that had the jury been given the requested instruction, it might have concluded the criminal intent originated with law enforcement and not defendant. State v. Keller, 374 N.C. 637 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Jury instructions—self-defense—defense of habitation—use of deadly force—At a trial for attempted first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, the trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense and the defense of habitation. Viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, the evidence showed that defendant (who had a broken leg and used a wheelchair) reasonably believed that using deadly force was necessary to protect himself against an intruder who had already attacked him earlier that night at a neighbor's house, followed him home, broken into his home twice to violently assault him, and was breaking into the home for the third time when defendant shot him. State v. Coley, 375 N.C. 156 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Jury instructions—unsupported instruction—harmless error analysis—prejudice—The trial court committed prejudicial error in a trial for possession of multiple controlled substances when it instructed the jury on both acting in concert and constructive possession because there was no evidence supporting a theory of acting in concert, there existed a strong possibility of confusing the jury by presenting both theories, and the evidence supporting constructive possession was in dispute and subject to questions regarding its credibility. State v. Glover, 376 N.C. 420 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Pleadings—amendment—after arraignment—name of property owner—The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to amend a warrant by filing a statement of charges form after arraignment to correct the name of the property owner for the charges of misdemeanor larceny and injury to personal property (from "LOVES TRUCK STOP" to "Love's Travel Stops & Country Stores Inc."). The change was in substance an amendment to the arrest warrant, and it did not change the nature of the offense charged and was otherwise authorized by law. State v. Capps, 374 N.C. 621 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Possession—jury instructions—acting in concert—alternative theory to constructive possession—In a trial for possession of multiple controlled substances, the trial court erred by giving jury instructions for the theory of acting in concert where the State failed to present any evidence of a common plan or purpose to possess the controlled substances. The State's evidence that the drugs were stored in defendant's personal area by his housemate, whom he previously did drugs with, could support a theory of constructive possession but failed to demonstrate a common plan or purpose between defendant and his housemate. State v. Glover, 376 N.C. 420 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Post-conviction relief—Racial Justice Act—evidentiary hearing—sufficiency of evidentiary forecast—The trial court erred by determining that defendant's Racial Justice Act claims lacked merit and could be denied on the pleadings without an evidentiary hearing, because defendant presented sufficient statistical and non-statistical evidence that race was a significant factor in the prosecutor's decision to seek the death sentence, in the use of peremptory challenges, and in the actual imposition of death sentences in defendant's murder trial. Defendant was entitled to not only an evidentiary hearing but also discovery pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f). State v. Ramseur, 374 N.C. 658 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Prosecutor's closing argument—reasonable fear and race—prejudice analysis—In a first-degree murder trial, the trial court did not err by overruling defendant's objections to the prosecutor's statements during closing argument regarding race and reasonable fear, where defendant asserted he shot the victim through a window in his house in self-defense. Assuming without deciding that the prosecutor's statements were improper, defendant did not demonstrate prejudice, given the totality of the prosecutor's closing argument (which focused extensively on defendant's lack of credibility as a witness) and in light of the overwhelming evidence presented of defendant's guilt of murder by premeditation and deliberation and/or by lying in wait. State v. Copley, 374 N.C. 224 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Racial Justice Act—motion for appropriate relief—denial without evidentiary hearing—abuse of discretion—The trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's request for relief from his conviction for murder, made pursuant to the Racial Justice Act, without holding an evidentiary hearing. Defendant presented extensive evidence supporting his argument that race was a significant factor at multiple points during his prosecution. State v. Burke, 374 N.C. 617 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Withdrawal of a guilty plea—analysis of prejudice to the State—unnecessary—Once it determined that the factors stated in State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532 (1990), weighed against allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in a capital case, the Court of Appeals was not required to analyze any potential prejudice to the State in the event that the plea withdrawal had been allowed. State v. Taylor, 374 N.C. 710 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Withdrawal of a guilty plea—effective assistance of counsel—dismissal without prejudice—In a capital case, where it was unnecessary to determine whether defense counsel's competency weighed in favor of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was dismissed without prejudice so he could raise it in a motion for appropriate relief. State v. Taylor, 374 N.C. 710 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Withdrawal of a guilty plea—fair and just reason—consideration of factors—Defendant failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea to second-degree murder and two related robbery charges where the factors stated in State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532 (1990), weighed against permitting the plea withdrawal. Defendant had not sufficiently asserted his legal innocence before attempting to withdraw his plea; the State's proffered evidence of defendant's guilt, though not overwhelming, was uncontested and sufficient; defendant waited eighteen months to file his motion to withdraw the plea; and defendant did not enter into his plea agreement under any misunderstanding, haste, confusion, or coercion. It was unnecessary to determine whether the Handy factor regarding defense counsel's competency benefitted defendant. State v. Taylor, 374 N.C. 710 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Punitive damages—breach of consent order—not a separate tort—Where the trial court granted summary judgment to defendants on a misappropriation of trade secrets claim, the court did not err by also finding for defendants on plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, because plaintiff's alternative basis for punitive damages–that defendants breached a consent order–did not constitute a separate tort. SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Attorney-client privilege—communications by agent of sole shareholder—not agent of corporation—not protected—The Business Court did not abuse its discretion by compelling the production of communications involving the agent of a corporation's sole shareholder because that person was not also the agent of the corporation–a properly formed corporation is a distinct entity and not the alter ego of shareholders, even one who owns all of the corporation's stock. The communications at issue were not protected by the attorney-client privilege, nor would they be under specialized applications of the privilege–the functional-equivalent test or the Kovel doctrine–even if those applications were recognized by North Carolina law. Global Textile Alliance, Inc. v. TDI Worldwide, LLC, 375 N.C. 72 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Compelling production—in-camera review—limited in scope—abuse of discretion analysis—The Business Court did not abuse its discretion by limiting its in camera review of contested communications to a "reasonable sampling" where the corporation seeking protection from a discovery request failed to promptly provide all documents necessary for an exhaustive review and welcomed the accommodation of a limited review. Global Textile Alliance, Inc. v. TDI Worldwide, LLC, 375 N.C. 72 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Work-product doctrine—corporate litigation—communications with agent of shareholder—The Business Court did not abuse its discretion by determining that communications involving an agent of a corporation's sole shareholder were not protected from discovery under the work-product doctrine where the communications were not prepared in anticipation of litigation–the agent had no role at the corporation, was not retained by the corporation to work on the current litigation, and did not advise the corporation about the litigation in any capacity. Global Textile Alliance, Inc. v. TDI Worldwide, LLC, 375 N.C. 72 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Inverse condemnation—Map Act—recordation of roadway corridor map—compensation for taxes paid—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, the trial court properly took into account the taxes paid by the homeowners–on property that essentially had no fair market value after the map was recorded–when considering the amount of compensation due the homeowners. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—pre-judgment interest—prudent investor standard—appropriate interest rate—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, the trial court erred in applying a compounded interest rate of 8% per annum to the value of both the 1992 and 2006 takings when determining pre-judgment interest, because this method essentially combined two allowable methods rather than choosing between them. A party may choose between a presumptively reasonable statutory rate pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 24-1, or rebut that rate with a prudent investor rate compounded, if compounded rates would have been available. Further, the trial court erred by basing its decision on a non-diversified prudent investor's investment portfolio. The issue was remanded to determine the appropriate interest rate. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—quick-take procedure by NCDOT—timeliness of filing—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the proceeding to continue to trial despite NCDOT having filed a motion for a permissive counterclaim to assert quick-take rights under N.C.G.S. § 136-104 (which would allow it to take title immediately to the subject property). Trial courts have broad discretion pursuant to section 136-114 to make all necessary orders and rules to carry out the purpose of the condemnation statutes, the trial court in this case did not block NCDOT's right to assert a permissive counterclaim under all circumstances, and the trial court properly took into account the length of time the proceeding had been pending (over three years) before denying NCDOT's attempt to assert its right two months prior to trial. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—recordation of roadway corridor map—fair market value—expert testimony—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the homeowners' appraiser to testify that the fair market value of the property was zero after the map was recorded where evidence was presented that there was no market at all for the property in that geographic area based on the effect of the map, even though the homeowners were able to continue using their property. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—recordation of roadway corridor map—jury instructions—consideration of project once completed—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, any error in the trial court's instruction to the jury to consider the proposed highway project in its completed state when determining the amount of just compensation–where the nature of the taking was an indefinite negative easement and not similar to a fee simple taking–would not have impacted the result and therefore was not prejudicial where the evidence supported the jury's verdict on fair compensation. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Inverse condemnation—recordation of roadway corridor map—nature of taking—evidentiary rulings—In an inverse condemnation action filed by homeowners after the N.C. Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed a roadway corridor map encompassing their property, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings regarding evidence of the parties' respective appraisers where the court correctly applied the proper measure of just compensation for a partial taking pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 136-112–the difference between the fair market value of the property before the map was recorded and after–and allowed only the testimony that was in accordance with that measure, after determining that the nature of the taking was that of an indefinite negative easement, not a three-year restriction as NCDOT argued. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding potentially misleading expert testimony that analogized the property restrictions after the map was recorded to those placed on property in floodplains. Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 374 N.C. 273 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Negligent infliction of emotional distress—foreseeability—judgment on the pleadings—The trial court erred by entering judgment on the pleadings for defendants, operators of an unlicensed at-home day care, on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) brought by plaintiffs, parents of a two-year-old girl who was fatally shot at defendants' home with a loaded shotgun left on the kitchen table accessible to unsupervised children. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, sufficiently forecast that plaintiffs' severe emotional distress was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendants' negligent conduct, including the fact that plaintiffs were known to defendants. Newman v. Stepp, 376 N.C. 300 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Expert witnesses—mootness—The trial court did not err in an action for misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and breach of a consent order by denying as moot defendant's motions to exclude the testimony of two expert witnesses. The claims for trade secrets and unfair trade practices had been dismissed and the testimony was not relevant to the breach of contract claim (breach of a consent order being a breach of contract claim). SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Lay witness testimony—improper vouching for credibility of child sex abuse victim—admission plain error —The trial court committed plain error in a prosecution for sexual offense with a child by an adult, child abuse by a sexual act, and indecent liberties with a child by allowing an investigator with the Department of Social Services (DSS) to improperly vouch for the credibility of the minor child victim by testifying that DSS had substantiated the allegations against defendant when there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse and the jury's verdict depended entirely on their assessment of the victim's credibility. State v. Warden, 376 N.C. 503 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Sufficiency of evidence—attempt to obtain any thing of value—forfeited bail bonds—The State presented sufficient evidence to convict defendant of obtaining property by false pretenses where defendant attempted to reduce the amount that his bail bond company was required to pay as surety for forfeited bonds–a "thing of value" under N.C.G.S. § 14-100–by participating in a scheme in which he directed a county clerk of court employee to falsify court documents. State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Flash bang grenade—weapon of mass destruction—The State presented substantial evidence that defendant possessed a weapon of mass death and destruction in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-288.8 where a "flash bang" grenade was found in his car. The statute explicitly provided that any explosive or incendiary grenade was a weapon of mass death and destruction. Evidence that the grenade was explosive or incendiary included the label on the grenade and the testimony of a Highway Patrol Trooper who had been in the military. State v. Carey, 373 N.C. 445 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Possession of a firearm by a felon—affirmative defense—justification—In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court recognized the common law defense of justification as an affirmative defense for possession of a firearm by a felon (N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1) in narrow and extraordinary circumstances. The Court adopted the four-factor test outlined in United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000). State v. Mercer, 373 N.C. 459 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Possession on school property—multiple weapons—one offense—The Court of Appeals correctly reversed five judgments for possession of firearms on school property and remanded for resentencing where defendant was arrested and charged after one incident on school grounds during which he was in possession of five firearms. Because N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) was ambiguous as to whether multiple convictions were permitted for the simultaneous possession of more than one firearm on a single occasion, under the rule of lenity defendant could be convicted lawfully on only one count. State v. Conley, 374 N.C. 209 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Immigration-related arrest or detainment—authority to detain absent a 287(g) agreement—analysis unnecessary—The portion of the Court of Appeals opinion addressing whether state sheriffs who had not entered into 287(g) agreements with the federal government lacked authority to detain individuals pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers–or whether those detained individuals would be entitled to release in a habeas corpus proceeding–was vacated where the local sheriff who detained petitioners in this case had entered into a 287(g) agreement. Chavez v. McFadden, 374 N.C. 458 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Immigration-related arrest or detainment—pursuant to 287(g) agreement—habeas corpus petitions in state court—federal preemption—The trial court erred by failing to summarily deny petitioners' applications seeking a writ of habeas corpus, where the sheriff who detained petitioners was a party to a 287(g) agreement with the federal government and was holding petitioners pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers. Local sheriffs acting under 287(g) agreements operate as de facto federal immigration officers; therefore, state court judges cannot interfere with detentions made pursuant to those agreements given the preemptive effect of federal immigration laws. Chavez v. McFadden, 374 N.C. 458 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Felony murder—jury instruction—attempted murder with a deadly weapon—hands and arms as "deadly weapons"—Under North Carolina law, an adult's hands and arms can, depending on the circumstances, qualify as "deadly weapons" for purposes of the statutory felony murder rule (N.C.G.S. § 14-17(a)). Therefore, at defendant's trial for his grandfather's murder and the attempted murder of his mother, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that it could convict defendant of murdering his grandfather under the felony murder rule if it found–as the predicate felony under the "continuous transaction" doctrine–that defendant attempted to murder his mother using his hands and arms as deadly weapons. State v. Steen, 376 N.C. 469 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Felony murder—jury instruction—attempted murder with a deadly weapon—prejudicial error—In a murder prosecution where the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict defendant of murdering his grandfather under the felony murder rule if it found–as the predicate felony–that defendant attempted to murder his mother (who could only recall being strangled) using either his hands and arms or a garden hoe as a deadly weapon, the trial court committed prejudicial error by including the garden hoe in its instruction. Given defendant's denials of guilt, the lack of DNA evidence linking him to the crime scene, and his mother's conflicting statements about her attacker's identity, there was a reasonable probability that, absent the instruction mentioning the garden hoe, the jury might not have convicted defendant of murdering his grandfather under a felony murder theory. State v. Steen, 376 N.C. 469 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Jury instructions—interpretation of element—"in the presence of"—In a prosecution for indecent exposure, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the presence element where the facts showed defendant was inside his car when he called a mother to his car window and her child was about twenty feet away. In light of the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9, as interpreted by State v. Fly, 348 N.C. 556 (1998), the requirement that the exposure be in the presence of the victim does not mean that the victim could have seen the exposed private parts had the victim looked. The focus is on where the defendants place themselves and on what the defendants do, not on what the victims do. State v. Hoyle, 373 N.C. 454 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Sufficiency of evidence—presence—There was sufficient evidence of the presence element of indecent exposure where defendant exposed himself while sitting in his car to a mother standing at his passenger side window while her child was about twenty feet away. The proximity to the child was sufficiently close that the jury could find defendant's act was in the child's presence. State v. Hoyle, 373 N.C. 454 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Commercial underinsured motorist policy—endorsement—choice of law clause—third-party settlement—subrogation—Where a commercial uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM) policy included an endorsement that specifically invoked South Carolina law, UIM proceeds paid to a widow on behalf of her husband's estate (in a settlement with a third party in a South Carolina wrongful death action) were not subject to subrogation under South Carolina law. The insurer was therefore not entitled to reimbursement from the UIM proceeds of worker's compensation death benefits paid in a previous action before the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Walker v. K&W Cafeterias, 375 N.C. 254 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Policy terms—interpretation—"resident" of "household"—separate dwellings—In a dispute concerning insurance coverage for injuries sustained in a car accident, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff insurance carrier where evidence clearly indicated defendants (a mother and daughter) never lived in the same dwelling as the policyholder (the daughter's paternal grandmother) and therefore did not qualify as a "resident" of the grandmother's "household" within the meaning of the insurance policy. Although defendants lived on the grandmother's farm, they lived in a separate house with a different address than the grandmother and had never actually lived together under the same roof. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Martin, 376 N.C. 280 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Policy—homeowners—definitions—actual cash value—depreciation for labor costs and materials—The term "actual cash value" (ACV) in a homeowners insurance policy unambiguously included depreciation for labor costs in addition to depreciation for material costs even though the "definitions" section of the policy did not provide a definition for ACV. The roof coverage addendum did not distinguish between depreciation of labor costs and depreciation of material costs and should be read in harmony with the remainder of the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed the Business Court's dismissal of plaintiff insured's breach of contract claim. Accardi v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 373 N.C. 292 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Discipline—probable cause hearing without presence of defense counsel—public reprimand—The Supreme Court issued a public reprimand for conduct in violation of Canons 2A and 3A(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute (N.C.G.S. § 7A-376) where a district court judge held a probable cause hearing without a defendant's court-appointed counsel in order to "make a point" about defense counsel's chronic tardiness, demonstrating a disregard by the judge for the defendant's statutory and constitutional rights. The Court rejected respondent-judge's argument that an objectively reasonable reading of the General Statutes allowed him to conduct the probable cause hearing without defense counsel present. In re Clontz, 376 N.C. 128 (2020) (Author: Justice Per Curiam)

Discipline—unprofessional work environment—censure—The Supreme Court censured an appellate judge for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2B, 3A(3), and 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute and willful misconduct in office (N.C.G.S. § 7A-376) where the judge contributed to and enabled an unprofessional work environment in his office and minimized the inappropriate conduct of an employee–a longtime friend–who engaged in a pattern of lying, intimidating co-workers, making sexually inappropriate comments, and using profane language in the office. In re Murphy, 376 N.C. 219 (2020) (Author: Justice Per Curiam)

Misconduct—conduct bringing judicial office into disrepute—response to State Bar—A district court judge was censured for his response to the State Bar concerning a fee dispute that arose when he was an attorney in private practice. He responded using judicial letterhead and his judicial title, incorrectly believing that using the letterhead and title in a personal matter was appropriate because the notices from the State Bar were addressed to him in his official capacity. Some of his statements to the State Bar were misleading or were made with reckless disregard for the truth. However, respondent was candid and cooperative with the Judicial Standards Commission. In re Stone, 373 N.C. 368 (2020) (Author: Justice Per Curiam)

Improper conviction—vacating versus arresting judgment—distinction—Where the trial court improperly entered judgment for both misdemeanor habitual assault and felony assault based on the same assaultive act, the correct remedy was to arrest judgment on the former conviction, rather than vacate it, since there was no fatal defect in the record affecting the verdict itself. State v. Fields, 374 N.C. 629 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Personal—specific—minimum contacts—nonresident company—banking and business meetings—A nonresident company was subject to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina pursuant to the doctrine of specific jurisdiction where the nonresident company executed an agreement with a North Carolina resident to create a Limited-Liability Limited Partnership (LLLP) and the nonresident company's sole representative traveled to North Carolina multiple times to conduct the LLLP's business. The nonresident company's contacts with North Carolina related to the LLLP agreement and its implementation, and the lawsuit was concerned with the nonresident company's conduct under that agreement. Beem USA Ltd.-Liab. Ltd. P'ship v. Grax Consulting LLC, 373 N.C. 297 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Standing—hog farm agreement—Board of Education—The New Hanover Board of Education lacked standing to challenge the authority of the Attorney General to enter an agreement with Smithfield Foods concerning hog waste lagoons. The mere fact that the Attorney General and Smithfield Farms entered the agreement did not harm the Board of Education; the Board was not a party to and did not have rights under the agreement; and the Board would not be entitled to have any money paid to the school fund if the agreement was unenforceable. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Stein, 374 N.C. 102 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Jury selection—Batson analysis—prima facie case—Where a criminal defendant raised a Batson claim at trial, he satisfied the first step of the Batson analysis by making a prima facie showing of racial discrimination during jury selection. The prosecutor's acceptance rate for white prospective jurors was 100%, the prosecutor used 100% of his peremptory challenges to excuse African American prospective jurors, and there was no obvious justification for the peremptory challenges based on the prospective jurors' answers to questions during voir dire. State v. Bennett, 374 N.C. 579 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Jury selection—Batson claim—waiver of appellate review—sufficiency of the record—In a prosecution for multiple drug charges, defendant did not waive appellate review of his Batson claim because the record sufficiently established the race of each prospective juror that the prosecutor peremptorily challenged at trial. Defendant's trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court each agreed that these prospective jurors were African American, and this agreement amounted to a stipulation in the record. State v. Bennett, 374 N.C. 579 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Selection—Batson challenge—pretext—erroneous analysis—Where an African-American first-degree murder defendant lodged Batson challenges to the State's exercise of peremptory challenges against two black potential jurors, the trial court erred in its analysis that ultimately concluded the State's use of its peremptory challenges was not based on race. The trial court erroneously considered the peremptory challenges exercised by defendant; failed to explain how it weighed the totality of the circumstances, including the historical evidence of discrimination raised by defendant; and erroneously focused only on whether the prosecution asked white and black jurors different questions, rather than also comparing their answers. State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Selection—Batson challenge—pretext—erroneous analysis—Where an African-American first-degree murder defendant lodged a Batson challenge to the State's exercise of a peremptory challenge against a black potential juror, the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis that ultimately concluded the State's use of its peremptory challenge was not based on race. That court failed to conduct a comparative juror analysis and failed to weigh all the evidence presented by defendant, including historical evidence of discrimination. State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Selection—Batson challenge—prima facie case—mootness—Whether an African-American first-degree murder defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination in a Batson challenge (Batson's first step) was a moot question because the State provided purportedly race-neutral reasons for its peremptory challenges against black potential jurors (Batson's second step) and the trial court ruled on them (Batson's third step). State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Voir dire—limits on questioning—police officer shootings—racial bias—In a prosecution for multiple crimes arising from a robbery committed during an underground poker game and a subsequent incident during which defendant exchanged gunfire with police officers, the trial court abused its discretion by restricting defendant's questioning during voir dire that prevented any inquiry into whether prospective jurors harbored implicit or racial bias or to explore what opinions those jurors might have regarding police shootings of black men. The trial court's limitations were prejudicial where defendant's attempted questioning, which did not include impermissible stakeout questions, involved issues pertinent to the case. State v. Crump, 376 N.C. 375 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Admissions—sufficiency of factual basis—termination of trial court's jurisdiction—juvenile reaching age of majority—The trial court did not err by accepting a juvenile's admission to attempted larceny where a bicycle was stolen and the juvenile was at the crime scene with bolt cutters in his backpack. However, because the juvenile turned eighteen years old during the pendency of the appeal, the trial court's jurisdiction terminated and the matter was not remanded for a new disposition hearing. In re J.D., 376 N.C. 148 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Breach of lease—automatically renewing—acceptance of rent—right to evict—A Section 8 apartment complex did not waive the right to evict a tenant for breaches of her lease agreement when it accepted her rent payments knowing she had violated her lease. The Supreme Court held that a landlord does not, by accepting rent payments, waive the right to terminate an automatically renewing lease at the end of the lease term for breaches where (1) the landlord notifies the tenant of the breaches, (2) the landlord communicates to the tenant that, as a result of the breaches, the landlord will not renew the lease at the end of the then-effective lease term, (3) the landlord accepts rent from the tenant through the end of the then-effective lease term, and (4) non-renewal of the lease is specifically enumerated in the lease as a remedy in the event of a breach by the tenant. Winston Affordable Hous., LLC v. Roberts, 374 N.C. 395 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Termination of lease—federally subsidized housing—compliance with federal law—A summary ejectment action was remanded to the trial court for findings as to whether a Section 8 apartment complex complied with federal requirements when terminating a tenant's lease. Termination of a lease or a federal subsidy for a tenant in federally subsidized housing requires compliance with applicable federal law as incorporated in the terms of the lease. Winston Affordable Hous., LLC v. Roberts, 374 N.C. 395 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Termination of lease—nonpayment of rent—sufficiency of findings—A summary ejectment action was remanded because it did not contain sufficient findings to support the conclusion that a Section 8 apartment complex was entitled to possession of a tenant's apartment based on her nonpayment of rent. The record did not contain a termination notice regarding nonpayment of rent, and there were no findings as to whether a rent increase was made in accordance with the terms of the lease and federal requirements. Winston Affordable Hous., LLC v. Roberts, 374 N.C. 395 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Defamation—jury instructions—material falsity—attribution—opinion—In a defamation action, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that a materially false attribution may constitute libel where defendant-newspaper reported that several firearms experts had expressed opinions that they did not actually express regarding the work of a State Bureau of Investigation forensic firearms examiner (plaintiff) in two related murder cases. Desmond v. News & Observer Publ'g Co., 375 N.C. 21 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Defamation—jury instructions—punitive damages—statutory aggravating factors—In a defamation action, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it was required to find one of the statutory aggravating factors before awarding punitive damages pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1D-15(a). Contrary to an incorrect statement of law in the pattern jury instructions, a finding of actual malice in the liability stage did not obviate the need for the jury to find one of the statutory aggravating factors. Desmond v. News & Observer Publ'g Co., 375 N.C. 21 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Defamation—newspaper articles—public official—actual malice—forensic firearms examiner—In an action by a State Bureau of Investigation forensic firearms examiner (plaintiff) alleging that a newspaper publishing company and one of its reporters (defendants) defamed her in a series of news articles concerning her work in two related murder cases, plaintiff (who stipulated she was a public official and that the alleged defamation related to her official conduct) presented clear and convincing evidence that defendants acted with actual malice–that is, with knowledge that the alleged defamatory statements were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false. Defendants published several statements claiming that independent firearms experts had asserted that plaintiff–either through extreme incompetence or deliberate fraud–had erred in her laboratory analysis and possibly caused the conviction of an innocent man; however, among other things, the purported expert sources testified that they did not make the statements attributed to them; the reporter made significant mischaracterizations and omissions in the articles; and defendants were aware that an independent examination of the ballistics evidence was planned, but they proceeded with publication without waiting for the results. Desmond v. News & Observer Publ'g Co., 375 N.C. 21 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Disciplinary action—attorney fees—N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1—statutory interpretation—The Supreme Court construed ambiguous phrasing in N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1(a) (regarding attorney fees for a party appealing or defending against an agency decision) as allowing trial courts to award attorney fees in a disciplinary action by a licensing board. Winkler v. N.C. State Bd. of Plumbing, Heating & Fire Sprinkler Contractors, 374 N.C. 726 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Disciplinary action—substantial justification by agency—attorney fees—N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1—The trial court abused its discretion by awarding a contractor attorney fees for defending a disciplinary action brought by the Board of Plumbing, Heating & Fire Sprinkler Contractors because the Board had substantial justification for pursuing its claim, even though it did not prevail. The sequence of events after the contractor erroneously determined that there was no gas leak after he inspected a hotel's pool heating system–work for which he did not possess the requisite license–included the death of three people from carbon monoxide poisoning and the serious injury of another person. Winkler v. N.C. State Bd. of Plumbing, Heating & Fire Sprinkler Contractors, 374 N.C. 726 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Loss of chance—for improved outcome—proximate cause—stroke—In a medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court declined to recognize a new cause of action–"loss of chance"–where a stroke patient (plaintiff) showed only, at most, that defendant-physician's negligence in failing to timely diagnose her stroke lost her the opportunity to receive a time-sensitive treatment that could have given her a 40 percent chance of improved neurological outcome. Plaintiff's claim failed to meet the "more likely than not" (greater than a 50 percent chance) threshold for proximate cause, making summary judgment for defendant-physician proper. Parkes v. Hermann, 376 N.C. 320 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Pleadings—Rule 9(j) affidavit—sufficiency —The plaintiff in a medical malpractice action satisfied her responsibility under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j) by obtaining the opinion of a doctor whom she reasonably expected to meet the test for qualification on the question of whether defendant violated the standard of care for cardiologists in reading the decedent's exercise treadmill stress test and EKG recordings and communicating those results to the ordering physician. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, while it was reasonable to infer that the expert was unwilling to testify against defendant purely on the basis of the report, some of which the expert was not qualified to address, he was willing to testify that defendant's failure to submit the report or otherwise communicate the results was a breach of the standard of care. Furthermore, Rule 9(j) does not require that both the defendant and the testifying witness have exactly the same qualifications. Preston v. Movahed, 374 N.C. 177 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Proximate cause—forecast of evidence—sufficiency—The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to defendants (three hospitalists) where plaintiff presented sufficient evidence, through a proffered expert who was erroneously disqualified from testifying about the standard of care, that the actions of defendants in continuing to prescribe a particular antibiotic to treat decedent's infection–even though she was also taking a corticosteroid–proximately caused decedent to suffer a ruptured tendon. Da Silva v. WakeMed, 375 N.C. 1 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Rule 702—specialist expert—qualifications—similar specialty to defendants—active clinical practice—The trial court erred as a matter of law by disqualifying plaintiff's expert from testifying as to the standard of care in a suit against three hospitalists (for prescribing an antibiotic in conjunction with a corticosteroid) where sufficient evidence was presented as to each requirement in Evidence Rule 702 for qualifying a specialist expert. The proffered expert was board certified in internal medicine and therefore had a similar specialty as the defendant-hospitalists, and his specialty included the performance of the procedure that was the subject of the lawsuit. Further, during the year immediately preceding plaintiff's hospitalization, the proffered expert devoted the majority of his professional time to clinical practice as an internist, including two months full time in a hospital. Da Silva v. WakeMed, 375 N.C. 1 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Indian Child Welfare Act—compliance—termination of parental rights—The trial court's order terminating a mother's parental rights in her child was remanded for further proceedings where the record did not contain sufficient information to show whether the trial court adequately ensured that the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act were met. The trial court had reason to know that the child might be an Indian child, the notices sent by the department of social services (DSS) to the relevant tribes were not contained in the record, and there was no indication that DSS sought assistance from the Bureau of Indian Affairs after several of the tribes did not respond to the notices. In re N.K., 375 N.C. 805 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Indian Child Welfare Act—termination of parental rights—tribal notice requirements—The trial court erred in terminating a father's parental rights to two children without fully complying with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)) and related federal regulations (25 C.F.R. § 23.111). Although notices were sent to each of three federally-recognized Cherokee tribes, albeit not in a timely manner, which prompted responses from two of those tribes, the notices were legally insufficient because they did not include all necessary information. Even if the notices had been sufficient, the trial court failed to ensure that the county department of social services exercised due diligence when contacting the tribes, particularly with regard to the third tribe that did not respond to the notice. In re E.J.B., 375 N.C. 95 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Jurisdiction—special jury instruction—legal versus factual issue—In a case involving a murder on land belonging to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, defendant was not entitled to a special jury verdict on the jurisdictional issue underlying his motion to dismiss the charges against him where the issue hinged on a legal determination of whether the Indian Major Crimes Act applied and not the resolution of a factual dispute. State v. Nobles, 373 N.C. 471 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Status as Indian—tribal or federal recognition—application of balancing test—In a case involving a murder on land belonging to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI), defendant did not qualify as an "Indian" for purposes of the federal Indian Major Crimes Act based on multiple factors, including those found in St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456 (D.S.D. 1988). Defendant was not enrolled in the EBCI, received limited tribal medical benefits as a minor, did not enjoy benefits of tribal affiliation, did not participate in Indian social life, had never previously been subjected to tribal jurisdiction, and did not hold himself out as an Indian. State v. Nobles, 373 N.C. 471 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Status as Indian—tribal or federal recognition—four-factor balancing test—factors not exhaustive—To establish whether a criminal defendant met the definition of "Indian" and therefore was subject to the federal Indian Major Crimes Act for a murder that occurred on land belonging to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the Supreme Court adopted a non-exhaustive balancing test for determining the second prong of a two-pronged test under United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846), which is recognition as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government. The test utilized the four factors set forth in St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456 (D.S.D. 1988), as well as other relevant factors. State v. Nobles, 373 N.C. 471 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Status as Indian—tribal recognition—first descendant status—In a case involving a murder on land belonging to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI), the Supreme Court rejected arguments by the defendant that his status as a first descendant of the EBCI conclusively demonstrated his tribal or federal recognition as an Indian under the second prong of the two-pronged test in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846), precluding the need to consider factors set forth in St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. (D.S.D. 1988), regarding such recognition. Classification as an Indian solely on the basis of percentage of Indian blood (the first Rogers prong) and status as a first descendant would reduce the Rogers test to one of genetics, and ignore a person's social, societal, and spiritual ties to a tribe. State v. Nobles, 373 N.C. 471 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Open and obvious condition—contributory negligence—exterior steps—trip and fall—summary judgment—Defendant church had no duty to warn a visitor (plaintiff) about an allegedly dangerous condition on its exterior steps where the condition was open and obvious–the top step of five steps was visibly higher than the other steps and made of noticeably different materials. Further, plaintiff failed to take reasonable care when he ascended the steps, which he had just descended, as he walked sideways carrying a casket and looking at the door rather than the steps. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. Draughon v. Evening Star Holiness Church of Dunn, 374 N.C. 479 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Termination of parental rights case—personal jurisdiction—service of process by publication—affidavit requirement—The trial court's order terminating a father's parental rights to his daughter was void where the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the father because the mother (who filed the termination petition) failed to properly serve the father with process by publication, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 4(j1), by neglecting to file an affidavit showing the circumstances warranting service by publication. Moreover, where the mother filed a motion seeking leave to serve process by publication, her trial counsel's signature on the motion–certifying the facts therein pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 11(a)–did not satisfy the affidavit requirement under Rule 4(j1). In re S.E.T., 375 N.C. 665 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Career employee—wrongful termination—back pay—attorney fees—An administrative law judge was expressly authorized by statute (N.C.G.S. § 126-34.02) to award back pay and attorney fees to a career local government employee who prevailed in a wrongful termination proceeding under the Human Resources Act. The portions of Watlington v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Rockingham Cty., 252 N.C. App. 512 (2017), to the contrary were overruled. Rouse v. Forsyth Cty. Dep't Soc. Servs., 373 N.C. 400 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Public university—student disciplinary records—effect of federal law on state disclosure requirement—Student disciplinary records sought pursuant to the Public Records Act (PRA)–including the name of the student, the violation committed, and any sanction imposed by the university, but not the date of offense–must be disclosed as public records, despite the records also qualifying as educational records under the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). The federal and state law were not in conflict with each other under these circumstances, and the federal law did not grant discretion to the university to determine whether the records should be disclosed. Therefore, FERPA did not operate to preempt the PRA, either through the doctrine of conflict preemption or field preemption, so as to protect from disclosure the disciplinary records at issue. DTH Media Corp. v. Folt, 374 N.C. 292 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Civil penalty fund—hog farm agreement—The trial court correctly decided to enter summary judgment for the Attorney General in a case questioning whether monies from an agreement with Smithfield Foods concerning hog waste should have gone into the civil penalties fund to be distributed to schools. The payments contemplated by the agreement did not stem from an enforcement action, were not intended to punish or deter Smithfield, and did not constitute penalties. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Stein, 374 N.C. 102 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Reasonable suspicion—disorderly conduct—vehicle passenger—"flipping the bird"—A state trooper lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in disorderly conduct where the trooper saw a vehicle traveling down the road with defendant's arm out of the window making a pumping-up-and-down motion with his middle finger. The trooper did not know whether defendant's gesture was directed at him or at another driver, and the facts were insufficient to lead a reasonable officer to believe that defendant was intending to or was likely to provoke a violent reaction from another driver that would cause a breach of the peace. State v. Ellis, 374 N.C. 340 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Search warrant application—affidavit—probable cause—nexus between location and illegal activity—An affidavit submitted with an application for a search warrant established probable cause to search a residence for suspected drugs and related paraphernalia even though the affidavit did not relate any evidence that drugs were actually sold at the residence, where it showed some connection between the residence and an observed illegal drug transaction conducted by two people known to live at the residence. State v. Bailey, 374 N.C. 332 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Traffic stop—duration—reasonableness—The trial court's findings of fact did not support its denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop where the law enforcement officer who made the initial stop for a speeding violation impermissibly extended the stop without a reasonable and articulable suspicion. Although the officer issued a traffic warning ticket to defendant and stated that the stop was concluded, defendant was still seated in the passenger side of the officer's patrol car when the officer asked if he would be willing to answer more questions. The officer gave contradictory statements during the suppression hearing regarding whether defendant was free to leave at that point. State v. Reed, 373 N.C. 498 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Child abuse by sexual act—definition of "sexual act"—The Court of Appeals erred by holding that the trial court was required to instruct the jury according to the definition of "sexual act" contained in N.C.G.S. § 14-27.1(4) in a felony child abuse by sexual act (N.C.G.S. § 14-318.4(a2)) case. The legislature intended section 14-27.1(4)'s definition of "sexual act" to apply only within its own article, of which felony child abuse by sexual act was not a part. State v. Alonzo, 373 N.C. 437 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Forcible sexual offense—sexual act—anal penetration—sufficiency of evidence—juvenile offender—The State failed to present sufficient evidence to survive a motion to dismiss a juvenile petition for first-degree forcible sexual offense where the victim unambiguously denied that anal penetration occurred, the video recording of the incident did not show penetration, and witnesses indicated only that penetration could have occurred. The State thus failed to present sufficient evidence of a sexual act pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-27.20(4). In re J.D., 376 N.C. 148 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Sexual activity with student by teacher—sufficiency of evidence—status as teacher—There was substantial evidence that defendant was a "teacher" under the statute prohibiting sexual activity with students (N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7) where–even though he was denominated as a "substitute teacher" because he lacked a teaching certificate–he worked at a high school as a full-time physical education teacher, he had a planning period, and he had the same access to students as any certified teacher would. The Supreme Court rejected a hyper-technical interpretation of the statute in favor of a common-sense, case-by-case evaluation of whether an individual would qualify as a teacher under the statute. State v. Smith, 375 N.C. 224 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Sexual exploitation of a minor—video recording of sexual activity—acting in concert—sufficiency of evidence—juvenile offender—The State failed to present sufficient evidence to survive a motion to dismiss a juvenile petition for second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor where the charged juvenile's cousin made and distributed a video recording of the charged juvenile engaging in sexual activity with another juvenile and the State relied on the theory of acting in concert. The State's evidence did not show a common plan or scheme–rather, it showed the charged juvenile telling his cousin not to make the video recording. In re J.D., 376 N.C. 148 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Adjudication—findings of fact—sufficiency of evidence—Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported multiple findings of fact in the trial court's order terminating a father's parental rights to his son, including findings regarding the father's lack of progress in addressing his substance abuse, anger issues, Medicaid insurance coverage, and unwillingness to learn about his son's special needs. Conversely, some findings were not supported by the evidence and were disregarded on appeal. In re J.C.L., 374 N.C. 772 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Best interest of the child—likelihood of adoption—sufficiency of evidence—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of a mother's and father's parental rights was in their children's best interest where, although no potential adoptive placement had been identified at the time of the termination hearing, the evidence showed a high likelihood of the children being adopted and of more resources for recruiting potential adoptive families becoming available once the parents' rights were terminated. In re K.S.D-F., 375 N.C. 626 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Best interest of the child—statutory factors—lack of proposed adoptive placement—The trial court's findings supported its conclusion that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interests of her child, an eleven-year-old with behavioral issues. There was no abuse of discretion where the trial court properly considered the relevant statutory criteria in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a); further, the lack of a proposed adoptive placement at the time of the hearing was not a bar to termination. In re C.B., 375 N.C. 556 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Best interest of the child—statutory factors—likelihood of adoption—behavioral issues—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of a mother and father's parental rights served their twelve-year-old child's best interests where a family was interested in adopting all six of their children (including the twelve-year-old) and the trial court did not find that the child's behavioral issues made adoption unlikely. In re S.M., 375 N.C. 673 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Best interest of the child—sufficiency of findings—likelihood of adoption—bond between parent and child—In a termination of parental rights case, the Supreme Court rejected the mother's challenges to the trial court's dispositional findings regarding her eleven-year-old child who had behavioral issues. The challenged findings on achievement of permanence and likelihood of adoption were supported by competent evidence, and the trial court was not required to make findings about the child's attitude toward adoption or whether the mother's relationship with the child was detrimental to his well-being. In re C.B., 375 N.C. 556 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Best interests of child—bond between children and parent—written findings—The trial court's written findings of fact were sufficient to demonstrate its consideration of the evidence regarding the bond between the children and their mother in determining the children's best interests where the trial court found that the mother had not created a bond with her children, the mother did not visit or maintain regular contact with the children after they were placed with a kinship provider, and the mother had made no effort on her Out of Home Family Services Agreements–findings which the mother did not challenge on appeal. Further, the trial court was not required to make written findings on the children's feelings toward their mother because no evidence was presented on the matter, except for evidence that the children desired to remain with their foster parents. In re C.V.D.C., 374 N.C. 525 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of child—consideration of factors—When determining the best interests of a mother's three minor sons, the trial court properly considered each factor in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and did not need to enter written factual findings as to those factors in the absence of conflicting evidence concerning any factor. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests where all three children were under the age of twelve; the youngest was with a potential adoptive placement and was "100 percent likely" to be adopted; the Department of Social Services had placed the other two in therapeutic foster homes and planned to move them into an adoptive home; and none of the children had a bond with the mother. In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Best interests of child—consideration of factors—no abuse of discretion—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of a mother's parental rights to her four children was in the children's best interests. When making its best interests determination, the court properly considered each dispositional factor under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), entered findings of fact supported by the evidence, and assessed the children's best interests in a way that was consistent with those findings and with the recommendations made by the children's guardian ad litem. In re E.F., 375 N.C. 88 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of child—disposition—standard of review—abuse of discretion—The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a trial court's determination of a child's best interest in a termination proceeding (under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)) is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard of review. In re C.V.D.C., 374 N.C. 525 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of child—fact-finding requirements—statutory interpretation—standard of review—de novo—Whether the trial court complied with the fact-finding requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) in determining a child's best interests was a question of statutory interpretation, which is reviewed de novo. In re C.V.D.C., 374 N.C. 525 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of child—findings—basis—The trial court's conclusion that termination of respondents' parental rights to their three children was in the children's best interests was supported by unchallenged findings of fact addressing the statutory factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Although respondent-father had a strong bond with the oldest child, and the three children would not be able to live together as a family unit after termination, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by weighing certain factors more than others in determining that termination was in the best interests of the children. In re A.H.F.S., 375 N.C. 503 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Best interests of child—likelihood of adoption—developmental challenges—The Supreme Court rejected respondent-mother's argument that her children were unlikely to be adopted due to their serious developmental challenges and that the trial court therefore abused its discretion by terminating her parental rights. The evidence and findings supported the trial court's conclusions that the children had a high likelihood of adoption by specific prospective adoptive parents. In re J.H., 373 N.C. 264 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Best interests of child—placement with relative—evidence showing availability—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of a father's parental rights would be in his child's best interests, and the court was not required to make findings on whether the child could be placed with a relative. Even though the paternal grandmother had been offered as a relative placement option in a previous proceeding, the county department of health and human services (DHHS) had refrained from recommending placement with her because of concerns about her finances, transportation, and criminal history, and the trial court had determined that the child's best interests would be served by remaining in DHHS custody rather than being placed with a relative. In re S.D.C., 373 N.C. 285 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Best interests of child—potential guardian—findings of fact—not required—In determining that termination of a mother's parental rights to her four children was in the children's best interests, the trial court did not err by failing to consider the maternal great-grandmother as a potential guardian because the mother presented insufficient evidence of the great-grandmother's willingness or ability to provide the children a permanent home. Thus, when making its best interests determination, the court was not obligated to enter findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6) about the great-grandmother's eligibility as a placement option for the children. In re E.F., 375 N.C. 88 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of child—statutory factors—likelihood of adoption—aid in accomplishing permanent plan—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of a mother's parental rights to her four children was in the children's best interests. Although the father of the three youngest children retained his parental rights at the time of the termination hearing, the trial court properly found that the children had a high likelihood of being adopted and that terminating the mother's parental rights would aid in accomplishing the children's permanent plan of adoption (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2)-(3)) where competent evidence showed that the father wanted his children's foster caretaker to adopt the children and that the foster caretaker had already taken steps toward doing so. In re E.F., 375 N.C. 88 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of child—statutory factors—no written findings—no conflict in evidence—There was no reversible error in the trial court's failure to make written findings of fact as to several of the factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) where there was no conflict in the evidence as to those statutory factors. In re C.V.D.C., 374 N.C. 525 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of the child—abuse of discretion analysis—The Supreme Court declined to deviate from well-established precedent that a trial court's best interest determination in a termination of parental rights case should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, rather than de novo, as argued by respondent-mother. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interest based on detailed dispositional findings addressing the statutory factors contained in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and that the child's best interests lay in being adopted by his maternal aunt and uncle with whom he had resided for several years. In re A.M.O., 375 N.C. 717 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Best interests of the child—abuse of discretion standard—The standard for reviewing the best interests of the child determination in a termination of parental rights proceeding is abuse of discretion. The trial court, which is involved in the case from the beginning and hears the evidence, is in the best position to assess and weigh the evidence, find the facts, and reach conclusions. In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of the child—adoption or guardianship—sixteen-year-old minor—misapprehension of law—remand—Where the trial court's best interests determination–which found that termination of parental rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan of adoption or guardianship–appeared to rest upon a misapprehension of the legal differences between adoption and guardianship (termination was not necessary to accomplish guardianship), the matter was remanded for reconsideration of guardianship as a dispositional alternative. The trial court was instructed to give proper weight to the now-seventeen-year-old minor's age, his lack of consent to adoption, his bond with his parents, and the availability of a family to be appointed as guardians. In re A.K.O., 375 N.C. 698 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of the child—bond with parents—no abuse of discretion—The trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights proceeding by determining that the best interests of the children were served by termination despite the children's bond with the parents. The trial court considered the statutory factors and performed a reasoned analysis. The trial court's determination was not unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could not be the result of a reasoned decision. In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of the child—constitutionally protected status as parent—forfeiture—willful abandonment—A father lost his constitutionally protected paramount right to the custody, care, and control of his child when the trial court determined that he had willfully abandoned her under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7), and the trial court thereafter properly considered whether the child's best interests would be served by the termination of her father's parental rights–without regard for his constitutionally protected status. In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of the child—current circumstances—speculation—On remand from an earlier appeal, respondent-father failed to show the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of his three children on the existing record without taking additional evidence. The trial court properly relied on evidence from the original termination hearing, and respondent's argument that the trial court failed to take into account changes in the children's circumstances was based on speculation and not supported by a forecast of evidence. In re R.L.O., 375 N.C. 655 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Best interests of the child—dispositional factors—competent evidence—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that termination of both parents' parental rights, rather than guardianship, was in the best interests of the children after considering and weighing the dispositional factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), including the bond the children had with their parents. The court's finding that the two children had a "very strong bond" with their foster parents, despite the children having lived with them for only three months, was supported by the evidence, and the court made an unchallenged finding that the children were highly adoptable. The trial judge's verbal statement suggesting that the foster parents "honor" the relationship the children had with their parents was neither part of the written order nor an acknowledgment that termination was not in the children's best interests. In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Best interests of the child—dispositional factors—private termination action—intention of mother's husband to adopt child—The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a child's best interests would be served by the termination of her father's parental rights in an action between her two parents, where the trial court demonstrated careful consideration of the dispositional factors of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), including the strong bond between the child and the mother's husband, his intention to adopt her, and the loving environment in the home of the mother and her husband. In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of the child—findings of fact—evidentiary support —The trial court's finding of fact during the best interest determination of a termination of parental rights proceeding that children who are adopted often face harm was not supported by competent evidence and was prejudicial, warranting remand, because of the possibility it improperly influenced the trial court's best interest determination. In re R.D., 376 N.C. 244 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Best interests of the child—findings—bond with parent—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child where it considered the dispositional factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 and its findings, including one that the mother-child bond was "similar to that of playmates," were supported by evidence–including testimony by the social worker who supervised visits. Moreover, in making findings regarding the child's relationship with his foster family, the trial court did not improperly relegate the decision of whether to terminate the mother's rights to a direct comparison or choice between the mother and the foster parent. In re A.B.C., 374 N.C. 752 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Best interests of the child—likelihood of adoption—abuse of discretion analysis—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in her daughter's best interests where the court's dispositional findings addressed all the relevant criteria required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). As required by the Court of Appeals' mandate in a prior opinion in the matter, the trial court properly considered the daughter's likelihood of adoption–concluding that a necessary condition to adoptability was the stability and closure that could result only from termination of her mother's parental rights, and recognizing the possibility that the daughter may never achieve adoptability. In re S.M.M., 374 N.C. 911 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Best interests of the child—misapprehension of law—co-parenting inconsistent with termination—The trial court's disposition order concluding that termination of respondent-father's parental rights in his son was in the son's best interests was vacated and remanded for reconsideration where the court's order–directing the department of social services to continue to allow respondent-father to co-parent his son and to honor the son's request not to be adopted by his foster parents–indicated a misapprehension of the law regarding the effect termination would have on the parental-child relationship. In re Z.O.G.-I., 375 N.C. 858 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of the child—multiple children—consideration of factors—for each child—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interests of her five children, where the court made the required dispositional findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) with respect to each child and weighed the findings applicable to each child in making its best interests determinations. Further, the trial court's findings demonstrated that it considered the children's bonds with each other and with their mother and the fact that not all of the children had pre-adoptive placements. In re J.J.H., 376 N.C. 161 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Best interests of the child—private termination action—likelihood of adoption—dispositional factors—In a private termination of parental rights action between a child's two parents, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the child's best interests would be served by termination of the father's parental rights. The mother's relationship with her boyfriend was not sufficiently relevant to require findings on the potential for future adoption, and the trial court properly balanced the factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), including the child's young age, lack of any bond with the father, and need for consistency. In re C.J.C., 374 N.C. 42 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Best interests of the child—statutory factors—findings as to each factor—The trial court did not err when it failed to make explicit findings for each statutory factor listed in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) during a termination of parental rights proceeding because trial courts are not required to make specific findings as to each statutory factor and the trial court properly considered all factors and made written findings for those factors that were relevant. In re R.D., 376 N.C. 244 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Best interests of the child—statutory factors—likelihood of adoption—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of a mother's parental rights would be in the best interests of her children where the trial court made detailed findings of fact addressing each of the relevant criteria in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and the findings were supported by competent evidence. Further, the children's strong bond with their parents and their desire to return to their parents' home did not preclude a finding that the children were likely to be adopted. In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Best interests of the child—statutory factors—likelihood of adoption—child's wishes—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of respondent-father's parental rights was in the best interests of his fifteen-year-old son where the court's findings addressed each of the dispositional factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and were supported by competent evidence. The findings demonstrated the court's consideration of the son's views on being adopted, and supported the court's determination that the son's best interests would not be served by requiring him to consent to adoption. In re B.E., 375 N.C. 730 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Best interests of the child—statutory factors—parent not promoting child's well-being—foster family eager to adopt—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of a mother's parental rights was in her child's best interests where the trial court considered the statutory factors and found that the mother had demonstrated that she would not promote her child's well-being, there had been no progress toward returning the child home after 26 months in social services' care, and the child's foster family was meeting all her needs and eager to adopt her. In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Best interests of the child—statutory factors—sufficiency of findings—adoption—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of a mother's and father's parental rights was in their nine-year-old daughter's best interests where the trial court appropriately considered the statutory factors, making unchallenged findings that the daughter was bonded with her prospective adoptive family and that termination would aid in the permanent plan of adoption. Explicit written findings were not required on matters for which there was no conflict in the evidence. In re A.K.O., 375 N.C. 698 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Best interests of the child—sufficiency of dispositional findings—mother's poverty and mental health—dispositional alternatives—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of a mother's parental rights would be in her child's best interests where the trial court made sufficient dispositional findings and performed the proper statutory analysis. The trial court was not required to make dispositional findings concerning the mother's poverty and mental health issues, and it also was not required to consider whether an alternative plan of guardianship that included visitation would have been in the child's best interests. In re N.K., 375 N.C. 805 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Best interests of the child—weighing factors—evidentiary support—The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of a father's parental rights to his three-year-old son was in the child's best interests. First, the evidence supported the trial court's findings that the child was placed in a pre-adoptive home and had a high likelihood of adoption. Second, although the record contained some evidence weighing against terminating the father's parental rights, the trial court properly weighed the factors in determining the child's best interests (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110), thereby reaching a decision that was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unsupported by reason. In re J.C.L., 374 N.C. 772 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Best interests of the child—weighing of dispositional factors—In a private termination action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of a father's parental rights would be in his children's best interests where the unchallenged dispositional findings included the children's young ages, the children's positive living arrangements with their mother and grandparents, the son's significant progress in overcoming the trauma of seeing his father shoot his mother in the leg, the lack of any bond between the children and the father, and the mother's demonstrated ability to meet the children's needs. The trial court's weighing of the dispositional factors was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unsupported by reason. In re K.L.M., 375 N.C. 118 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Competency inquiry—parental guardian ad litem—In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a second inquiry into whether respondent-mother was entitled to a guardian ad litem despite respondent being adjudicated incompetent and appointed a guardian of the person in a separate adult protective services proceeding. Although these events occurred after the trial court's first determination that respondent was not entitled to a Rule 17 guardian, the trial court was not required to hold another competency hearing before proceeding with termination where there was sufficient evidence that respondent was competent to take part in the proceedings without the aid of a guardian ad litem. In re Q.B., 375 N.C. 826 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Competency inquiry—parental guardian ad litem—obligation of petitioning agency to request—In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the petitioning department of social services was not obligated to request the appointment of a guardian ad litem for respondent-mother if there was reason to believe she was incompetent where Civil Procedure Rule 17(c) imposed no such requirement. In re Q.B., 375 N.C. 826 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Competency of parent—appointment of guardian ad litem—trial court's discretion—In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to inquire into whether a guardian ad litem should have been appointed for respondent-mother, who had untreated mental health problems and a mild intellectual deficit. The trial court had ample opportunity to observe the mother during the proceedings, and the record tended to show that she was not incompetent. In re N.K., 375 N.C. 805 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Competency of parent—guardian ad litem—Rule 17—duties of guardian ad litem—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating respondent-father's parental rights where the performance of respondent's guardian ad litem was legally sufficient. There was no evidence that the guardian ad litem failed to meet or interact with respondent and there was no evidence of actions the guardian ad litem could have taken which would have increased the probability of a favorable ruling for respondent. In re W.K., 376 N.C. 269 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Continuances—beyond 90 days after initial petition—extraordinary circumstances—procrastination—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a father's motion to continue a termination of parental rights hearing where the father filed the motion at the start of the hearing and argued that he had insufficient time to follow the recommendations in his psychosexual evaluation, which he received only the day before the hearing. The father failed to show the existence of extraordinary circumstances for continuance of the termination hearing beyond 90 days from the date of the initial petition (pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(d))–especially because the father's procrastination in submitting to the court-ordered evaluation caused the delay. In re S.M., 375 N.C. 673 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Disposition—best interests of child—no abuse of discretion—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of respondents' parental rights was in the juvenile's best interests. The trial court appropriately considered the factors stated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and the trial court's weighing of those factors was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unsupported by reason. Additionally, the findings of fact which respondents challenged on appeal were supported by competent evidence. In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Disposition—best interests of children—factors—The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of respondents' parental rights was in the best interests of their two minor children. The trial court's factual findings regarding the likelihood of the children's adoption, as well as the nature and extent of the mother's bond with the children (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2), (4)), were supported by sufficient evidence. Moreover, the trial court properly weighed all relevant statutory factors from section 7B-1110(a) when determining the children's best interests. In re I.N.C., 374 N.C. 542 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Dispositional evidence—bifurcated hearings—not required—The trial court in a termination of parental rights case was not required to conduct a separate dispositional hearing where it heard dispositional evidence with adjudicatory evidence and applied the correct evidentiary standards to each. In re S.M.M., 374 N.C. 911 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Effective assistance of counsel—brief cross-examination—conciliatory closing argument—A mother received effective assistance of counsel at a termination of parental rights hearing, even though her attorney only conducted a brief cross-examination of the department of social service's (DSS) key witness and gave a closing argument in which he largely agreed with DSS's presentation of facts that were unfavorable to the mother. Despite the conciliatory tone of his closing argument, the attorney sufficiently advocated for the mother by mentioning several positive facts in her favor, expressing that she did not want to lose her parental rights, and asking the court to rule against terminating her rights. In re T.N.C., 375 N.C. 849 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Evidence—guardian ad litem report—right to confront and cross-examine guardian ad litem—During the disposition phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to subject the guardian ad litem, who also served as the attorney advocate, to cross-examination regarding the report she submitted because a disposition proceeding is not adversarial in nature, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) allows trial courts to consider hearsay evidence, and a potential ethical conflict existed pursuant to Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In re R.D., 376 N.C. 244 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Findings of fact—evidentiary support—Where a father challenged numerous findings of fact in the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his child, several challenges were barred by collateral estoppel, many of the challenged findings were supported by the evidence, and several other challenged findings were disregarded because they were not supported by evidence. In re J.M.J.-J., 374 N.C. 553 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Findings of fact—evidentiary support—In a termination of parental rights case, a finding of fact that a mother did not complete a substance abuse treatment program was disregarded where it did not accurately reflect the evidence and contradicted another of the trial court's findings. Two other findings regarding the mother's housing conditions at the time of the termination hearing were not supported by evidence or were incomplete. In re A.B.C., 374 N.C. 752 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—abandonment—no findings on willfulness—evidence of minimal contact with child—The termination of a mother's parental rights to her daughter on grounds of willful abandonment (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7)) was reversed and remanded on appeal where the termination order failed to address whether the mother's conduct was willful but where some evidence (showing minimal contact between the mother and her child during the relevant statutory period) might have supported termination of parental rights on these grounds. In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—dependency—alternative care placement—sufficiency of findings —The trial court erred in finding grounds to terminate a mother's parental rights based on dependency (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6)) where it failed to enter a finding of fact that the mother lacked an appropriate alternative child care arrangement, and where no evidence was presented to support such a finding. In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—dependency—alternative child care arrangement—placement with legal guardian—The trial court improperly terminated a mother's parental rights on grounds of dependency (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6)) where it failed to make any findings of fact addressing whether the mother lacked an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. Moreover, the statutory requirements for establishing dependency as grounds for termination could not be met where the child had been placed with legal permanent guardians pursuant to a valid permanency planning order. In re A.L.L., 376 N.C. 99 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—dependency—appropriate alternative child care arrangement—no allegation or findings—The trial court erred by concluding that grounds of dependency existed to terminate a mother's parental rights in her child where the department of social services made no allegation that the mother lacked an appropriate alternative child care arrangement and the trial court made no findings addressing the issue. In re K.D.C., 375 N.C. 784 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—dependency—conclusion of law—evidentiary support—The trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of dependency where the trial court's conclusion that the mother was incapable of providing a safe, permanent home for the child was not supported by the record. Instead, evidence demonstrated that the mother adequately addressed her past history of abusive relationships, displayed appropriate parenting techniques, and obtained suitable housing. In re K.L.T., 374 N.C. 826 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Grounds for termination—dependency—existence of appropriate alternative child care arrangement—sufficiency of findings—Where the trial court terminated a sixteen-year-old mother's parental rights in her infant based on dependency (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6)) but failed to make any findings regarding whether the mother had an appropriate alternative child care arrangement, the trial court's findings were insufficient to support its conclusion of law on this ground for termination and the order was reversed. In re K.H., 375 N.C. 610 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—dependency—incarceration—The trial court did not err by terminating a mother's parental rights in her children on the grounds of dependency (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6)) where the mother would be incarcerated for at least twenty-two months beyond the termination hearing and there was no appropriate alternative child care arrangement. The trial court's error in finding that her expected release date was approximately eight additional months later (thirty months) was harmless. In re A.L.S., 375 N.C. 708 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—The trial court properly terminated respondent-father's parental rights in his child based on grounds of failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the child where respondent was put on notice of the requirements of his case plan but failed to consistently submit to drug screens or to demonstrate maintained sobriety, failed to obtain income either through employment or disability benefits, failed to participate in individual therapy, and delayed starting his visitation schedule with the child until over a year after he was released from incarceration. In re Z.O.G.-I., 375 N.C. 858 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—Respondents' parental rights to their three children were properly terminated based on grounds of failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the children where respondents did not adequately address the mother's substance abuse and mental health, conditions and safety of the home, and the children's medical, dental, and developmental needs. Although respondent-father made some progress on his case plan, he did not make reasonable progress toward the primary issues which led to the removal of the children. The trial court's determination that respondent-mother's failure was willful was supported by the evidence and findings of fact. In re A.H.F.S., 375 N.C. 503 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—dependency—The trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her four children under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) after finding that the mother made some progress on her family services plan but willfully failed to make reasonable progress in correcting the filthy, hazardous living conditions which led to the children's removal from her home. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in simultaneously finding the mother mentally incapable of parenting her children for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) where, according to a psychologist's testimony, the mother's cognitive limitations affected her childrearing abilities but not her ability to clean her home. In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—findings of fact—Where the trial court terminated a mother's parental rights to her two children for failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to the removal of her children, the findings challenged by the mother on appeal were supported by competent evidence, including that she had not been honest about, or concealed the truth about, the cause of her younger child's injuries. Respondent-mother provided no medically feasible explanation for the multiple bone fractures suffered by her son while he was under her and her fiance's care, and resumed a relationship with her fiance despite domestic violence incidents. In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—incarceration—The trial court erred by concluding that grounds of failure to make reasonable progress existed to terminate a mother's parental rights where the department of social services failed to carry its burden of proof. The finding that the mother, who was incarcerated, was able to comply with her case plan during her incarceration was not supported by sufficient evidence; her release date was too remote in time (fifteen months) to expect her to have secured housing and employment; and her completion of a "mothering" class was a sufficient attempt to complete a required "parenting" class. In re K.D.C., 375 N.C. 784 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—incarceration—ability to comply with case plan—The trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his daughter on grounds of willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)) where the trial court found that, although the father's incarceration for a drug offense limited his ability to comply with his case plan, the father failed to complete parts of his case plan that he could have accomplished while incarcerated or to supply documentation confirming that he completed any case plan item apart from one parenting class. Additionally, the court found that the father never inquired about his daughter in the fifteen months before his incarceration, even though he knew she was in the department of social services' custody. In re A.J.P., 375 N.C. 516 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—juvenile mother and child in same foster home—Where a sixteen-year-old mother and her nine-month-old baby were taken into social services custody and placed in the same foster home, the time that the mother and baby lived together in the same foster home could not count toward the requisite twelve months of separation for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) because they were not living apart from each other. In re K.H., 375 N.C. 610 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—removal conditions—direct or indirect—In a termination of parental rights case, the Supreme Court rejected a mother's argument that the removal conditions she had to correct to avoid termination based on N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) were limited to those set forth in the underlying petition, which the mother contended were the need for stable and appropriate housing. The trial court had the authority to require her to address any condition that directly or indirectly contributed to the children's removal, which included parenting, mental health concerns, and housing instability. In re E.C., 375 N.C. 581 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—sufficiency of findings—The trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his daughter on grounds of willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)) where the evidence supported the court's findings of fact, including that the father was the mother's drug supplier, the father knew about the mother's pregnancy months before the child's birth, and the father provided drugs to the mother throughout her pregnancy. These findings established a nexus between the conditions leading to the daughter's removal (she tested positive for controlled substances at birth and her mother's drug abuse problems persisted) and the substance abuse and mental health components of the father's case plan that he failed to comply with. In re A.J.P., 375 N.C. 516 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—sufficiency of findings—extremely limited progress—Grounds existed to terminate a mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) for willful failure to make reasonable progress where the mother made only extremely limited progress in correcting the conditions that led to her children's removal and no evidence suggested that the mother had any barriers preventing her from complying with her case plan. Among other things, she failed to cooperate with social services workers; to obtain stable housing, employment, and income; to participate in domestic violence counseling; and to complete a court-ordered substance abuse assessment. In re S.M., 375 N.C. 673 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—sufficiency of findings—failure to comply with case plan—In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court's findings supported its conclusion that a mother willfully left her children in foster care where she failed to comply with the components of her case plan addressing her parenting and mental health issues, and she addressed the housing component only one month before the termination hearing–after the children had been in Youth and Family Services custody for more than three years. In re E.C., 375 N.C. 581 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—failure to make reasonable progress—willfully leaving juveniles in placement outside home—voluntary kinship placement—The trial court erred in finding grounds to terminate a mother's parental rights for willfully leaving her daughter in a placement outside the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to her removal (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)). These grounds did not apply because the mother agreed to place her child with the child's aunt and uncle through a voluntary kinship placement, and the aunt and uncle later obtained full custody though a civil custody order under Chapter 50 of the General Statutes. In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care—In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court's findings established that respondent-mother had the ability to pay some amount toward the cost of care for her children while they were in the custody of the Department of Social Services but did not. Those findings supported the conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights. In re J.M., 373 N.C. 352 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care—The trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his daughter based on willful failure to pay child support (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3)) where the evidence showed that the father was employed during the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, that he earned some income during that time, and that he had the financial means to support his child. The trial court was not obligated to enter findings about the father's living expenses in order to support its adjudication. In re J.A.E.W., 375 N.C. 112 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—failure to pay reasonable portion of cost of care—six months immediately preceding petition—sufficiency of findings—Where the trial court terminated a sixteen-year-old mother's parental rights in her infant for willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3)) but failed to address the six-month time period immediately preceding the filing of the petition, the trial court's findings were insufficient to support its conclusion of law on this ground for termination and the order was reversed. In re K.H., 375 N.C. 610 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—findings—In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court's extensive findings of fact as to the grounds for removal–likelihood that the neglect would be repeated, failure to remedy the conditions leading to the children's removal, and inability to provide care or supervision–were supported by clear and convincing evidence and the findings as a whole supported the legal conclusions. In re J.M., 373 N.C. 352 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—neglect—conclusions of law—The trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her two children on the ground of neglect after concluding that the mother would be likely to neglect her children in the future, based on her failure to provide an explanation for or acknowledge her responsibility for multiple bone fractures suffered by her younger child while he was under her and her fiance's care. In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Grounds for termination—neglect—failure to address underlying problems—sufficiency of evidence—A mother's parental rights in her child were subject to termination on the grounds of neglect (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)) where the child had been adjudicated neglected and the neglect was likely to recur based on the mother's failure to adequately address her substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence problems and to obtain appropriate housing. Contrary to the mother's argument on appeal, the trial court made an independent determination by taking judicial notice of the underlying adjudicatory and dispositional orders, admitting reports from the department of social services and the child's guardian ad litem, and hearing testimony from the child's social worker. In re N.K., 375 N.C. 805 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—neglect—failure to make reasonable progress—sufficiency of findings—In a termination of parental rights case, the findings supported the conclusion that grounds existed to terminate for neglect and failure to make reasonable progress. The trial court found that defendant continued to use alcohol, and the father's three-month period of sobriety did not occur after the permanency planning hearing. Further, the trial court correctly determined that the father's three-month period of sobriety was outweighed by his continuous pattern of relapse. In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds for termination—neglect—findings—The trial court did not err by determining that grounds existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) to terminate the parental rights of a father who had numerous convictions for sex offenses against a child. Despite the father's claims to the contrary, the district court expressly made a specific ultimate finding that there was a high probability that repetition of neglect would occur in the future if the child were placed with his father. The trial court's findings were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. In re N.P., 374 N.C. 61 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—neglect—findings of fact—sufficiency of evidence—In a proceeding to terminate a father's parental rights in his son based on neglect, competent evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact regarding the father's failure to voluntarily contribute to his son's care from his wages and his violation of the conditions of his probation by incurring new criminal charges, but the evidence contradicted the trial court's finding that the father did not enroll in a domestic violence intervention program. In re K.N., 373 N.C. 274 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Grounds for termination—neglect—findings of fact—sufficiency of evidence—The trial court erred by determining that a mother's parental rights should be terminated on the ground of neglect, where its findings regarding the mother's compliance with her case plan, relationship issues, therapy participation, parenting skills, and home environment were not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and partially relied on speculation. Further, one of the court's ultimate findings linking the mother's history to the likelihood of future neglect failed to take into account the mother's positive steps to address domestic violence issues since the child was removed from her care, including obtaining a divorce from and taking out a protective order against the child's father with whom she had been in an abusive relationship, engaging in therapy, and writing a detailed safety plan in anticipation of regaining custody of her child. In re K.L.T., 374 N.C. 826 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Grounds for termination—neglect—findings—evidentiary support—The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact were sufficient to support termination of respondent-father's parental rights on the ground of neglect given respondent's extensive history of substance abuse, failure to follow his case plan, and his lack of contact with his children over several years, and any of the challenged findings that were not supported by evidence had no impact on the trial court's ultimate determination that a ground for termination existed. In re W.K., 376 N.C. 269 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—The trial court properly terminated respondent-father's parental rights to his three children on the grounds of neglect after making supplemental findings of fact from the existing record (on remand from an earlier appeal) without taking new evidence. The findings were binding where respondent did not challenge their evidentiary basis, and they established a pattern of neglect consisting of an unsafe and unsanitary home and improper care of the children, which in turn supported a reasonable conclusion that neglect would likely continue if the children were returned to the father's care. In re R.L.O., 375 N.C. 655 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—The trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his son on grounds of neglect, where the father's lack of progress in completing his case plan with the Department of Social Services indicated a reasonable likelihood of future neglect if his son were returned to his care. In re J.C.L., 374 N.C. 772 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—The trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his son on grounds of neglect, where the father's continued substance abuse, limited progress on his case plan, multiple criminal charges during the pendency of the case, and incarceration after entering an Alford plea to one of those charges–during which he made no attempt to contact his son–indicated a likelihood of future neglect if the son were returned to the father's care. In re A.S.T., 375 N.C. 547 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—In an action between two parents, the trial court properly terminated respondent-mother's parental rights to her child on the grounds of neglect based on an unchallenged finding that the child was previously neglected due to living in an environment injurious to his welfare when living with respondent, and on findings showing a likelihood of repetition of neglect if the child were returned to her care. Respondent's previously stated desire to relinquish her parental rights for a sum of money, her past substance abuse and lack of treatment, her previous failure to contact her son for a period of more than a year, and a lack of evidence that the condition of her home had changed sufficiently demonstrated respondent's inability or unwillingness to provide adequate care and supported a reasonable conclusion that neglect would likely continue in the future. In re D.L.A.D., 375 N.C. 565 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—incarceration—The trial court's findings did not support its conclusion that grounds of neglect existed to terminate a mother's parental rights where the trial court erred in determining that there would be a likelihood of future neglect. The finding that the mother, who was incarcerated, had the ability to comply with her case plan during her incarceration was not supported by sufficient evidence; her release date was too remote in time (fifteen months) to expect her to have secured housing and employment; she completed a "mothering" class (in lieu of a required "parenting" class), an anger management class, and a grief recovery class; and she maintained regular contact with her children. In re K.D.C., 375 N.C. 784 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—neglect by abandonment—The trial court erred in finding grounds to terminate a mother's parental rights to her daughter based on neglect (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)) where there was no evidence to support a finding of a high likelihood of future neglect if the child were returned to the mother's care, apart from highly speculative testimony regarding the mother's ability to care for the child in light of her own mental disabilities. Furthermore, the mother did not neglect her daughter by abandonment where she consistently sent gifts and repeatedly contacted her daughter and her daughter's caregivers over a long period of time leading up to the termination hearing. In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—sufficiency of findings—substance abuse and domestic violence—There was a reasonable probability that a mother with an extensive history of substance abuse and domestic violence would repeat the neglect of her children if they were returned to her care where the trial court found that she was inconsistent with drug screening requirements, failed to establish the status or durability of her sobriety, failed to complete her recommended domestic violence counseling, and demonstrated no meaningful recognition of the effect of domestic violence on her children. In re D.M., 375 N.C. 761 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—neglect—likelihood of future neglect—sufficiency of findings—substance abuse and domestic violence—There was a reasonable probability that a father with an extensive history of substance abuse and domestic violence would repeat the neglect of his children if they were returned to his care where the trial court found that he was inconsistent with drug screening requirements, failed to establish the status or durability of his sobriety, failed to comply with his recommended long-term individual counseling for domestic violence, and demonstrated no meaningful recognition of the effect of domestic violence on his children. In re D.M., 375 N.C. 761 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—neglect—non-compliance with case plan—The trial court's determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent-father's parental rights in his children based on neglect was upheld where it was supported by unchallenged findings of fact and record evidence that respondent failed to comply with numerous requirements of his service plan related to substance abuse, domestic violence, housing, parenting, visitation, and child support. In re K.P.-S.T., 375 N.C. 797 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—neglect—private termination—In a private termination of parental rights action where the child had not been in respondent-mother's physical custody for several years, the trial court properly terminated respondent's rights based on neglect where its unchallenged findings established that the child was previously neglected, supporting a conclusion that the child was likely to be neglected again if returned to respondent's care. In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—neglect—probability of repeated neglect—domestic violence—The trial court did not err by determining that a father's parental rights to his children were subject to termination on the grounds of neglect where the trial court found that a substantial probability existed that the children would be neglected if they were returned to the father's care, based on findings that included the father's lengthy history of domestic violence in the presence of the children, his failure to fully follow the trial court's order to participate in domestic violence treatment, and testimony regarding 911 calls relating to domestic disturbances at his residence. In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—neglect—substance abuse and inappropriate discipline—denial of effect on children—The trial court properly terminated respondent-mother's parental rights in her children based on neglect where the trial court found, based on sufficient evidence, that respondent-mother was in denial about how alcohol abuse by the children's father and physical abuse he inflicted on them affected the children and that her failure to address past trauma through recommended therapy precluded her from providing her children with proper care and supervision. These and other findings supported the court's conclusion that there was a high likelihood of the repetition of neglect should the children be returned to her care. In re B.E., 375 N.C. 730 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Grounds for termination—neglect—substance abuse—probability of future neglect—The trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights after concluding that there existed a high probability of future neglect of the child based on the father's persistent substance abuse issues and domestic discord in the home. The findings of fact in support of that conclusion were in turn supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. 797 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Grounds for termination—neglect—sufficiency of findings—The trial court's findings of fact were insufficient to support its termination of a father's parental rights in his son on the ground of neglect where the trial court's only factual finding directly relating to the father's ability to care for his son concerned the father's incarceration. Incarceration, standing alone, cannot support termination on the ground of neglect without an analysis of the relevant facts and circumstances, which the trial court did not do. Other findings regarding the adequacy of the father's participation in different aspects of his case plan were not fleshed out enough to support a conclusion that neglect was likely to recur if the minor were returned to the father's care. In re K.N., 373 N.C. 274 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Grounds for termination—neglect—sufficiency of findings—The trial court's findings supported its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate a father's parental rights based on neglect (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)) where the father's failure to comply with his case plan during the time he was not incarcerated demonstrated a likelihood of future neglect. Specifically, he continued using illegal drugs, failed to comply with mental health treatment, failed to maintain stable employment or income, failed to take parenting classes, and failed to maintain stable housing suitable for the child. His minimal eleventh-hour efforts during his subsequent incarceration did not outweigh his previous failure to make progress on his case plan. In re O.W.D.A., 375 N.C. 645 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—neglect—sufficiency of findings—evidence of changed circumstances—The trial court's conclusion that grounds existed to terminate a mother's parental rights for neglect was supported by sufficient findings of fact, which were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, where the children were exposed numerous times to domestic violence between their parents and the mother repeatedly returned to her relationship with the abusive father. The trial court was not required to consider in its findings the mother's evidence of changed circumstances–that the father had received a long prison sentence and that she would not return to a relationship with him–in light of the history of the couple's relationship and the fact that the trial court did not have to believe the mother's testimony. In re M.C., 374 N.C. 882 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—neglect—sufficiency of findings—support for legal conclusion—likelihood of future neglect—The trial court properly terminated a mother's rights in her five children on grounds of neglect where clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported the court's findings of fact and where those findings supported its conclusion that a repetition of neglect was likely if the children were returned to the mother's care. Specifically, the mother failed to secure appropriate housing to accommodate the children's special needs, reacted inappropriately to stressful situations, downplayed her children's health and behavioral problems (including her eldest son's inappropriate sexual behavior), missed several scheduled visits with the children, and was incapable of managing the children's complicated schedules and taking them to school or medical appointments. In re J.J.H., 376 N.C. 161 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—neglect—support for conclusion—The trial court did not err by terminating a father's parental rights to his child where the findings of fact supported the conclusion that grounds for termination existed due to neglect. The father's failure to complete his case plan affected his fitness to parent his child because, even though he was not responsible for the mother's substance abuse and mental health problems, the prior adjudication of neglect resulted because the child could not be placed with the father. Further, the father failed to maintain any contact with the child even before he was incarcerated. In re J.M.J.-J., 374 N.C. 553 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—parental rights to another child terminated involuntarily—mental health issues—The trial court did not err by concluding that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9) to terminate a father's parental rights where it was undisputed that his parental rights to another child had been terminated involuntarily and sufficient evidence supported the trial court's findings that the father suffered from antisocial personality disorder, he lied to the county department of social services to conceal his identity, and he made only minimal efforts toward treatment for his mental health issues. Even assuming the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder was stale, the findings nonetheless supported the conclusion that the father was unable to provide a safe home for his child because the nature of the disorder made change unlikely, he lacked interest in and cancelled appointments for treatment, and he engaged in incidents of deception. In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—willful abandonment—conduct outside the statutory period—The trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his daughter on grounds of willful abandonment (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7)) where the trial court found the father knew of his daughter about four months before her birth but failed to contact or provide support to her between her birth and his incarceration for possession of cocaine. Although the father was incarcerated during the relevant six-month period, the trial court properly considered the father's conduct outside that period in evaluating his credibility and intentions within the relevant period. In re A.J.P., 375 N.C. 516 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds for termination—willful abandonment—determinative time period—no contact or support—The trial court's decision terminating a father's parental rights in his child on the grounds of willful abandonment was affirmed where, during the determinative six-month period, the father had no contact with his child, who had moved to California with the mother, despite having working cell phone numbers for the mother and her husband; had expressed no interest in a relationship with the child; and had sent nothing to or for the child except for one partial child support payment. The trial court was also permitted to consider the father's actions outside of the six-month period to evaluate his intentions–for example, the father's failure to express any interest in seeing the child after learning she was back in North Carolina (after the termination petition was filed). In re C.A.H., 375 N.C. 750 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Grounds for termination—willful abandonment—evidence—findings—The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact in a termination of parental rights proceeding were based on sufficient evidence and supported the court's conclusion of law that a mother willfully abandoned her child. The mother's complete failure to attempt any form of contact or communication with her daughter over several years was not excused by a prior custody order which did not grant her visitation rights. In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. 515 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Grounds for termination—willful abandonment—incarceration—order prohibiting direct contact with children—The trial court's findings supported its conclusion that a father's parental rights in his children were subject to termination on the ground of abandonment (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7)). Even though the father was incarcerated and was prohibited by a custody and visitation order from directly contacting his children, he made no attempts during the determinative six-month period to contact the mother or anyone else to inquire about the children's welfare or to send along his best wishes to them. Further, the father would not even clearly tell his trial counsel whether he wanted to contest the termination of parental rights action. In re A.G.D., 374 N.C. 317 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds for termination—willful abandonment—no contact or financial support—In an action between two parents, the trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his daughter based on willful abandonment where, during the nearly three years prior to the filing of the termination petition, the father had no contact with his daughter and provided no financial or other tangible support for her. Although the trial court failed to use the statutory language of "willful abandonment," its findings–based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence–supported the conclusion that respondent's conduct constituted willful abandonment. In re N.M.H., 375 N.C. 637 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds for termination—willful abandonment—willful intent—parent with severe mental health issues—The trial court improperly terminated a mother's parental rights on grounds of willful abandonment where the court failed to enter any factual findings or conclusions of law stating that the mother willfully abandoned her child, and where the record lacked clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of willful intent to forgo all parental duties and claims to the child. Rather, the evidence showed that the mother intended to parent her child but lacked full capacity to do so because of multiple severe mental illnesses. In re A.L.L., 376 N.C. 99 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Grounds for termination—willful failure to make reasonable progress—addiction—The trial court's determination that grounds existed to terminate a mother's parental rights on the basis that she willfully failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions which led to her child's removal from the home was supported by the court's unchallenged findings of fact regarding mother's lack of progress on her substance abuse issues. In re A.B.C., 374 N.C. 752 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds for termination—willful failure to make reasonable progress—nexus between court-approved plan and conditions which led to removal—The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact were sufficient to terminate a mother's parental rights in her daughter on the grounds that she willfully left her daughter in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions which led to the child's removal from her care, and were based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the mother failed to maintain contact with the department of social services while her daughter was in its custody or to participate in any aspect of the court-ordered case plan. Despite the mother's argument that the conditions she failed to correct were not those which directly led to her daughter's removal, there existed a sufficient nexus between the components of the case plan and the overall conditions which led to the daughter's removal from the mother's care. In re C.J., 373 N.C. 260 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Grounds—failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care—In a termination of parental rights case, there was no merit to respondent-mother's contention that she did not know she was required to pay for her children's care while they were in custody and therefore willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care could not be a ground for termination. Parents have an inherent duty to support their children, and the absence of a court order, notice, or knowledge of a requirement to pay support is not a defense to the parent's obligation. Moreover, respondent-mother was on notice through repeated findings in the permanency planning orders. In re S.E., 373 N.C. 360 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Grounds—neglect—findings—conclusions—In a proceeding to terminate a father's parental rights based on neglect, the trial court made detailed findings of fact, supported by competent evidence, that the child was previously adjudicated neglected and that the father had not made sufficient progress toward completing the requirements of his case plan to enable reunification to occur. The findings were sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the child was neglected in the past and that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect given the father's history of criminal activity and substance abuse, his lack of progress in correcting the barriers to reunification, and his inability to provide care for his child at the time of the termination hearing. In re S.D., 374 N.C. 67 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Grounds—willful abandonment—challenged findings—outside determinative time period—In an appeal from the trial court's order terminating a father's parental rights on the grounds of willful abandonment, any error in the trial court's findings challenged by the father were harmless where those challenged findings concerned his actions outside the six-month determinative time period preceding the filing of the petition. In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds—willful abandonment—determinative time period—no contact or financial support—In a termination of parental rights action between a child's two parents, the trial court's findings supported its adjudication of willful abandonment where, during the determinative time period, the father had no contact with the child and provided no financial support for her. In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds—willful abandonment—evidence and findings—The trial court appropriately found grounds to terminate a father's parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) where the father argued that the evidence did not show willful abandonment. The trial court's findings demonstrated that respondent willfully withheld his love, care, and affection from his child during the determinative six-month period. In re B.C.B., 374 N.C. 32 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Grounds—willful failure to make reasonable progress—The trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her daughter based upon a willful failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to the child's removal from the family home (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)). The trial court found that the mother failed to maintain stable housing and employment, frequently missed scheduled visits with her daughter, and failed to attend most of her individual and group therapy sessions despite continuing to be involved in incidents of domestic violence with the daughter's father since the child's removal from the home. In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. 124 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Guardian ad litem—attorney advocate—failure to check box on AOC form—clerical error—On appeal from the termination of a father's parental rights to his child in a private termination action between the two parents, the Supreme Court rejected the father's argument that the trial court erred by failing to appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the child. The attorney advocate was appointed to serve as both GAL and attorney advocate for the child, and the trial court's failure to check the box for "Attorney Advocate is also acting as [GAL]" on the appropriate form was a mere clerical error. Further, the attorney advocate competently fulfilled his role as GAL. In re C.J.C., 374 N.C. 42 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Guardian ad litem—evidence—admissibility of report—During the disposition phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the admission of the guardian ad litem's report because trial courts are allowed to consider any evidence that they deem to be relevant, reliable, and necessary without making specific findings as to admissibility during this stage of the proceeding. In re R.D., 376 N.C. 244 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Jurisdiction—requirements—dependency proceeding in another county—Where a child's permanent legal guardians filed a termination of parental rights petition in the district court in the same county where the child resided with them, that district court had subject matter jurisdiction (pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101) to enter an order terminating the mother's parental rights in the child, regardless of the fact that a district court in another county previously had entered an order establishing a permanent plan of guardianship in the child's dependency proceeding. In re A.L.L., 376 N.C. 99 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Jurisdiction—UCCJEA—home state—record evidence—The trial court had jurisdiction to terminate a father's parental rights to his daughter, even though a prior custody order had been entered in Delaware, where the record reflected that the daughter had lived in North Carolina for more than six months prior to the filing of the juvenile petition, marking North Carolina as the minor's "home state" under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) when the proceedings commenced. In re L.T., 374 N.C. 567 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Jurisdiction—UCCJEA—home state—record evidence—The trial court had jurisdiction to terminate respondents' parental rights to their two children, despite respondents' argument that the trial court failed to make specific findings establishing North Carolina as the children's home state (per the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)) in a previous order adjudicating the children neglected, where record evidence established that both children lived in various locations in North Carolina since they were born and at all times until the department of social services obtained custody. In re A.S.M.R., 375 N.C. 539 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Likelihood of adoption—findings—evidentiary support—In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court's findings of fact regarding the juvenile's likelihood of adoption–including her mental health, her behavioral issues, and her biological family being an obstacle to stability–were supported by competent evidence and properly complied with the Court of Appeals' remand instructions. In re S.M.M., 374 N.C. 911 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Motion for continuance—more time for counsel to review court records—In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the father's motion to continue the termination hearing to allow his counsel time to review a permanency planning order that counsel allegedly never received a copy of. The father failed to show extraordinary circumstances justifying the continuance–which would have extended beyond the statutorily allowed period–where his counsel's court file contained multiple references to the permanency planning order, including summaries of the trial court's findings and of the evidence at the permanency planning hearing. In re A.J.P., 375 N.C. 516 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Motion to continue—denied—abuse of discretion analysis—In a termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a mother's motion to continue the hearing to allow her sixteen-year-old son (who was not the subject of the TPR hearing) to testify, where the court had already granted a month-long continuance on the same basis, the mother made no showing of extraordinary circumstances as required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(d) to justify another continuance, and the mother's counsel did not tender an affidavit or other proof of the significance of the expected testimony. In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. 515 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

No-merit brief—abandonment and neglect—drug use and failure to comply with case plan—The termination of a father's parental rights on the grounds of neglect and abandonment (he had a history of drug-related offenses and failed to comply with his case plan) was affirmed where the father's counsel filed a no-merit brief and the termination order was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and based on proper legal grounds. In re X.P.W., 375 N.C. 694 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

No-merit brief—neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress—The trial court's termination of a mother and father's parental rights on the grounds of neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress was affirmed where their counsel filed a no-merit brief. The termination order was based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and based on proper legal grounds. In re C.R.B., 374 N.C. 523 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

No-merit brief—neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress—The trial court's termination of a mother's parental rights to her two daughters–on grounds of neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions leading to the children's removal from the home–was affirmed where her counsel filed a no-merit brief, and where the record evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact, which in turn supported the statutory grounds for termination and the court's determination that terminating the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest. In re G.L., 375 N.C. 588 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

No-merit brief—neglect—abandonment—parental rights to another child terminated —The termination of a mother's parental rights in her three children on grounds of neglect, abandonment, and having her parental rights in another child terminated and lacking the ability or willingness to establish a safe home (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (7), (9)) was affirmed where her counsel filed a no-merit brief, the evidence supported termination under subsection (a)(9) (which was sufficient to uphold the order), and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that terminating her rights would be in the children's best interests. In re J.S., 375 N.C. 780 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

No-merit brief—neglect—failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care—personal jurisdiction—The termination of a mother's and father's parental rights to their daughter on grounds of neglect and willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care (N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (3)) was affirmed where the parents' counsel filed a no-merit brief, the trial court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the parents (who were served process by publication after diligent but unsuccessful attempts to effect personal service), and the order was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and based on proper legal grounds. In re A.P., 375 N.C. 726 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

No-merit brief—neglect—willful failure to make reasonable progress—The trial court's termination of a mother's parental rights–based on neglect and leaving her child in a placement outside the home without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to his removal–was affirmed where her counsel filed a no-merit brief and the order was based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination. In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. 797 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

No-merit brief—sexual abuse of child—The termination of a father's parental rights was affirmed where his counsel filed a no-merit brief and the termination was based on his sexual abuse of the child. The termination order was based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination. In re R.A.B., 374 N.C. 908 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

No-merit brief—termination on multiple grounds—substance abuse—The termination of a father's parental rights in his two children on multiple statutory grounds (he had a history of substance abuse, which the children were exposed to at home, and he made minimal progress in addressing the problem) was affirmed where the father's counsel filed a no-merit brief and the termination order was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. In re S.D.H., 375 N.C. 846 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

On remand from earlier appeal—no new evidence taken—abuse of discretion analysis—On remand from an earlier appeal, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating respondent-father's parental rights to his three children on review of the existing record without taking further evidence. Not only did respondent stipulate that the trial court could enter an order on remand without an evidentiary hearing, but also the Court of Appeals' instructions for the trial court on remand left the decision to take new evidence in the trial court's discretion. In re R.L.O., 375 N.C. 655 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Parental right to counsel—withdrawal of counsel—pro se representation—inquiry by trial court—The trial court erred by allowing a mother's retained counsel to withdraw from representation in a termination of parental rights case without first conducting an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding counsel's motion to withdraw–for example, whether the mother had been served the withdrawal motion, whether counsel had informed the mother of his intent to withdraw, why the mother had asked him to withdraw, and whether the mother understood the implications of counsel withdrawing. The trial court then further erred by allowing the mother to represent herself at the termination hearing without first conducting an adequate inquiry into whether she knowingly and voluntarily wished to appear pro se. In re K.M.W., 376 N.C. 195 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Permanency planning order—reunification with parent—eliminated—sufficiency of findings—Before terminating a mother's parental rights to her daughter, the trial court did not err by entering a permanency planning order eliminating reunification with the mother from the child's permanent plan. Not only did the trial court's findings of fact address each of the factors stated in N.C.G.S. § 906.2(d) for evaluating the likely success of future reunification efforts, but the court also expressly found that the mother and the child's father–who shared a continuing pattern of domestic violence and often neglected to feed their child–acted in a manner inconsistent with the child's health and safety. In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. 124 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Permanency planning order—standard of proof—misstated—harmless error—Before terminating a mother's parental rights to her daughter, the trial court did not commit prejudicial error by misstating the applicable standard of proof in a permanency planning order that eliminated reunification with the mother from the child's permanent plan. Under the misstated standard, the trial court's decision to eliminate reunification from the permanent plan rested upon findings of fact that required the petitioner (the Department of Social Services) to present stronger proof than the law actually required; therefore, the trial court's error worked in the mother's favor. In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. 124 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Permanency planning order—visitation—reduced—proper—Before terminating a mother's parental rights to her daughter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering a permanency planning order reducing the amount of visitation the mother was entitled to have with the child. In addition to properly eliminating reunification with the mother from the child's permanent plan, the court found that the mother neglected to take full advantage of her existing visitation rights, frequently missing or arriving late to visits with her daughter. In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. 124 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Personal jurisdiction—amended petition—new summons—The trial court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over a father in a termination of parental rights (TPR) case where the Health and Human Services Agency (HHSA)–after discovering a jurisdictional defect in its original TPR petition–filed an amended petition and served the father with a new summons. The new summons and petition constituted new filings initiating a second TPR proceeding. Thus, although HHSA's failure to obtain the issuance of an alias and pluries summons or an endorsement of the original summons would have discontinued the first proceeding, it had no effect on jurisdiction in the second proceeding. In re W.I.M., 374 N.C. 922 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Personal jurisdiction—nonresident parent—minimum contacts—status exception —In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court held that the status exception to the minimum contacts requirement of personal jurisdiction applied in termination of parental rights proceedings. Thus, due process did not require a nonresident father in a termination of parental rights case to have minimum contacts with the state of North Carolina in order for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. In re F.S.T.Y., 374 N.C. 532 (2020) (Author: Justice Cheri Beasley)

Petition to terminate parental rights—denied—alleged mistake of law—findings of ultimate fact—conclusions of law—sufficiency—In an order denying a mother's petition to terminate the father's parental rights to their child, the trial court's statement that the mother failed to prove that "necessary grounds" for termination existed did not indicate that the court mistakenly believed the mother had to prove multiple grounds for terminating the father's rights. However, the order was still vacated and remanded because the trial court failed to make sufficient, specific findings of ultimate fact–as required under N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109(e) and -1110(c)–and sufficient conclusions of law to allow for meaningful appellate review. In re K.R.C., 374 N.C. 849 (2020) (Author: Justice Michael Morgan)

Pleadings—sufficiency—failure to pay child support—willful abandonment—A mother's petition to terminate a father's parental rights was sufficient to survive the father's motion to dismiss. Contrary to the father's argument, the petition specifically alleged that his failure to pay child support and abandonment of his child were willful. Petitioner addressed at length the father's violation of child support orders and his failure to exercise visitation. In re B.C.B., 374 N.C. 32 (2020) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Remand from appellate court—motion to reopen evidence—trial court's discretion—mere speculation—In a termination of parental rights case on remand from the Court of Appeals for dispositional findings on the juvenile's likelihood of adoption, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the mother's motion to reopen the evidence. The Court of Appeals left the decision whether to take new evidence on remand to the trial court's discretion; further, the mother's motion offered mere speculation rather than a forecast of relevant evidence bearing upon the juvenile's best interests. In re S.M.M., 374 N.C. 911 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Reunification efforts—cessation—adequacy of progress—best interests of child—The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that ceasing reunification efforts was in the best interests of respondent-mother's children where the evidence supported the trial court's findings that she made only "some progress" on her parenting skills, struggled with and was uncooperative in parent coaching sessions, and could not safely parent her children. In re J.H., 373 N.C. 264 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Standard of proof—clear, cogent, and convincing evidence—statement in open court —The trial court did not commit error in a termination of parental rights case when it failed to include the "clear, cogent, and convincing" standard of proof in its written order because it announced the proper standard of proof in open court, satisfying the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f). In re B.L.H., 376 N.C. 118 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Standing to file petition—effect on trial court's jurisdiction—In a termination of parental rights case, where the trial court entered a permanency planning order awarding custody and guardianship of the children to their great-aunt and uncle while specifically retaining jurisdiction and providing for further hearings upon motion by any party, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter an order granting nonsecure custody of the children to the department of social services (DSS) after DSS filed a motion seeking review of the children's custody arrangement. Thus, as a party granted custody by a "court of competent jurisdiction," DSS had standing to file a petition to terminate respondent-parents' rights to the children and, therefore, did not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. In re K.S.D-F., 375 N.C. 626 (2020) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Standing—underlying adjudication order—not appealed—collateral attack—Respondents' failure to appeal from a trial court's order adjudicating their two children neglected constituted an abandonment of any non-jurisdictional challenges to that order. Not only were they precluded from collaterally attacking that order in a subsequent termination of parental rights proceeding, but in addition, their contention that the adjudication order contained errors, even if true, would not deprive the department of social services of standing to pursue a termination of parental rights proceeding. In re A.S.M.R., 375 N.C. 539 (2020) (Author: Justice Mark Davis)

Subject matter jurisdiction—proceeding in another state—In a termination of parental rights case, the trial had subject matter jurisdiction despite respondent-mother's contentions involving a prior Oklahoma protective services and child custody determination. Respondent-mother relied on allegations and inferences to support her argument and did not meet her burden of showing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Furthermore, respondent-mother stipulated that the Oklahoma matter had been closed. In re S.E., 373 N.C. 360 (2020) (Author: Justice Robin Hudson)

Choice of law—misappropriation of trade secrets—lex loci test—The trial court did not err by determining that the appropriate choice of law test for use in misappropriation of trade secrets cases in North Carolina was lex loci. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence favored the use of the lex loci test in cases involving tort or tort-like claims, and the weight of authority was supported by practical considerations. SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Misappropriation—choice of law—application of lex loci test—Applying the lex loci test to plaintiff's misappropriation of trade secrets claim, the trial court properly determined that North Carolina law did not apply. All of the evidence tended to show that any misappropriation of plaintiff's trade secrets by defendants occurred outside North Carolina. The fact that there was sufficient evidence to determine that defendants violated a North Carolina consent order did not render the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act applicable. SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Summary judgment—confidentiality of information—public knowledge—The trial court did not err in a misappropriation of trade secrets action related to specialty adhesives by concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the extent to which the relevant component was publicly known before defendants used it for their own products. SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Antitrust claims against local hospital authority—Chapter 75—applicability to quasi-municipal corporations—In a class action suit brought by North Carolina residents against a local hospital authority, which had been including provisions in its contracts encouraging insurers to steer patients toward the hospital authority's services while forbidding insurers from allowing competitors to enforce similar contract provisions, the trial court properly granted the hospital authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiffs' antitrust claims (restraint of trade, unfair or deceptive practices, and monopolization) under Chapter 75 of the General Statutes. The hospital authority–as a quasi-municipal, non-profit corporation–was not subject to liability under Chapter 75, which applies to actions of a "person, firm, or corporation." DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 376 N.C. 63 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Summary judgment—substantial aggravating circumstances—intentional breach of consent order—not alone sufficient—The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's unfair and deceptive trade practices (UDTP) claim where plaintiff merely alleged the intentional breach of a consent order, which was not sufficient by itself to establish the required substantial aggravating circumstance to support a UDTP claim. SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

General rate case—coal ash spill—coal ash remediation costs—rejection of equitable sharing proposal—reversed and remanded—In two general rate cases (consolidated on appeal), where the Utilities Commission entered orders allowing two electric companies to include certain coal ash remediation costs in the cost of service used to establish their retail rates, the orders were reversed and remanded because the Commission failed to consider all "material facts in the record," pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 62-133(d), before rejecting an equitable sharing arrangement proposed by the Public Staff in response to the companies' numerous environmental violations. Specifically, the Commission failed to evaluate the extent to which the companies committed environmental violations relating to coal ash management before deciding whether the companies' coal ash-related costs were reasonable or whether equitable sharing of those costs between shareholders and ratepayers was necessary. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Stein, 375 N.C. 870 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

General rate case—coal ash spill—inclusion of coal ash remediation costs in rate base calculation—reasonableness of the costs—In two general rate cases (consolidated on appeal), where the Utilities Commission allowed two electric companies to include certain coal ash remediation costs in the cost of service used to establish their retail rates, the Commission properly found the companies "reasonably and prudently incurred" these costs in compliance with the Coal Ash Management Act (CAMA), which was enacted shortly after the companies faced criminal charges for a coal ash spill at one of their facilities. The Attorney General failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness by failing to produce evidence showing the companies should have begun the remediation process sooner than they did or that the companies' coal ash spill was the main reason for CAMA's enactment. Further, the intervenors in both cases failed to identify which specific costs were unreasonable. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Stein, 375 N.C. 870 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

General rate case—coal ash spill—inclusion of coal ash remediation costs in rate base calculation—section 62-133.13—applicability—In two general rate cases (consolidated on appeal), the Utilities Commission properly allowed two electric companies to include certain coal ash remediation costs in the cost of service used to establish their retail rates because N.C.G.S. § 62-133.13 (forbidding utilities from recovering costs related to unlawful discharges of coal combustion residuals into surface waters) did not preclude it from doing so. Although the companies had recently faced criminal charges when a burst pipe at one of their facilities emitted large quantities of coal ash into a local river, the Commission found the companies incurred their coal ash remediation costs to comply with federal and state environmental law rather than as the result of that coal ash spill. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Stein, 375 N.C. 870 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

General rate case—coal ash spill—return on coal ash remediation costs—consideration of "other material facts"—In two general rate cases (consolidated on appeal), where the Utilities Commission allowed two electric companies to defer certain coal ash remediation costs and to include those costs in the cost of service used to establish their retail rates, the Commission properly allowed the companies to earn a return on the unamortized balance of those costs. Although this decision represented a departure from ordinary ratemaking procedures, it was nevertheless lawful where the Commission properly exercised its authority under N.C.G.S. § 62-133(d) to "consider all other material facts of record" apart from those specifically mentioned throughout section 62-133 (the ratemaking statute) when determining what rates would be "just and reasonable." State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Stein, 375 N.C. 870 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

General rate case—coal ash spill—return on coal ash remediation costs—sufficiency of findings—In two general rate cases (consolidated on appeal), where the Utilities Commission allowed two electric companies to include certain coal ash remediation costs in the cost of service used to establish their retail rates, the Commission entered sufficient findings of fact pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 62-79(a) to enable the Court of Appeals to discern the bases for also allowing the companies to earn a return on the unamortized balance of those costs. Although intervenors in both cases argued that the Commission made contradictory findings about how it classified the coal ash-related costs under the ratemaking statute (N.C.G.S. § 62-133), the Commission clearly decided that it had authority to allow the return on those costs regardless of the classification issue. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Stein, 375 N.C. 870 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

General rate case—increase in basic facilities charge—for one class of ratepayers—In a general rate case, the Utilities Commission did not err by authorizing an electric company to increase the basic facilities charge for the residential rate class while leaving the facilities charges against other classes of ratepayers unchanged. Evidence in the record supported the increase, as well as the exact dollar figure the Commission chose and the methodology used to generate that figure, and the Commission properly balanced competing policy goals when approving the increase. Further, the Commission adequately considered any adverse effects of the increased facilities charge on low-income customers and showed that the increase was not "unduly discriminatory" under N.C.G.S. § 62-140. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Stein, 375 N.C. 870 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Conditional use permit—denied by city council—standard of review by superior court—A trial court used the correct standards when reviewing a city council's denial of a conditional use permit for a hotel, including reviewing de novo the issue of whether the hotel developer made the necessary prima facie showing that it presented competent, material, and substantial evidence tending to satisfy the standards set forth in the city's unified development ordinance. PHG Asheville, LLC v. City of Asheville, 374 N.C. 133 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Conditional use permit—prima facie entitlement—sufficiency of evidence—A hotel developer seeking a conditional use permit presented competent, material, and substantial evidence tending to show it satisfied the standards set forth in the city's unified development ordinance by presenting three expert witnesses and their respective reports regarding the impact of the project on adjoining properties and traffic. PHG Asheville, LLC v. City of Asheville, 374 N.C. 133 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Conditional use permit—prima facie showing by applicant—authority of city to deny permit—Upon a prima facie showing by a hotel developer that it met its burden of production by presenting competent, material, and substantial evidence tending to show it satisfied the standards set forth in the city's unified development ordinance, the city had no authority to deny the permit in the absence of a similar level of evidence in opposition. Although a city council may rely on special knowledge of local conditions, the questions raised in this case by council members were not sufficient to justify a finding that the developer had not met its burden. PHG Asheville, LLC v. City of Asheville, 374 N.C. 133 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Conditional use permit—unified development ordinance—city bound by standards—The Supreme Court rejected an argument by a city that its denial of a conditional use permit for a hotel was proper pursuant to Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1 (2002). In this case, the city council was bound by the standards set forth in the city's unified development ordinance, and an applicant that has presented competent, material, and substantial evidence that it has satisfied those standards has made a prima facie case that it is entitled to issuance of a permit. PHG Asheville, LLC v. City of Asheville, 374 N.C. 133 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)

Planning permit application—preliminary letter of assessment—not binding or final—A county was not required to appeal from a letter issued by the county planning director, because the letter was not binding or final–despite containing a favorable recommendation regarding an application to operate an asphalt plant–where it did not contain determinative or authoritative language and did not affect the rights of the parties. Since the county was not precluded from challenging the trial court's order requiring the county to issue the permit, the matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of the remaining issues on appeal. Ashe Cnty. v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd., 376 N.C. 1 (2020) (Author: Justice Sam Ervin, IV)