Inverse condemnation declaratory judgment action—prior direct condemnation action pending—damages left unresolved—A municipality was precluded from filing an action seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its claim of inverse condemnation where an earlier direct condemnation action regarding the same sewer easement across private property remained pending in that a judgment entered by the trial court in the direct condemnation action–which held that the taking of the sewer easement was for a private purpose (and that the public's interest was merely incidental) such that the municipality's exercise of eminent domain was null and void–left unresolved the issue of damages (including the appropriate remedy) because the municipality had already installed a sewer line in the easement. Town of Apex v. Rubin , No. 206PA21 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Renewal of school bus driver's certificates—falsified records—applicability of section 20-34.1—The N.C. Department of Transportation (DOT) did not have just cause to terminate from employment a driver education program specialist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1, which criminalizes the act of knowingly entering "false information concerning a drivers license or a special identification card" into official records, because the statute did not apply to the specialist's conduct recertifying several school bus drivers without having conducted ride-along observations of those drivers. A school bus driver's certificate does not qualify as a "drivers license" for purposes of section 20-34.1, since it is a separate driving credential. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals (reversing the final decision of the administrative law judge finding no just cause) was reversed, and the matter was remanded to the lower appellate court for consideration of the DOT's remaining arguments on appeal. Savage v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. , No. 235PA23 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Standard of review—statutory interpretation—agency deference disavowed—de novo review applicable—The Supreme Court clarified that the proper standard of review for courts reviewing a state agency's interpretation of a state statute is de novo review; although an agency's reasoning may be instructive, it is not controlling. The Supreme Court expressly disavowed the application of deference to an agency decision and overruled prior case law from the Court of Appeals requiring agency deference. Savage v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. , No. 235PA23 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Abandonment of issues—"swapping horses" on appeal—issue not raised at trial or in prior appeal—In a breach of contract action brought against the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina (defendant) by students (plaintiffs) seeking refunds for mandatory fees and parking permits they paid for during the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant's argument–that, in light of the statutory mandate in N.C.G.S. § 116-143(a), the fees at issue in the case could not be the subject of a contract–was not preserved for appeal. Defendant neither raised the issue before the trial court nor included it in their appellate brief in their prior appeal to the Court of Appeals, and defendant could not "swap horses" between courts to "get a better mount" before the Supreme Court. Lannan v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. , No. 316PA22 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Juvenile abuse and neglect—unpreserved issues—analyzed on appellate review—improper—When reversing part of the Court of Appeals' decision vacating a neglect adjudication in a juvenile abuse and neglect case, the Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals' analysis of issues that the parties neither raised before the trial court nor addressed in their appellate briefs, thereby underscoring the well-settled rule that appellate courts may not "create an appeal" for an appellant by addressing issues that were never raised below. Further, the Court specifically rejected the analysis of whether the adjudication order constituted an "ultimatum" to "confess [to the abuse] or lose your children" that violated "marital privilege," where marital privilege did not apply in juvenile proceedings such as this one. In re E.H. , No. 188PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Murder prosecution—juvenile defendant—gender discrimination in jury selection—issue raised post-conviction—procedurally barred—In a first-degree murder case involving a juvenile defendant who, during the pendency of his appeal to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals' decision affirming his conviction, filed a motion for appropriate relief asserting for the first time a claim of unconstitutional gender discrimination in jury selection, pursuant to J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), defendant's J.E.B. claim was procedurally barred under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419 (barring appellate review of issues raised in post-conviction proceedings, including when the defendant was in a position to raise the issue in a prior appeal but failed to do so) for the reasons stated in his co-defendant's appeal in State v. Bell, No. 86A02-2 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025). State v. Sims , No. 297PA18 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Preservation of issues—jury selection—gender-based discrimination—failure to object or raise in prior appeal—The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's amended motion for appropriate relief–in which he claimed that, in a trial that resulted in defendant being sentenced to death for first-degree murder, the prosecution engaged in gender-based discrimination during jury selection in violation of his constitutional rights to equal protection under the law as articulated in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)–where defendant's J.E.B. argument was not preserved because, despite multiple explicit statements made in open court by the prosecutor about wanting more men on the jury, defendant failed to raise this constitutional issue at trial, during jury selection or otherwise. Moreover, even had defendant preserved his J.E.B. claim, it was procedurally barred pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419 because he did not raise this issue in his previous appeal despite having access to direct evidence (the explicit statements by the prosecutor), statistical evidence (apparent in the record regarding the State's use of peremptory strikes), and side-by-side comparison evidence (regarding the female potential juror whose strike was at the heart of the claim and other venire members who were not struck). State v. Bell , No. 86A02-2 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Preservation of issues—motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict—not specifically raised in motion for directed verdict—waiver—In a complex business case, the Supreme Court endorsed a line of precedent from the Court of Appeals holding that, to preserve an issue for use in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 50(b)–which is essentially a renewal of a motion for directed verdict (DV)–a party must first have timely moved for a DV on the issue, articulating the same specific argument or theory to the trial court. Here, because defendant's JNOV argument as to a conversion claim rested upon a theory raised in his DV motion only as to a separate claim (for embezzlement), the Business Court properly held that the JNOV argument was waived as to conversion. Likewise, the argument underlying defendant's JNOV motion as to a fraud claim–insufficient evidence of intent to deceive–was waived where his DV motion on that claim was based upon insufficient evidence of another element–his having made misrepresentations. Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody , No. 15A24 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Standard of review—cruel and unusual punishment—life imprisonment without parole—juvenile defendant—In a first-degree murder case involving a juvenile defendant who, after his conviction, appealed his sentence of life imprisonment without parole on the ground that it violated his Eighth Amendment rights, the appellate court properly reviewed the trial court's sentencing determination for an abuse of discretion. Thus, there was no merit to defendant's argument that, instead of applying an abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court should have engaged in a "meaningful analysis" of whether the trial court's findings supported a conclusion that he was "irreparably corrupt." State v. Sims , No. 297PA18 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Adjudication of neglect—sufficiency and specificity of findings—substantial risk of impairment—The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to vacate and remand the trial court's adjudication of respondent-mother's child as a neglected juvenile, holding that the trial court's findings regarding the mother's ongoing substance abuse, hallucinations, unsafe living conditions, and violation of a safety plan (two days after signing it) were sufficient to support the trial court's adjudication. Importantly, the trial court was not required to make a specific written finding regarding a substantial risk of impairment because its findings, when viewed by a reasonable person in the totality of the circumstances, contained enough factual specificity to logically support its conclusion that the child was neglected. In re L.C. , No. 108PA24 (N.C. May. 23, 2025) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Neglect—based on abuse of infant sibling—other factors suggesting risk of future harm—In an abuse and neglect matter involving two children, where the trial court adjudicated the younger child as abused and neglected after the child–a three-week-old baby at the time–presented at a hospital with multiple acute fractures, the trial court properly adjudicated the older sibling as neglected based on the younger sibling's abuse where it found that the parents' home was an "injurious environment" posing a substantial risk of similar harm to any child living there, since the parents: (1) had no plausible explanation for the younger child's injuries, (2) refused to take responsibility for the injuries (despite evidence that the fractures resulted from non-accidental trauma), and (3) did nothing to remedy the environment that caused the harm or to assure social workers that the abuse would not happen again. In re E.H. , No. 188PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Custody modification—escalating conflict—effect on children's health and welfare—substantial change in circumstances—best interests of the children—The Supreme Court upheld an order modifying child custody–from granting the parents joint custody to granting the mother primary physical custody and final decision-making authority on major parenting decisions–where the trial court's findings of fact supported its conclusions of law that a substantial change in circumstances affecting the children's welfare had occurred and that modifying custody was in the children's best interests. Specifically, the court found that an ongoing conflict between the parties had escalated, with the father exhibiting increasing hostility to one of the parenting coordinators assigned to the case, as well as an unwillingness to communicate or cooperate with the mother or the parenting coordinator regarding the children's medical care. Further, the court found that the conflict adversely affected the children's health and welfare, especially where the father refused to take both children to their weekly therapy appointments or to administer necessary medication prescribed to one of the children to treat asthma. Durbin v. Durbin , No. 78A24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Closing argument—request to read excerpts from appellate opinions to jury—properly denied—In plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action to determine whether keeping chickens on their property violated their homeowner’s association's restrictive covenants, the trial court correctly denied plaintiffs' counsel's request to read excerpts from two Court of Appeals decisions (addressing restrictive covenants as they applied to animals) to the jury during closing arguments where the passages counsel sought to read were largely composed of facts from the two earlier cases–which may not used to imply that a jury should return a favorable verdict in the case at bar. Moreover, the jury was only deciding two factual issues–whether the chickens were household pets or were kept for commercial purposes–rendering any statements of law about interpreting restrictive covenants from the passages in the earlier cases irrelevant. Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass'n , No. 123PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Summary judgment—motion to strike portions of affidavit—conclusory statements and inadmissible legal conclusions—lack of specific facts—In a dispute between two businessmen, where plaintiff alleged that he and defendant had formed a common law general partnership to acquire a group of restaurants, which defendant ultimately purchased on his own, the Business Court did not abuse its discretion at summary judgment when it granted defendants' motion to strike portions of plaintiff's affidavit containing conclusory statements and "bare assertions of belief" unsupported by specific facts. For example, one of the stricken paragraphs merely announced plaintiff's belief that he could have bought the restaurants if defendant had not done so, while another paragraph alleged that plaintiff had "various financing options" available without identifying any specific financing options. Further, the Business Court properly struck any references to the formation of a "partnership" and to defendant's alleged "misappropriation" of a business opportunity, since those terms amounted to legal conclusions that the court could not consider on summary judgment. Cutter v. Vojnovic , No. 229A24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Summary judgment—unsworn expert witness report—properly excluded—In a dispute between two businessmen, where the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims before the Business Court, the court did not err in disregarding an unsworn report by plaintiff's purported expert witness, since the plain language of Civil Procedure Rule 56 did not identify unsworn expert reports as evidence that could properly be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Cutter v. Vojnovic , No. 229A24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Class certification—predominance issues—illegal sales promotion—differing referral statutes between states—The Supreme Court of North Carolina vacated the trial court's order certifying a class that consisted of all persons who bought a home water treatment system from defendants (the system's manufacturer and a national home improvement store) during a specified period of time, during which a sales promotion was in place that offered rewards to buyers for referring new customers. The class included both South Carolina and North Carolina residents, whose purchases would be governed by their respective states' laws, and, since the states' respective referral statutes differed on whether inducement was a required element (i.e., that the illegal sales promotion induced a claimant to enter into the sale), the class, as certified, did not meet the predominance criteria for class certification (requiring that common issues of law or fact predominate over issues affecting only individual claimants) because South Carolina's statute would necessitate a plaintiff-by-plaintiff evaluation of who was induced by the sales promotion to buy the treatment system. Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. , No. 334A23 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Predominance issues—illegal sales promotion—certification vacated—considerations on remand—In a putative class action lawsuit brought by a purchaser of a home water treatment system, who alleged that the sellers violated North Carolina's referral statute (N.C.G.S. § 25A-37, prohibiting sales promotions offering a discount or other benefit in exchange for referring prospective customers), where the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's class certification order because the class included members whose claims defeated the predominance criteria for certification, the Court directed that the following additional issues were to be considered on remand: (1) whether plaintiff's claim for the return of "all consideration paid" by class members for the treatment systems would involve individualized fact determinations that would defeat class certification; (2) whether plaintiff's claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices would also involve individualized fact determinations regarding actual harm suffered by each claimant; and (3) whether a class action remained the superior method for adjudicating the rest of the claims and resultant remedies. Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. , No. 334A23 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Cruel and unusual punishment—juvenile defendant—life imprisonment without parole—consideration of mitigating factors—In a first-degree murder case involving a juvenile defendant, the sentence of life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) did not violate defendant's Eighth Amendment rights despite his contention that he was not one of those "rare" juveniles who were "irreparably corrupt." Defendant's argument failed on appeal because: (1) the trial court properly followed the sentencing procedure enunciated in the state's Miller-fix statute–consisting of weighing mitigating factors regarding defendant's youth and attendant characteristics–and it is the adherence to this procedure that makes LWOP sentences "rare" for juveniles, thereby eliminating any Eighth Amendment concerns; and (2) the Miller-fix procedure did not require the court to make a separate finding that defendant was "irreparably corrupt" before imposing LWOP. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when weighing the Miller factors where its challenged findings of fact were supported by the evidence, the court properly considered any mitigating evidence pertaining to each factor, and–although the court did not enter findings as to every fact arising from the evidence and perhaps could have said more about particular mitigating circumstances–the factors could not be reweighed on appeal. State v. Sims , No. 297PA18 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Eighth Amendment—consecutive life sentences imposed—juvenile defendant—Miller factors—The Supreme Court upheld defendant's consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole, which were imposed after he was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for killing his parents just before he turned eighteen years old, where the sentences did not violate the Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution as interpreted by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) or Art. I, sec. 27 of the North Carolina constitution, which does not provide additional protections for juvenile defendants. The trial court expressly considered evidence in mitigation with regard to each of the factors contained in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.19B–a statute that was enacted to address the Miller requirements–including defendant's youth and attendant circumstances, and defendant's capacity to consider the consequences of his actions, and did not abuse its discretion in weighing the evidence and the factors before reaching its sentencing decision. State v. Borlase , No. 33A24 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Eighth Amendment—juvenile offender—life imprisonment without parole—separate review of state constitutional claim not required—The decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without parole–for two first-degree murders committed when defendant was seventeen years old–was affirmed where, contrary to defendant's assertion, the appellate court properly analyzed each of defendant's challenges to his sentences under federal and state constitutional provisions. Even so, since the sentences did not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides greater protections for juvenile offenders than Art. I, sec. 27 of the North Carolina Constitution, and since the Eighth Amendment and section 27 have been interpreted in lockstep, a separate review of defendant's state constitutional claim was unnecessary. Further, defendant's sentences did not implicate–and thus were not in violation of–State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), because he was not a member of the narrow class of juvenile offenders to which that case applied. State v. Tirado , No. 267PA21 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

North Carolina—Corum claim—Equal Protection—economic regulation—rational basis review—In an action brought by a group of bar owners and employees (plaintiffs) challenging executive orders issued by the governor (defendant) restricting plaintiffs' businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic, where plaintiffs raised a claim pursuant to Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761 (1992), alleging that defendant's executive orders violated the state constitution’s Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily treating plaintiffs' private bars differently from other businesses serving alcohol, the Supreme Court held that, under rational basis review, the different treatment of businesses under the executive orders had a conceivable rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest of reducing COVID-19 transmission. In so holding, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding plaintiffs' equal protection claim under strict scrutiny review, since economic regulations (such as the restrictions imposed under the executive orders), absent the involvement of a suspect class or fundamental right, were generally subject to rational basis review. N.C. Bar and Tavern Ass'n v. Stein , No. 126PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

North Carolina—Corum claim—Fruits of Labor Clause—legal standard for appellate review—In an action brought by a group of bar owners and employees (plaintiffs) challenging executive orders issued by the governor (defendant) restricting plaintiffs' businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic, where plaintiffs raised a claim pursuant to Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761 (1992), alleging that defendant's executive orders violated their constitutional right to earn a living under the state constitution's Fruits of Labor Clause, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' determination that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant on that Corum claim. However, because the Court of Appeals applied rational basis review to the claim when the proper standard required a fact-intensive inquiry into whether defendant's actions were reasonably necessary to promote public health or prevent public harm, the Court modified the decision to reflect the correct legal standard and remanded the case to the trial court to reopen factual discovery on the reasonableness of the governor's actions. N.C. Bar and Tavern Ass'n v. Stein , No. 126PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

North Carolina—Corum claims—not barred by sovereign immunity—A complaint filed by owners and operators of bars across North Carolina against the state and certain elected officials, alleging that executive orders issued by the governor to address the COVID-19 pandemic violated plaintiffs' state constitutional rights to earn a living (pursuant to the Fruits of Their Own Labor and Law of the Land clauses) by first ordering the closure of bars and then imposing restrictions so severe that they could not reopen (including allowing alcohol sales only in outdoor seating areas and barring alcohol sales between 9 p.m. and 7 a.m.), pled facts that were sufficient to survive defendants' motion to dismiss. Sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiffs' direct claims against the state (known as Corum claims) because plaintiffs alleged–in addition to state action and the absence of any other adequate, alternative state remedy (pleading requirements that were undisputed in the case)–a colorable state constitutional claim; namely, that the restrictions imposed effectively forced bars to stay closed for nine months and were not reasonably necessary. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals–affirming the trial court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss–was modified (as to the applicable standards in reviewing the trial court's ruling) and affirmed. Howell v. Cooper , No. 252A23 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

North Carolina—Corum claims—validity—"adequate state remedy" versus "least intrusive remedy"—sovereign immunity not a bar —In an action brought by a group of bar owners and employees (plaintiffs) challenging executive orders issued by the governor (defendant) restricting plaintiffs' businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic, sovereign immunity did not preclude plaintiffs' claims brought pursuant to Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761 (1992), because plaintiffs satisfied all of the criteria for raising valid Corum claims, including the requirement that there be no "adequate state remedy" available. Importantly, defendant's main argument–that sovereign immunity precluded plaintiffs' claims because damages were not the least intrusive remedy–incorrectly conflated two stages of legal analysis: the ex ante determination of whether an adequate state remedy existed (a required element of a Corum claim) and the post-trial determination of the least intrusive remedy once a constitutional violation has been proven. Further, defendant's argument that plaintiffs should have sought a preliminary injunction was rejected as circular, since the Corum claims themselves would have been the only vehicle for seeking such relief. N.C. Bar and Tavern Ass'n v. Stein , No. 126PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

North Carolina—separation of powers—child sexual abuse claims—dismissed in prior final judgments—not revived by legislation—In a pair of consolidated cases involving claims of child sexual abuse by Catholic priests, which plaintiffs originally raised over a decade earlier and which were dismissed with prejudice because they were time-barred, plaintiffs' new lawsuits were properly dismissed on the ground that their claims were now barred by principles of res judicata. Although plaintiffs had filed their new suits after the General Assembly had passed the SAFE Child Act, which revived previously time-barred claims of child sexual abuse by extending the applicable statute of limitations, the Act did not override the earlier final judgments dismissing plaintiffs' claims. Under the North Carolina Constitution and separation of powers principles, the judicial power–which includes the powers to enter and set aside judgments–belongs to the judicial branch alone; therefore, an act of the legislative branch cannot set aside a final judgment entered by the judicial branch. Doe 1K v. Roman Cath. Diocese , No. 167PA22 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

North Carolina—tort claims—child sexual abuse—retroactive alteration of expired statutes of limitations—no vested right—In considering a facial challenge to a provision of the SAFE Child Act allowing victims of child sexual abuse to file otherwise time-barred tort claims during a specified two-year period, the Supreme Court construed the Law of the Land and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the North Carolina Constitution to affirm, as modified, the Court of Appeals' lead decision holding that an action–brought against a county board of education (defendant) by three men (plaintiffs) who, as minors, were sexually abused by their high school wrestling coach–did not implicate any constitutionally protected vested right. The statute of limitations applicable to plaintiffs' tort claims fell outside the scope of the vested right doctrine because it affected procedural remedies–rather than property of the sort protected by the Law of the Land Clause–and, having been created by legislation, could be altered by legislation. Further, the text and history of the Ex Post Facto Clause–along with pertinent caselaw–revealed that retroactive civil laws which do not impose taxes are constitutionally permissible. Finally, the Court noted that the lower appellate court's tiered substantive due process framework analysis was immaterial to defendant's argument, and thus, unnecessary. McKinney v. Goins , No. 109PA22-2 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Waiver of right to counsel—statutory colloquy—range of permissible punishments—tantamount to a life sentence—Where defendant sought to waive his right to counsel and represent himself on numerous felony charges–arising from his assault, kidnapping, and rape of his mother–and the trial court, in undertaking the colloquy required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242, erroneously informed defendant (then 29 years old) that he could face a term of imprisonment of 75 to 175 years (the actual sentence imposed upon defendant's convictions totaled 121 to 178 years), the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' determination that defendant was not entitled to a new trial because, despite the trial court's numerically inaccurate statement of the range of sentences defendant could receive, defendant was made aware that he faced what was tantamount to a life sentence; accordingly, no statutory error occurred. The Court of Appeals' decision was modified to clarify that the trial court was responsible for engaging defendant in a thorough colloquy as required by statute as to all charges–not just the most serious–and could not delegate that duty to the prosecutor. State v. Fenner , No. 289PA23 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Retail Sales Installment Act—illegal sales promotion—referral statute—no inducement element—In a putative class action lawsuit brought by a purchaser of a home water treatment system, who alleged that the sellers violated N.C.G.S. § 25A-37 by offering a sales promotion that promised a discount or other benefit in exchange for referring prospective customers, the Supreme Court determined that, based on the plain language of the statute, inducement was not an essential element of the statutory violation. Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. , No. 334A23 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Breach—express contracts—sufficiency of allegations—motion to dismiss—evidence needed for trial—In a breach of contract action brought against the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina (defendant) by students (plaintiffs) seeking refunds for mandatory fees and parking permits they paid for during the COVID-19 pandemic, plaintiffs' complaint alleged sufficient facts to overcome defendant's Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; specifically, plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the existence of express contracts between the parties for specific on-campus benefits in exchange for payment. Although defendant's argument–that there was never a meeting of the minds between the parties to form a contract–was properly rejected at the motion-to-dismiss phase, plaintiffs would need to prove their allegations with evidence in order to defeat defendant's argument at trial. Lannan v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. , No. 316PA22 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Limited liability companies—grounds for judicial dissolution—managerial deadlock—continued operations not practicable—factors adopted—In a case involving two family-owned limited liability companies (LLCs), which together owned 68 acres of undeveloped land (the Property), the North Carolina Business Court did not abuse its discretion by judicially dissolving the LLCs pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 57D-6-02(2)(i) where undisputed evidence showed that, because the only two managers of the LLCs were at a complete impasse regarding operating decisions–resulting in no development or active use of the Property for its intended purpose for several years, even though there was some continued financial feasibility of the LLCs–and the LLCs' Operating Agreements did not provide a mechanism for breaking the deadlock, it was "not practicable" for the LLCs to continue operating. The Supreme Court defined the statutory term "not practicable" as "unfeasible" rather than "impossible," and adopted a six-factor balancing test for determining whether it was not practicable for an LLC to continue in accord with its operating agreement. James H.Q. Davis Tr. v. JHD Props., LLC , No. 32PA24 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Punitive damages—insurance application—material misrepresentations by agent—willful and wanton conduct—In a real property insurance dispute arising from an insurer's cancellation of plaintiff's homeowners policy and refusal to cover plaintiff's losses from hurricane damage, plaintiff's claim against his insurance agent for punitive damages based on gross negligence–for submitting an application for insurance that contained material misrepresentations, which was the basis for the insurer's actions–was not subject to dismissal at the pleading stage. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to support punitive damages based on willful and wanton conduct and to put the agent on notice of that aggravating factor, where the details of the agent's conduct were averred with particularity, including that the agent: induced plaintiff to apply for a policy with a new insurer by promising the same coverage at a lower premium; knowingly misrepresented basic information about plaintiff's property on the application for insurance (by failing to disclose the existence of a pond on the property and understating the size of the property by several acres); and realized a financial gain by obtaining issuance of the new policy. Jones v. J. Kim Hatcher Ins. Agencies, Inc. , No. 264A23 (N.C. May. 23, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Equitable distribution—classification of land—pretrial stipulation—no ruling on motion to set aside—invited error—The decision of the Court of Appeals upholding a trial court's equitable distribution (ED) order, in which the trial court classified a tract of land as defendant's separate property even though the parties had filed a pretrial stipulation classifying the tract as marital property, was modified and affirmed. Although plaintiff argued that the stipulations remained binding on the parties because the trial court never ruled on defendant's motion to set them aside, any error by the trial court in failing to rule on the motion constituted invited error and could not serve as the basis for a new ED hearing because plaintiff's attorney expressly invited the trial court to proceed with the ED hearing even though no direct proceeding had been held on defendant's motion to set aside the stipulations. Smith v. Smith , No. 79A24 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Sewer—taken for a private purpose—null and void—title revested in landowner—remanded for determination of proper remedy—Where a municipality filed a complaint and declaration of taking for a sewer easement (to which the landowner objected on the ground that the taking was for a private purpose) and then installed a sewer pipe based upon its own opinion as to its authority to do so–after which the trial court determined that the taking was for a private purpose (and that the public's interest was merely incidental) such that the municipality's exercise of eminent domain was null and void–title of the sewer easement was revested in the landowner. Therefore, the landowner was entitled to seek a mandatory injunction requiring the municipality to remove the sewer line, and the matter was remanded for a weighing of the equities by the trial court to determine whether a such an injunction or money damages would be the proper remedy for the continuing trespass of the sewer pipe on the landowner's property. Town of Apex v. Rubin , No. 206PA21 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Cell phone records—strictly computer-generated data—neither hearsay nor testimonial—Confrontation Clause—inapplicable—In a prosecution for multiple sexual offenses against a minor, the trial court did not violate the Confrontation Clause or the rule against hearsay by admitting defendant's cell phone records along with a derivative record showing communications between his and the victim's phones. First, the records consisted of strictly computer-generated data, created without any human judgment or input; therefore, they did not constitute hearsay, which necessarily refers to statements made by a human "declarant" capable of making assertions. Second, even though law enforcement later accessed the records with the primary purpose of producing evidence for defendant's trial, the computer systems that generated the cell phone data as part of the phone company's day-to-day operations could not have created the records for that same primary purpose, especially since machines, by their nature, cannot act with intent at all; therefore, the records were not testimonial either. State v. Lester , No. 293PA23-2 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Definition of "animal" in a county's animal control ordinance—not included in restrictive covenants at issue—risk that jury would be misled—exclusion proper—In plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action to determine whether keeping chickens on their property violated their homeowner’s association's restrictive covenants, the trial court properly excluded evidence plaintiffs sought to introduce–the text of a county animal control ordinance which defined the term "animal," referenced in a different portion of the restrictive covenants–where the provision of the restrictive covenants at issue prohibited "animals, livestock, or poultry of any kind" except for "household pets," and the latter term was not defined in the restrictive covenants. Permitting plaintiffs to argue that the ordinance definition of "animal" controlled the definition of "household pets" in the restrictive covenants would have misled the jury. Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass'n , No. 123PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Emergency Management Act—private bar closures during pandemic—affirmative appropriation or possession of private property—required—In an action brought by a group of bar owners and employees (plaintiffs) challenging executive orders issued by the governor (defendant) restricting plaintiffs' businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic, plaintiffs' were not entitled to compensation under the Emergency Management Act because the restrictions placed under the orders did not constitute a "taking" or "use" of plaintiffs' property as defined by the Act. Specifically, the Act required ​a showing of affirmative appropriation or possession of private property by defendant, not merely restrictions on its use. N.C. Bar and Tavern Ass'n v. Stein , No. 126PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Federal public emergency act—unwanted vaccination during pandemic—tort claims barred—no preemption of state constitutional claims—A county board of education and a medical provider affiliated with the county school system (defendants) were not completely shielded from suit filed by plaintiffs (a fourteen-year-old student and his mother) arising from the student being given a COVID-19 vaccine against his and his mother's wishes. The federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, activated in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, provided immunity from tort injuries caused by the administration of any "covered countermeasure" during a public health emergency and, therefore, defendants were immune from plaintiffs' state law battery claims. However, contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals, the PREP Act did not preempt plaintiffs' claims under the North Carolina constitution (regarding the mother's right to control the upbringing of her son and both plaintiffs' shared right to the son's bodily integrity), which did not constitute "claims for loss" under the Act. Therefore, the lower appellate court's opinion barring all of plaintiffs' claims was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter was remanded to that court to resolve the remaining state constitutional issues raised in the parties' briefs. Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , No. 86PA24 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Public official—not available to an employee of a government agency—position not created by statute—no exercise of sovereign power—In a tort action brought by a surgeon (plaintiff) against his former supervisor (defendant), who held several positions at the UNC Burn Center (part of UNC Hospitals)–alleging, among other claims, tortious interference with contract and slander per se in the form of false accusations of inappropriate and unprofessional behavior and sexual misconduct by plaintiff at his going-away party–the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on the ground of public official immunity. Public official immunity did not extend to defendant because his positions (1) as division chief did not arise under the constitution, by statute, or through the delegated authority of the State, and the conduct at issue did not involve the discretionary exercise of sovereign power; and (2) as medical director did not involve the discretionary exercise of sovereign power. Hwang v. Cairns , No. 58PA23 (N.C. May. 23, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Sovereign—waiver—breach of contract—express contracts—pleading—In a breach of contract action brought against the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina (defendant) by students (plaintiffs) seeking refunds for mandatory fees and parking permits they paid for during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that–taking the complaint's allegations as true–defendant waived sovereign immunity by entering into implied-in-fact contracts with plaintiffs, the Supreme Court affirmed and modified the Court of Appeals' decision, clarifying that plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged that defendant waived immunity by entering into express contracts, wherein they offered plaintiffs specific on-campus services, access to campus facilities, and access to on-campus parking in exchange for payment of the fees and the purchase of parking permits. Lannan v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. , No. 316PA22 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Misconduct—DWI—minor daughter in car—uncooperative during arrest—invoking judicial title to avoid legal consequences—censure—The Supreme Court censured a district court judge for violations of Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct–amounting to willful misconduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice–after the judge was arrested for driving while impaired, where he: had been driving with a high blood alcohol level (.23) on a workday during regular court hours, and with his thirteen-year-old daughter inside the car; was uncooperative with and disrespectful toward the officer who arrested him; and then repeatedly invoked his judicial title while pleading with the officer for leniency. After weighing the egregiousness of the judge's conduct against his commendable behavior following his arrest (he self-reported the incident to the Judicial Standards Commission, cooperated with the Commission's investigation, and sought treatment for alcohol abuse), the Court concluded that censure was the appropriate sanction, while noting that it was also the "minimum acceptable consequence" in this case. In re Kimble , No. 321A24 (N.C. May. 23, 2025) (Author: Justice Per Curiam)

Criminal trial—constitutional right to unanimity—amended juror substitution statute—deliberations begin anew—In a prosecution that resulted in convictions on charges of first-degree murder and assault with intent to kill inflicting serious injury arising from a shooting at a hotel that left a man dead and a woman injured, defendant's state constitutional right that a conviction only be returned by a unanimous jury of twelve was not violated where, after a partial hour of deliberations was completed, one juror was excused, an alternate juror was substituted, and the newly composed jury was instructed to restart its deliberations from the beginning. The amended version of the statutory section relied upon by the trial court (N.C.G.S. § 15A-1215(a))–allowing a juror to be excused and an alternate juror to be substituted after the deliberations in a criminal trial had begun (altering the previous version of the law, which only allowed such a substitution before the case was submitted to the jury)–was upheld because it required that (1) no "more than 12 jurors participate in the jury's deliberations," and (2) after a substitution, the jury must begin its deliberations anew. State v. Chambers , No. 56PA24 (N.C. May. 23, 2025) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Restrictive covenants—nonpattern instructions—request properly denied—In plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action to determine whether keeping chickens on their property violated their homeowner’s association's restrictive covenants, the trial court did not err in declining to give ten nonpattern jury instructions requested by plaintiffs. The first group of instructions–four statements of law concerning the interpretation of restrictive covenants–was properly rejected because the trial court had interpreted the restrictive covenants as a matter of law and the two factual issues submitted to the jury were whether the chickens were household pets and whether they were kept for a commercial purpose. The second group–five recitations and interpretations of dictionary definitions of the words "poultry," "pet," and "household"–was properly rejected because those words were undefined in the restrictive covenants and thus were to be accorded their ordinary meanings. The issue of the final requested instruction–regarding Civil Procedure Rule 30(b)(6) depositions–was abandoned because plaintiffs did not address it on appeal. Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass'n , No. 123PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Contributory negligence—summary judgment—golfing accident—open and obvious risk—lack of situational awareness—In a negligence action in which plaintiff sought to recover damages after being hit in the eye by a golf ball, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendants (the golfer whose stray ball struck plaintiff and the city that owned the property) because plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Uncontradicted evidence established a line of sight between plaintiff–who sat in a golf cart looking down at his phone with no awareness of what was occurring around him–and the tee-off area, and, viewed objectively, the evidence showed an open and obvious risk that a prudent person would have noticed. Moseley v. Hendricks , No. 63A24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Insurance agent—misrepresentations on application—sufficiency of pleading—no contributory negligence as a matter of law—In a real property insurance dispute arising from an insurer's cancellation of plaintiff's homeowners policy and refusal to cover plaintiff's losses from hurricane damage, plaintiff's claim against his insurance agent for ordinary negligence–by submitting an application for insurance that contained material misrepresentations, which was the basis for the insurer's actions–was not subject to dismissal pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). First, plaintiff adequately pleaded the claim by alleging that the agent assured plaintiff that the new policy would provide the same coverage as his existing coverage, told plaintiff that all he needed to do was sign the (single) application page and make the first payment, and had previously applied for and obtained a policy for plaintiff using this same procedure. Second, although plaintiff signed a blank application page and trusted his agent to accurately complete the application without reading the entire document, since plaintiff alleged a prior course of conduct between himself and the agent as well as the agent's specific assurances regarding the new policy, the complaint did not establish contributory negligence as a matter of law sufficient to overcome the ordinary negligence claim. Jones v. J. Kim Hatcher Ins. Agencies, Inc. , No. 264A23 (N.C. May. 23, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Derivative claims—general partner—on behalf of alleged general partnership—no standing—In a dispute between two businessmen, where plaintiff alleged that he and defendant had formed a common law general partnership (defendant-entity) to acquire a group of restaurants, which defendant ultimately purchased on his own, the Business Court's order and opinion dismissing plaintiff's derivative claims on behalf of defendant-entity was affirmed, since plaintiff lacked standing to bring those claims because neither the Uniform Partnership Act nor any other statute authorized a general partner to assert a derivative action against another general partner on behalf of a general partnership. Cutter v. Vojnovic , No. 229A24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Formation—sufficiency of evidence—absence of material term—agreement on loss-sharing not required—In a dispute between two businessmen, where plaintiff alleged that he and defendant had formed a common law general partnership (defendant-entity) to acquire a group of restaurants, which defendant ultimately purchased on his own, the Business Court properly dismissed plaintiff's claims–for judicial dissolution and an accounting of defendant-entity, along with claims against defendant alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and of the alleged partnership agreement–that depended on the existence of a partnership, since the undisputed evidence showed that the parties did not create a partnership but only "hoped" to do so. Specifically, the parties never agreed on how to finance the restaurant purchase–a material term of the purported partnership agreement–meaning that they were never even on their way toward the co-ownership or profit sharing necessary to prove partnership formation. Although the Business Court's decision was affirmed on this issue, it was also modified to clarify that an explicit agreement on loss-sharing is not required to show the creation of a partnership under North Carolina law. Cutter v. Vojnovic , No. 229A24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Judgment on the pleadings—sufficiency of factual allegations—conclusory statement insufficient—In a dispute between two businessmen, where plaintiff alleged that he and defendant had formed a common law general partnership (defendant-entity) to acquire a group of restaurants, which defendant ultimately purchased on his own, the Business Court's order granting partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant-entity on plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage was affirmed, since the one allegation in plaintiff's complaint asserting that defendant-entity "diverted the business opportunity away" from him was merely conclusory and lacked any supporting facts. Cutter v. Vojnovic , No. 229A24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Denial of justice officer certification—lack of good moral character—substantial evidence—not arbitrary and capricious—The Sheriffs' Education and Training Standards Commission did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denied petitioner's application for justice officer certification indefinitely–based on petitioner's prior misconduct, which led to his being fired from the State Highway Patrol (SHP), including providing a false home address and falsifying time records–where substantial evidence supported the Commission's determination that petitioner lacked good moral character. Although petitioner presented evidence of character rehabilitation at the hearing on his contested case petition challenging the final agency decision–through two witnesses who were familiar with petitioner's work as a deputy sheriff and school resource officer in the years since he was fired from SHP–petitioner's evasive answers in response to the Commission's questions about the reasons for his firing (particularly in contrast with the detailed answers he provided to his own counsel's questions) demonstrated a lack of sincerity and candor from which the Commission could make its conclusion. The Supreme Court clarified the relevant time period for evaluating moral character (at the time the application was made, or, if the prima facie showing of good character was refuted, at any subsequent time that the applicant satisfied his or her burden of proof) and that any retroactive certification would only be to the point of time at which an applicant met the burden of proof. Devalle v. N.C. Sheriffs' Educ. & Training Standards Comm'n , No. 158PA23 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Public Records Act—request for records regarding executive orders—mediation requirements—no evidence of compliance—In an action brought by a group of bar owners and employees (plaintiffs) challenging executive orders issued by the governor (defendant) restricting plaintiffs' businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claim under the Public Records Act–alleging that defendant failed to comply with their request for public records related to the executive orders–where plaintiffs did not satisfy the mediation requirements outlined in the Act, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to decide the merits of the claim. Specifically, plaintiffs' complaint did include a request for mediation (or, alternatively, a waiver of the mediation requirement), but there was no evidence showing that plaintiffs appointed a mediator, conducted mediation, notified the trial court of the results, or established that waiver was appropriate. N.C. Bar and Tavern Ass'n v. Stein , No. 126PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Restrictive covenants—interpretation as a matter of law—“household pets”—chickens—directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict analysis—In plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action to determine whether keeping chickens on their property violated their homeowner’s association's restrictive covenants, the trial court correctly denied plaintiffs' motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was more than a scintilla of evidence that the chickens were not “household pets”–a category of animals allowed by the covenants, as opposed to livestock or other animals kept for commercial purposes, categories disallowed by the covenants–including that plaintiffs kept more than 60 chickens, could not recall the exact number or their names, spent only about 2 minutes per day with each chicken, and offered to sell eggs laid by the chickens on Facebook. The jury was properly asked to sort through the competing evidence offered at trial to resolve the issue of whether the chickens were household pets, and the Court of Appeals erred in finding error by the trial court. Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass'n , No. 123PA24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Warrantless search of backpack—voluntary consent—constitutionally permissible—The trial court's conclusion that defendant–who was the subject of a tip from a confidential informant and who had been stopped by law enforcement officers after riding his bike on a path marked with a "No Trespassing" sign–voluntarily consented to the search of his backpack (in which a stolen handgun was discovered) was supported by the court's findings of fact, including that: (1) during the stop, although defendant told the officers that he was afraid of them, the officers maintained calm demeanors, never brandished weapons, and returned defendant's personal identification card to him; (2) after initially agreeing to a search of his backpack, defendant retracted his consent and then denied the officers' continued requests to search multiple times; and (3) eventually, defendant agreed to allow the officers to look into the backpack, which defendant opened, revealing the grip of a handgun. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals decision to the contrary was reversed. State v. Wright , No. 258PA23 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Right to unanimous verdict—first-degree forcible sexual offense—disjunctive instruction—evidence of alternative acts to establish an element—no error—In defendant's prosecution on charges including two counts of first-degree forcible sexual offense, his right to a unanimous jury verdict was not violated where the trial court instructed the jury that it could find defendant guilty of each count upon its determination that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed a "sexual act"–an element of first-degree forcible sexual offense–against the victim, as established by the commission of any qualifying underlying act which the evidence tended to show: fellatio, anal intercourse, or any penetration of the victim's genital or anal openings. While jury unanimity as to the commission of the element–a "sexual act"–was required, there was no error, let alone plain error, in the disjunctive instruction listing multiple alternative acts, any one of which could establish that element. The Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary was reversed, and the matter was remanded to the lower appellate court for consideration of defendant's other arguments. State v. Bowman , No. 49A24 (N.C. May. 23, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Tort claims—child sexual abuse—retroactive alteration of expired statutes of limitations—applicable to enablers of abuse—The Supreme Court, having held in a companion case (McKinney v. Goins) that the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act–allowing victims of child sexual abuse to file otherwise time-barred tort claims during a specified two-year period–was facially constitutional, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals that the provision resuscitated claims against parties who allegedly enabled abuse, as well as direct abusers. Given that North Carolina has not recognized a distinct child sexual abuse tort, instead permitting victims to sue for common law torts–such as those grounded in negligence, the statute of limitations for which is found in N.C.G.S. § 1-52–the provision's plain text ("reviv[ing] any civil action for child sexual abuse otherwise time-barred under G.S. 1-52") applied to negligence-based causes of action brought against a Roman Catholic order and diocese (together, defendants) by a man who alleged he suffered sexual abuse as a child by a clergyman employed and supervised by defendants. The revival provision's use of the phrase "for child abuse" identified only the category of tort addressed and did not restrict the theory of tort liability a plaintiff could pursue. Cohane v. Home Missioners of Am. , No. 278A23 (N.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Contested case petition—as-applied constitutional challenge to tax statute—dismissal required—no subject matter jurisdiction in OAH—The Business Court, sitting as an appellate court, properly determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacked jurisdiction over an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 105-122 (a tax law, known as the "franchise statute") under N.C.G.S. § 105-241.17 (conditions for filing a civil action challenging a tax statute as unconstitutional) because the OAH, an executive branch agency, had only the powers conferred upon it by the General Assembly and those powers did not include jurisdiction over the issue of a tax statute's constitutionality–a matter reserved to the judicial branch under the separation-of-powers clause of the North Carolina Constitution. Further, this holding comported with the proper reading of N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4 (designation of complex business cases) with section 105-241.17; that is, interpreting those statutes in a manner to avoid finding a constitutional violation if such a construction is reasonable. N.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. , No. 242A23 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

tortious interference with prospective economic advantage—sufficiency of evidence—In a dispute between two businessmen, where plaintiff alleged that he and defendant had formed a common law general partnership to acquire a group of restaurants, which defendant ultimately purchased on his own, the Business Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage because plaintiff failed to present evidence that he could have purchased the restaurants but for defendant's malicious interference. Plaintiff's affidavit and deposition testimony merely offered conclusory assertions that he would have been able to obtain financing for the restaurant purchase–all of which were properly stricken by the Business Court under Civil Procedure Rule 56. Further, the evidence showed that plaintiff could not have independently bought the restaurants without an operator to run the restaurants, and plaintiff did not know anyone other than defendant who was qualified as such. Cutter v. Vojnovic , No. 229A24 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Permits—asphalt plant—compliance with setback requirements—meaning of "commercial building"—In a case regarding a county planning board's decision to issue a permit under the county's Polluting Industries Development Ordinance (PID Ordinance) for a company to build an asphalt plant, the board's decision was affirmed where, because a mobile shed and a barn near the proposed plant site were not "commercial buildings" under the PID Ordinance, the company's permit application complied with the PID Ordinance's "commercial building" setback requirements. The mobile shed was not a "building" given its impermanence (it lacked a foundation, footers, and running water; and it was demonstrably easy to relocate), and the barn, though clearly a "building," was not being used primarily for "commercial" purposes. Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd. , No. 249PA19-2 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Permits—asphalt plant—county planning board—authority to make factual determinations de novo—material misrepresentations in application—In a case regarding a county planning board's decision to issue a permit under the county's Polluting Industries Development Ordinance (PID Ordinance) for a company to build an asphalt plant, where the county planning director denied the company's permit application after finding that it contained material misrepresentations regarding compliance with the PID Ordinance, the board's decision to reverse the planning director's denial was affirmed on appeal. To begin with, the board had statutory authority to substitute its judgment for the planning director's on factual and legal issues, including whether the company's application contained material misrepresentations. Further, the board's unchallenged (and therefore binding) factual findings showed that the alleged misrepresentations–concerning grading discrepancies, alleged setback violations, and production tonnage changes–were either immaterial or unsupported by the evidence. Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd. , No. 249PA19-2 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Permits—asphalt plant—ordinance moratorium—triggering of permit choice statute—timing of application's completion —In a case regarding a county planning board's decision to issue a permit under the county's Polluting Industries Development Ordinance (PID Ordinance) for a company to build an asphalt plant, where the board issued the permit after having repealed and replaced the PID Ordinance with a new one, the board's decision was affirmed because, at the time the company submitted its application (which was before a temporary moratorium went into effect), the application was sufficiently "complete" under the state's moratoria statute (N.C.G.S. § 160D-107(c)) to trigger the state's permit choice statute (N.C.G.S. § 160D-108(a)), which allows developers to choose which version of an ordinance applies if it is amended between the time an application was "submitted" and a permit decision is made. Specifically, a "complete" application refers not to a fully finalized application but rather to one accepted by the permitting authority as adequate to begin permit compliance review. Further, although the PID Ordinance prohibited permit issuance without state and federal permits, the fact that the company did not have a state permit in hand when it submitted its application did not render the application incomplete. Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd. , No. 249PA19-2 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)