Medicaid reimbursements—prepayment review—constitutional violations alleged—no genuine issue of material fact—In a complex business case arising from the decision of the N.C. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to place a medical services company on Medicaid reimbursement prepayment review for alleged overbilling practices, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to DHHS where the company's evidentiary forecast did not demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact with regard to its substantive due process and equal protection violation claims. The agency's decision was not arbitrary and capricious where its reasons for placing the company on prepayment review were rationally related to a legitimate government interest of combating Medicaid fraud and where there was no evidence that DHHS treated the company differently from other personal care providers similarly situated. Halikierra Cmty. Servs. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 59A23 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Criminal conversation—unidentified lover—summary judgment—evidence of post-separation dating relationship—mere conjecture—The trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation, where plaintiff's wife began a romantic relationship with defendant about three months after separating from plaintiff and over a year after admitting to plaintiff that, while they were still married, she had had sexual intercourse with an unidentified coworker. Although evidence of post-separation conduct may be used at the summary judgment phase to corroborate evidence of pre-separation conduct, plaintiff's evidence regarding the pre-separation affair between his wife and the unidentified coworker did not give rise to anything more than "mere conjecture" that defendant was that same coworker; consequently, the evidence failed to support the malice prong of plaintiff's alienation of affection claim and the sexual intercourse element of his criminal conversation claim. Beavers v. McMican, No. 294A22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Class certification—inconsistent definitions of class—further issues for review on remand—In a class action lawsuit arising from an allegedly deceptive promotional flyer that a car dealership sent to plaintiffs–who were led to believe that they had won either a large cash prize or a free car when, in fact, they had won only two dollars–the trial court's class certification order was vacated because of an internal inconsistency in the order that precluded meaningful appellate review. Specifically, the court's order defined the prospective class in one way–as individuals who called the hotline listed on the flyer and then went to the car dealership to claim their prize–when analyzing the certification criteria, but then defined the class differently–as individuals who went to the car dealership to claim the prize regardless of whether they called the hotline–when certifying the class. The matter was remanded with additional instructions for the trial court to determine whether any conflicts of interest existed within the proposed class and whether any potential inefficiencies existed that would render class certification inappropriate–two issues that could only be resolved after the court settled on one definition of the class. Surgeon v. TKO Shelby, LLC, No. 198A22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Effective assistance of counsel—trial counsel—right to testify at trial—appellate counsel—Anders brief—motion for appropriate relief—The denial of a criminal defendant's motion for appropriate relief (MAR) was affirmed where defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) lacked merit. With respect to his first IAC claim, the record did not support defendant's argument that his trial counsel had neither informed him of his right to testify at trial nor allowed him to testify despite his desire to do so; rather, the trial court's colloquy with defendant revealed that defendant was aware of his right to testify, and nothing in the record suggested that defendant intended to exercise that right. With respect to defendant's second IAC claim, defendant's appellate counsel–who filed an Anders brief in defendant's appeal–was not ineffective for declining to argue that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of defendant's expert witness, since defendant's MAR failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in limiting that testimony. State v. Walker, No. 202PA22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

North Carolina—right to a speedy trial—convictions set aside—adequacy of remedy—Where plaintiff's criminal convictions were vacated as a remedy for the State having violated plaintiff's constitutional right to a speedy trial, plaintiff was not entitled to additional relief in the form of money damages, which he sought in a private action pursuant to Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761 (1992), because Corum claims are reserved solely for instances in which a plaintiff has no other forum in which to seek redress for a constitutional violation. Where plaintiff had an opportunity to present and have his constitutional claim heard, and was given an adequate state remedy, the trial court properly granted summary judgment against plaintiff in his action against the State and the officials involved in his criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision where, although the latter court correctly upheld the trial court's order, its reliance on a federal case rather than Corum to reach its conclusion was expressly disavowed. Washington v. Cline, No. 148PA14-2 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Motion for appropriate relief—standard of review—case overruled—In an appeal from the denial of a criminal defendant's motion for appropriate relief (MAR), in which defendant asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and in his prior appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the standard of review for MARs laid out in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c) while overruling the standard set forth in [i/]State v. Allen, 378 N.C. 286 (2021), which stated that the factual allegations contained in a defendant's MAR should be reviewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Walker, No. 202PA22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Governmental—speed limit exceeded by police officer—no statutory waiver of immunity—In a negligence and wrongful death action filed against a city and a police officer (defendants) by the estate of a pedestrian who was struck and killed while the officer was driving to the scene of a domestic violence incident, the speed limit exemption in N.C.G.S. § 20-145–under which speed limits do not apply to police officers while chasing or apprehending violators of the law or to other vehicle operators traveling in response to an emergency–did not operate as a statutory waiver of governmental immunity. Section 20-145, with its focus on individual drivers and individual actions and inclusion of non-governmental actors, contained no plain or clear legislative mandate withdrawing immunity from a discrete government body. Est. of Graham v. Lambert, No. 113A22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Governmental—speed limit exceeded by police officer—official capacity suit—same waiver analysis as for city—In a negligence and wrongful death action filed against a city and a police officer (defendants) by the estate of a pedestrian who was struck and killed while the officer was driving to the scene of a domestic violence incident, where the Court of Appeals' decision was reversed because that court applied the wrong standard of review to the trial court's order denying summary judgment to defendants, the Court of Appeals was instructed on remand to treat the estate's claim against the officer in his official capacity as merged with the claim against the city. Est. of Graham v. Lambert, No. 113A22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Governmental—waiver by insurance—standard for reviewing summary judgment denial—In a negligence and wrongful death action filed against a city and a police officer (defendants) by the estate of a pedestrian who was struck and killed while the officer was driving to the scene of a domestic violence incident, the Court of Appeals erred by applying the wrong legal standard when it reversed the trial court's order denying summary judgment to defendants. Rather than analyzing whether the evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the city had waived governmental immunity by purchasing liability insurance, the Court of Appeals instead erroneously employed the standard under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim) by focusing on the sufficiency of the complaint to raise the issue of waiver. Est. of Graham v. Lambert, No. 113A22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Discipline—improper phone call to magistrate—to demand bond reduction for her son—closing down administrative courtroom without permission—suspension—On the basis of two incidents, a district court judge was suspended without pay for 120 days for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(3), 3A(5), 3B(1), and 3C of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute (N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b)). In the first incident, the judge called a magistrate's office, used her judicial title to ask if a particular criminal defendant had been placed into custody without disclosing that that defendant was her son, and then yelled at the magistrate while demanding a bond reduction for her son based on inaccurate information. In the second incident, the judge–while on notice of the disciplinary charges filed against her based on the first incident–demanded, without first notifying her chief district court judge, that an assistant district attorney and a presiding magistrate close their administrative courtroom for her own use despite an active administrative order mandating that the courtroom remain open; notably, the judge's conduct caused more than one hundred cases to be continued. In re Foster, No. 347A23 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Per Curiam)

Personal—service of process—waiver—post-judgment motion to exempt property—general appearance —In a complex business case, in which defendant did not appear until after the trial court had already entered its judgment, at which point she filed a motion to claim exempt property pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1C-1603, the Business Court properly denied defendant's subsequent motion to set aside both the entries of default against her and the order of summary judgment for plaintiff–pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)–where defendant argued that the Business Court lacked personal jurisdiction over her because she had not been served with process. By moving to claim exempt property after judgment without also raising her objections to personal jurisdiction and the sufficiency of service of process, defendant made a general appearance in the action and therefore waived those objections. Slattery v. Appy City, LLC, No. 218A22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Standing—challenge to monument removal—breach of contract alleged—legal injury—In a dispute over a city's decision to remove a monument from public property, although the Court of Appeals properly upheld the trial court's order dismissing plaintiff historical society's claims (for breach of contract, a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a declaratory judgment), its decision was modified and affirmed. The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that plaintiff lacked standing under Rule 12(b)(1) to bring its breach of contract claim–which was a different basis for dismissal than that found by the trial court (failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6))–where plaintiff sufficiently alleged a legal injury to give rise to standing for that claim by alleging that a valid contract existed and that the contract had been breached. The Court of Appeals properly upheld the dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims for lack of standing, and plaintiff abandoned any argument regarding the merits of its breach of contract claim. Soc'y for the Hist. Pres. of the Twenty-sixth N.C. Troops, Inc. v. City of Asheville, No. 123PA22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Implied warranty of habitability—corroded gas line—notice requirement—In an action against a landlord (defendant) by his tenant (plaintiff) who was severely injured in a gas explosion that was caused by a corroded gas line to a furnace, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claim for breach of implied warranty of habitability, because there was no evidence that defendant knew or should have known about the need for any repairs to keep the property in a fit and habitable condition, where plaintiff never informed defendant that the bathroom floor directly over the furnace had a large hole through which water leaked or that a smell of natural gas had been detected in the home, and plaintiff did not ask defendant to make any repairs. Terry v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C., No. 28A23 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Residential Rental Agreements Act—corroded gas line—notice requirement—no duty to inspect—In an action against a landlord (defendant) by his tenant (plaintiff) who was severely injured in a gas explosion that was caused by a corroded gas line to a furnace, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claim that defendant violated the Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA), because the RRAA does not include a duty for landlords to regularly inspect rental property and there was no evidence that defendant knew or should have known about the hazardous condition or that there was a violation of the housing code, particularly since plaintiff did not inform defendant about the hole in the bathroom floor directly over the furnace through which water leaked or that a smell of natural gas had been detected in the home. Terry v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C., No. 28A23 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Insurance—underinsured motorist coverage—qualification as underinsured highway vehicle—interpolicy stacking—not permitted—In a declaratory judgment action to determine the underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage available to defendant, who owned the at-fault vehicle in a fatal car crash but was not the tortfeasor (his friend was driving the car while defendant rode as a passenger), the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings for defendant and thereby allowing him to recover under both his own policy and his parents' policy. Under the plain language of the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act, defendant could not "stack" the UIM coverage limits from his own policy and his parents' policy (which named defendant as an insured but did not cover his car) in order to qualify his car as an "underinsured highway vehicle" for purposes of activating his own policy's UIM coverage and bringing a UIM claim under that policy. Further, because defendant could not "stack" multiple UIM limits, his car did not meet the alternate definition of "underinsured highway vehicle" under the "multiple claimant exception" of the Act (N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4)). N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hebert, No. 281A22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Common law negligence—rental property—corroded gas line—requirement of notice to landlord—In an action against a landlord (defendant) by his tenant (plaintiff) who was severely injured in a gas explosion that was caused by a corroded gas line to a furnace, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's common law negligence claim, because there was no duty for defendant to repair absent actual knowledge or notice given by plaintiff about a dangerous condition on the property. Plaintiff, who had lived in the property for years, knew that there was a hole in the bathroom floor directly above the gas furnace through which water leaked and that the gas company and fire department had come to the home more than once after receiving reports of a gas smell coming from the home, but at no time did plaintiff inform defendant about these issues or request a repair. Terry v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C., No. 28A23 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Negligence per se—rental property—corroded gas line—housing code violation—knowledge by landlord required—In an action against a landlord (defendant) by his tenant (plaintiff) who was severely injured in a gas explosion that was caused by a corroded gas line to a furnace, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claim that defendant was negligent per se for violating the housing code, because there was no evidence that defendant knew or should have known that there was a housing code violation, particularly where plaintiff never informed defendant that the bathroom floor directly over the furnace had a large hole through which water leaked or that a smell of natural gas had been detected in the home. Terry v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C., No. 28A23 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Warrantless search—standing to challenge—reasonable expectation of privacy—material fact questions—findings required—In a prosecution for multiple drug offenses, where the trial court denied defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence that was found during a warrantless entry into defendant's uncle's house, but where the ruling was made orally and was never memorialized in a written order with findings of fact, the matter was remanded for the trial court to make the necessary findings of fact regarding the central question of whether defendant had standing to challenge the search of the home. There were material conflicts in the evidence requiring resolution by the trial court, although the record contained evidence that could support a determination that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home, despite defendant's statements to law enforcement that he did not live in the home and had no possessions there. Depending on the facts found, the court could either deny the motion to suppress again or grant a new trial. State v. Jordan, No. 124PA22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Compulsory counterclaim—relation back to filing of complaint—permitted by Rules of Civil Procedure—In a case arising from a motor vehicle accident, the Rules of Civil Procedure did not preclude the relation back of defendant's counterclaim to the date that the complaint was filed, and therefore defendant's counterclaim–which was filed one day after both the filing of plaintiff's complaint and the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16)–was not time-barred. Since, pursuant to Rule 3, the filing of a compulsory counterclaim does not amount to the commencement of a civil action, counterclaims relate back to the date an action is filed, and the Supreme Court overruled a prior Court of Appeals decision that concluded otherwise. Upchurch v. Harp Builders, Inc., No. 176PA22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Fraudulent denial of mortgage modification—date of discovery—lack of diligence—claims time-barred—In an action brought by homeowners (plaintiffs) alleging that a bank (defendant) operated a fraudulent scheme to delay plaintiffs' mortgage modification requests–submitted pursuant to a federal mortgage relief program–while continuing to collect trial period payments from them, which eventually resulted in the foreclosure of their homes, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims as being time-barred because the claims were filed outside of the applicable statutory time limits from the date plaintiffs knew or should have known of their injuries and of the alleged fraud. At the latest, the statutes of limitations for all of plaintiffs' claims (both non-fraud and fraud) began to run by the date that each plaintiff lost his or her home. Although plaintiffs argued that they could not have discovered defendant's fraud until later, given the nature and frequency of their interactions with defendant without any progress being made on the modification application process, plaintiffs should have known of defendant's misdeeds through the exercise of ordinary diligence. Taylor v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 102A20-3 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Compensability—causal connection to workplace injury—"directly related" test—three independent criteria—In a workers' compensation case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Full Commission awarding compensation to plaintiff for bariatric surgery–based on needing corrective knee surgery after two workplace accidents aggravated a preexisting knee condition, plaintiff was advised that she first needed to have bariatric surgery in order for the knee surgery to be safely performed–and remanded with instructions for the Industrial Commission to apply the proper legal standard regarding compensability for that treatment. The Supreme Court formally endorsed the "directly related" test, developed over the course of several Court of Appeals' cases, under which medical treatment is compensable only if it is directly related to the workplace injury. A sufficiently causal connection may be shown if (1) the workplace injury caused the condition for which treatment is sought, (2) the workplace injury aggravated the condition or caused new symptoms, or (3) the condition did not require treatment prior to the workplace injury but required treatment solely to remedy the workplace injury. Kluttz-Ellison v. Noah's Playloft Preschool, No. 173PA22 (N.C. Mar. 22, 2024) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)