Contested case petition—timeliness—Civil Procedure Rule 6(e)—inapplicable—After a corporation (petitioner) filed a petition for a contested case sixty-three days after the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (NCDHHS) mailed notice of its decision to revoke petitioner's licenses to operate two mental health facilities, the Office of Administrative Hearings properly dismissed the petition as untimely. Petitioner, citing an administrative code provision (26 N.C. Admin. Code 3.0116) stating that "time computations in contested cases" are governed by Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, contended that its petition was timely because NCDHHS gave notice by mail and, therefore, the prescribed sixty-day deadline (under N.C.G.S. § 150B-23(f)) for filing the petition was extended by an additional three days under Rule 6(e). However, because a contested case does not exist until it is commenced through the filing of a petition, the sixty-day deadline did not constitute a time limitation "in" a contested case; consequently, Rule 6(e) did not apply. Further, Rule 6(e) only applies to "service" of papers, which does not include delivery of an agency decision before any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding has commenced. Bradley Home v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 220PA24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Guilty plea—limited right of appeal—statutory exception inapplicable—appellate jurisdiction improper—After the defendant in a prosecution for embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses pleaded guilty to attaining habitual felon status, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that defendant had a right of appeal from the entry of her guilty plea under one of the exceptions to the general limitation on such appeals: specifically, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2)(3), which allows an appeal as of right where the duration of a prison sentence is not statutorily authorized for the defendant's class of offense and prior record level. This exception did not apply to defendant's appeal, which challenged the factual basis for the guilty plea rather than the duration of defendant's sentence. Consequently, the Court of Appeals–having dismissed defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari as moot–lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of defendant's appeal, prompting the Supreme Court to reverse that court's decision and to remand the case for further proceedings. State v. Mincey , No. 68A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Ineffective assistance of counsel—claim apparent from the record—not raised on direct appeal—improperly raised in motion for appropriate relief—In a criminal case where the defendant, after unsuccessfully appealing his convictions for first-degree murder and arson to the Court of Appeals, filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR) alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) at trial, the Supreme Court affirmed the subsequent denial of defendant's MAR on the ground that his IAC claims were procedurally barred under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3), which prohibits defendants from raising any post-conviction claims in an MAR that could have been adequately raised in a previous appeal. Here, defendant's IAC claims relied exclusively on information available from the record on direct appeal from his convictions; thus, he was in a position to adequately raise those claims in that prior appeal, and his failure to do so meant that he was barred from raising them in his MAR. Further, defendant failed to argue that either of the exceptions (listed under section 15A-1419(b)) to the procedural bar under section 15A-1419(a)(3) applied to his MAR. State v. Gupton , No. 444PA19-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Interlocutory order—constitutional Corum claim—substantial right—risk of inconsistent verdicts—In a civil action brought by a student against a teacher and the county school district arising from the teacher's physical assault of the student in a classroom, although the trial court's order granting the school board's Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the student's constitutional claim was interlocutory, the Supreme Court had subject matter jurisdiction to review the matter. Not only did the student sufficiently allege a Corum claim that her rights under the North Carolina Constitution to a sound basic education were infringed–based on the school board's decision to first suspend her, and then to transfer her to another school without her input or consent–but, further, the trial court's dismissal of the student's constitutional claim against the board–while allowing her separate tort claims against the teacher to go forward–created a risk of inconsistent verdicts and, therefore, affected a substantial right. K.H. v. Dixon , No. 290A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Interlocutory order—denying motion for reconsideration—partial summary judgment—rejecting statute of repose defense—substantial right affected—In a products liability action arising from a fatal plane crash, where the aircraft's engine manufacturer (defendant) argued that all of plaintiffs' claims were barred by the eighteen-year statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), but where the trial court denied summary judgment to defendant with respect to plaintiffs' claim for negligent failure to warn, the Court of Appeals' order dismissing defendant's appeal from the trial court's subsequent interlocutory order–denying defendant's motion to reconsider the partial summary judgment ruling–was reversed because the Court of Appeals had incorrectly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's appeal. Firstly, defendant had timely appealed from the correct order. Secondly, plaintiffs' contention that interlocutory orders denying reconsideration are never immediately appealable was meritless, especially where the order at issue substantially altered the court's earlier reasoning for granting partial summary judgment. Finally, unlike statutes of limitations, which are purely procedural and only provide immunity from civil liability, statutes of repose provide immunity from suit–a substantial right that is lost if a case proceeds to trial; therefore, appellate jurisdiction was proper where the order affected defendant's substantial right to immunity from suit under GARA's statute of repose. Byrd v. Avco Corp. , No. 270PA24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Preservation of issues—Fourth Amendment search—ankle monitor data—failure to object at trial after denial of motion to suppress—In a prosecution for charges arising from a drive-by shooting at a Raleigh convenience store, where law enforcement officers obtained (without a warrant) location data from an ankle monitor defendant wore as a condition of post-release supervision for other crimes, defendant waived his objection to the alleged search because, although defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress and renewed that objection at trial when the State's witness referenced the ankle monitor and when the State sought to introduce a spreadsheet containing machine-generated monitoring data, defendant did not object when the State introduced maps showing defendant's ankle monitor location at various points in time, superimposed over aerial or street maps. State v. Thomas , No. 248PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Preservation of issues—general rate case—transmission cost allocation stipulation—no opposition or objection raised—In a pair of general rate cases where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC), intervenor-appellant Carolina Industrial Group for Fair Utility Rates (CIGFUR) failed to preserve for review its challenge to the Commission's approval of a transmission cost allocation (TCA) stipulation approved by DEP, DEC, and the Public Staff. No party opposed the TCA stipulation during the DEP or DEC evidentiary hearings or raised any objection to it in post-hearing briefing and, additionally, CIGFUR only challenged the TCA stipulation in its appeal in the DEC rate case, yet asked that the stipulation be vacated in both the DEP and DEC matters. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Preservation of issues—insufficiency of evidence—two separate assault charges—general motion to dismiss—In a prosecution for multiple crimes arising from a domestic violence incident between defendant and his wife, defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his argument that insufficient evidence supported two separate charges of assault by strangulation rather than a single charge arising from one, continuous offense. Under Appellate Rule 10(a)(3), which precludes defendants from raising sufficiency of the evidence issues on appeal unless a motion to dismiss is made at trial, a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence is offense specific, meaning that a motion to dismiss one offense preserves all sufficiency issues with respect to that offense alone. Consequently, defendant's general motion to dismiss at trial did not preserve his argument regarding the two assault charges, especially where he announced to the trial court that he was excluding those specific charges from his motion. State v. Tadlock , No. 191PA25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Preservation of issues—preservation issue not raised by appellee until additional briefing requested—not waiver—In an appeal by a criminal defendant who sought review of the standard applicable to searches of ankle monitor data collected as a condition of his post-release supervision, the Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument: that it should not reach the question of whether defendant had preserved the issue for review because the State did not raise preservation until supplemental briefing was requested. The State's failure to initially argue defendant's failure to preserve was not waiver because the State was the appellee, and a reviewing court is not constrained to uphold a lower court ruling solely on the legal grounds presented by the appellee. State v. Thomas , No. 248PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Scope of appellate review—single issue in lower court's dissent—additional issue not inherently intertwined—The Supreme Court limited its review of defendant's criminal case–in which he was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping–to the single ground stated by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals' decision; namely, whether the State presented substantial evidence of the victim's restraint beyond that inherent in the murder to support the kidnapping charge. Where the State did not petition for discretionary review of additional issues but nevertheless argued that a governing line of cases should be overruled, the State's challenges to precedential case law was not inherently intertwined with the issue stated in the dissent. State v. Moore , No. 285A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Writ of certiorari—prior petition dismissed without prejudice to refile—second petition properly granted—Where one panel of the Court of Appeals disposed of defendant's first petition for a writ of certiorari–to review his criminal judgment based on his counsel's failure to timely file notice of appeal–by dismissing it without prejudice to refile with the inclusion of possible issues of merit, the discretionary decision by a different panel to issue a writ of certiorari upon defendant's second petition did not constitute an impermissible overruling of the first panel. State v. Martinez , No. 101PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Writ of certiorari—two-part test—loss of right to direct appeal—criminal case—counsel's deficient performance—discretionary decision—Where the Court of Appeals properly applied the two-part test set forth in Cryan v. Nat'l Council of YMCAs, 384 N.C. 569 (2023), for determining whether to issue a writ of certiorari, it acted within its discretion when it granted defendant's petition for writ of certiorari to review his criminal judgment. First, defendant's petition established merit or that probable error was committed below because it was accompanied by his counsel's affidavit acknowledging that, although he understood defendant wanted to appeal his judgment, counsel failed to speak with defendant or take any steps to timely file notice of appeal. Second, extraordinary circumstances existed to justify issuance of the writ where defendant lost the right to appeal due to his counsel's constitutionally deficient performance. State v. Martinez , No. 101PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Joinder—Rule 19—failure to join—subject matter jurisdiction not implicated—In a matter involving the question of whether Civil Procedure Rule 19 requires a revocable trust to be joined in an equitable distribution matter, the Supreme Court reiterated that any failure to join a necessary party pursuant to Rule 19 does not result in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. While a Rule 19 challenge may be deemed waived–unlike a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction–the appellate court declined to deem the joinder issue waived in this instance despite defendant's failure to raise it at his first opportunity, in order to identify the property subject to distribution. Face v. Face , No. 333PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—standard of review—documents outside of complaint—incorporation-by-reference doctrine—In an appeal regarding an order granting a Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss claims raised against a private school by parents whose children were expelled from the school after the parents complained about controversial changes to the curriculum, the Supreme Court expressly endorsed the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, which states that a court reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may consider documents that are not attached to the complaint but are submitted by the movant if: (1) the document is referenced in the complaint, (2) the document is central to the factual allegations or the claims asserted, and (3) there is no dispute about the document's authenticity. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Certification—class consisting of home builders—entitlement to refund of water and sewer impact fees paid to city —In a declaratory judgment action filed by two home construction companies, each seeking a refund of allegedly illegal Capital Facilities Fees (CFFs) paid to the City of Raleigh in exchange for connection to the city's water and sewer systems, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the companies' motion to certify–pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 23–a class consisting of home builders who had also paid the CFFs. The plain language of the applicable "refund statute" (N.C.G.S. § 160D-106) provided for refunds of illegally imposed fees to any "person who made the payment," making no distinction between those who ultimately bore the economic burden of the fee and those who passed that burden on to others through subsequent private transactions. Therefore, the fact that some class members incorporated the CFFs into the prices they charged home buyers did not defeat the existence of a class, create conflicts of interest among class members, or render a class action inferior to other available methods of adjudicating the case. Wardson Constr., Inc. v. City of Raleigh , No. 115A25 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Certification—feasibility of ascertaining class members—no predominance or superiority issues—In a class action lawsuit against a county regarding two types of waste disposal fees, the trial court's order certifying three of four proposed classes was affirmed. First, members of two of the proposed classes–those who paid either a "Green Box Fee" or a "Landfill Fee" but who used private waste collection services–could be feasibly and objectively ascertained from customer lists of the few private waste collection services in the county. Second, with regard to one of the proposed classes, any individualized issues regarding whether a member did or did not use a county-provided waste disposal unit did not predominate over the common issues, including whether the private facilities offered the "same services" as the county. Finally, with regard to the class encompassing those from whom the county overcollected–based on fees that exceeded the cost of operating the county's waste disposal facilities in violation of N.C.G.S. § 153A-292(b)–the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that a class action was a superior method of adjudicating those claims than any alternative, based on efficiency considerations. Armistead v. County of Carteret , No. 66A25 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Class certification—conflict between class definition and court's analysis—ascertainability—In a class action lawsuit arising from an allegedly deceptive promotional flyer that a car dealership sent to plaintiffs–who were led to believe that they had won either a large cash prize or a free car when, in fact, they had won only two dollars–the trial court's class certification order (entered on remand from a prior appeal) was vacated where the court defined the class to include people who received the flyer, called the promotional hotline number shown on the flyer, and then visited the dealership to claim their prize. This definition conflicted with the court's analysis, wherein the court found that one of the named plaintiffs did not call the hotline–rather, her grandmother did–but nevertheless allowed her to remain a named plaintiff representing the class; in turn, this inconsistency prevented meaningful appellate review. Additionally, the proposed class was not ascertainable where there were no records identifying which of the 2,118 people who called the hotline number were among the 927 who also visited the dealership during the promotional period. Surgeon v. TKO Shelby, LLC , No. 198A22-2 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Enforceability of employment agreement—prior lawsuit—issue not actually litigated—resolved by settlement—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including breach of contract for allegedly breaching the non-solicitation provisions of an employment agreement, plaintiffs were not collaterally estopped from seeking enforcement of those provisions despite a finding from a trial court in a prior lawsuit (which plaintiffs had brought against one of the defendants) determining that those provisions were unenforceable. The enforceability issue was not actually litigated and necessary to the judgment because the prior lawsuit was resolved by a settlement agreement, and there was no statement indicating the parties' intent to incorporate the unenforceability finding into the settlement agreement. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Effective assistance of counsel—admission of defendant's guilt without consent—Harbison per se prejudice rule—narrowed—In a prosecution on charges including second-degree murder and felony hit and run, brought after defendant walked away from the fatal collision of his vehicle with a motorcycle carrying a married couple–where defendant had admitted that he was driving the vehicle and that people were killed in the crash, and he pled guilty to driving while license revoked–defendant did not receive ineffective assistance when his counsel conceded his guilt to the lesser-included offenses of misdemeanor death by vehicle and misdemeanor hit and run without defendant’s consent. The expansive per se rule established in State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 (1985)–that a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment is established in every case where counsel admits his client’s guilt without the defendant’s consent–was narrowed in light of the holding of Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004): that prejudice is presumed only where counsel entirely fails to function as a defendant's advocate, a criterion which can be, but is not always, met by unconsented-to concessions of guilt. Here, because defense counsel did not admit any elements of the charges for which defendant was convicted that defendant had not already conceded, defendant could not demonstrate prejudice. State v. Farook , No. 457PA20-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Effective assistance of counsel—defense counsel's purported concessions of guilt—defendant's stipulations—Harbison inapplicable—In defendant's appeal from his convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, the Court of Appeals' determination that the record failed to show whether defendant knowingly consented in advance to his trial counsel's admission of guilt–and its resulting remand of the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on that issue–was reversed. There was no deficiency in defense counsel's performance regarding concessions–let alone per se prejudicial error pursuant to State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 (1985), and State v. McAllister, 375 N.C. 455 (2020), which together provide the appropriate framework when a client's autonomy, not counsel's competence, is in issue–where defendant stipulated on the record to his counsel's purported concessions in two separate colloquies with the trial court and, moreover, counsel did not actually concede defendant's guilt, either explicitly or implicitly. State v. Nunnally , No. 216A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

North Carolina—colorable Corum claim—student assaulted by teacher—right to sound basic education—sufficiency of facts—In a civil action brought by a student against a teacher and the county school district arising from the teacher's physical assault of the student in a classroom, the trial court erred by granting the school board's Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the student's constitutional claim, which she raised directly under the North Carolina Constitution pursuant to Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761 (1992). The student alleged sufficient facts to support a colorable constitutional claim that the Board's actions after she was assaulted–including by first suspending her, and then by transferring her to another school without her input or consent–constituted deliberate indifference to the conduct of others that infringed on her right to a sound basic education and, further, the student lacked another adequate state law remedy. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the trial court's order was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. K.H. v. Dixon , No. 290A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Right to counsel—waiver—knowing, intelligent, and voluntary—course of conduct—sufficiency of colloquy—In a prosecution for multiple sexual offenses, the trial court's determination that defendant clearly and unequivocally expressed his desire to proceed pro se and that defendant's waiver of his right to appointed counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary was supported by the totality of the circumstances; therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals granting defendant a new trial after finding otherwise was reversed. Over the course of the case defendant cycled through five appointed attorneys and twice filed handwritten waivers of counsel in which he asked to represent himself with the assistance of standby counsel. Further, the trial court conducted a colloquy with defendant that substantially complied with the requirements set forth in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242; although the trial court's statement of the range of permissible punishments was not precise, its miscalculation and the actual range of possible punishments both amounted to more than defendant's natural life. State v. McGirt , No. 91A25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Breach—private school enrollment contract—termination by school—sufficiency of complaint—notice pleading standard met—In a lawsuit filed against a private school and its leadership (defendants) where, after plaintiffs–the parents of two students at the school–complained about the addition of polarizing political issues into the curriculum, the school terminated plaintiffs' enrollment contracts and expelled their children, the trial court improperly granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) where plaintiffs alleged a narrow set of facts that, if taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, stated a proper breach of contract claim. Specifically, the complaint alleged that: a clause in the enrollment contracts permitted the school to terminate enrollment if certain criteria were satisfied; the school expelled plaintiffs' children for reasons not permitted under the contract and then used the termination clause as a false pretext; and, as a result, the school violated the termination clause and, therefore, breached the enrollment contracts. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Business dispute—breach of settlement agreement—non-solicitation provision—application of adverse inference—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including breach of a settlement agreement from a prior lawsuit–which included a non-solicitation-of-employees provision–where the Business Court had properly granted plaintiffs' motion for adverse inference due to defendants' extensive spoliation of evidence, plaintiffs' claim for breach of settlement agreement was remanded for the Business Court to fulfill its discretionary function regarding the application of the adverse inference to this claim. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Employment agreement—non-solicitation provisions—reasonableness—blue pencil doctrine inapplicable—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including breach of contract–alleging that defendants breached the non-solicitation provisions of their employment agreements (barring them from soliciting clients and employees)–although plaintiffs argued in the alternative for the application of the blue pencil doctrine to save any unenforceable provisions, the equitable doctrine could only be applied to an unreasonable provision that was separable from the rest of the agreement. Here, the doctrine did not apply because plaintiffs' suggestion on appeal that a particular term be blue-pencilled out of the agreement would require striking the term from at least forty-six separate clauses and not merely removing a separable, divisible provision from an otherwise enforceable contract. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Employment agreement—non-solicitation provisions—reasonableness—size and scope of company—remand required—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including breach of contract–alleging that defendants breached the non-solicitation provisions of their employment agreements (barring them from soliciting clients and employees)–although the Business Court had determined that the non-solicitation provisions were unreasonable, the issue was remanded for consideration of the size and scope of the company, since there was a factual dispute as to the meaning and identity of the main company and its affiliated members. On remand, the burden was on plaintiffs to prove the reasonableness of the restrictive provisions. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Enforceability—employment agreement—ownership interest provision—void for indefiniteness—In an action to enforce an employment agreement provision, under which plaintiff sought to exercise an option to purchase ten percent of the company after five years of employment (with the remaining ninety percent to be owner-financed over a period of years after that), the decision of the North Carolina Business Court granting summary judgment to defendants–based on its determination that the agreement between the parties was illusory–was modified and affirmed. The agreement could not be enforced due to it being void for indefiniteness where the ownership provision was not severable from its sub-division parts and where the agreement lacked material terms regarding the parties' respective rights and obligations, including those necessary for enforcement and, more particularly, a price or formula upon which a price could be calculated. Langley v. Autocraft, Inc. , No. 304A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Enforceability—provision of employment agreement—equitable defenses—quasi-estoppel—mend the hold—In an action to enforce an employment agreement provision, under which plaintiff sought to exercise an option to purchase ten percent of the company after five years of employment (with the remaining ninety percent to be owner-financed over a period of years after that), where the parties' agreement was void for indefiniteness, plaintiff's arguments in the alternative for relief pursuant to equitable principles of quasi-estoppel and mend the hold were unavailing. Since the ownership provision lacked material terms of enforcement, there was no meeting of minds regarding the parties' purported obligations and, thus, the agreement's indefiniteness precluded relief on a quasi-estoppel basis. The doctrine of mend the hold did not apply where defendants' counterclaim–in which they asserted that plaintiff owed a fiduciary duty to the company–was a separate claim stated in the alternative and did not constitute a new justification for nonperformance that would trigger the doctrine. Langley v. Autocraft, Inc. , No. 304A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Expenditures—scope of authority—net proceeds of occupancy tax—"tourism-related expenditures"—public safety services—Pursuant to the plain language of a legislative enabling statute that allows Currituck County to collect a room occupancy tax and spend the net proceeds from that tax on "tourism-related expenditures," the county's decision to use the occupancy tax revenues to enhance certain public safety services (including police, fire, and emergency response services) was within its discretionary authority, not taken in bad faith, not arbitrary or capricious, and not in disregard of the law. The county commissioners made a reasoned decision that the expenditures were necessary to promote and develop tourism based on the substantial population increase during peak tourist season and related year-round costs to provide public safety services during that period. Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants (the county and its tourism development agency) on plaintiffs' (county property owners) action for declaratory judgment; the decision by the Court of Appeals to the contrary was reversed and the matter was remanded for proceedings consistent with the holding of the Supreme Court. Costanzo v. Currituck County , No. 101PA24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Capital case—executive clemency—death sentence commuted to life imprisonment without parole— effect on right of direct appeal to Supreme Court —In a capital case, where defendant applied for clemency while his appeal from a judgment sentencing him to death for first-degree murder was still pending in the Supreme Court, which resulted in the governor commuting defendant's death sentence to life imprisonment without parole, the Supreme Court granted defendant's motion to remand the appeal to the Court of Appeals on the ground that, because he no longer faced execution, he did not retain his statutory right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court under N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(a)(1) and 15A-2000(d), since the legislative purpose under those statutes for allowing direct Supreme Court review–to prevent arbitrary or unjust executions–no longer applied to his case, which had become a non-capital felony case requiring appellate review in the Court of Appeals under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1). State v. Robinson , No. 142A12 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Deposition—request for production of documents—timeliness of objections—misstatement of law—abuse of discretion—In a suit against two automotive companies (defendants), in which plaintiff, as administratrix of her son's estate, asserted that the faulty design of her son's vehicle contributed to his death by a post-collision fire, the trial court committed an error of law when it held that defendants failed to timely object to plaintiff's request for production of documents prior to a scheduled deposition. Defendants' separate objections–filed ten days and seven days, respectively, prior to the deposition–were made within the deadlines set forth in Civil Procedure Rule 30(b)(5) (requiring that objections be served at least seven days prior to the taking of a deposition) and, despite plaintiff's request that objections be made earlier, one party cannot unilaterally impose tighter deadlines than those provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court's misstatement of the deadline caused prejudicial harm because the court improperly waived defendants' objections to both the Rule 30(b)(5) notice and to plaintiff's other Rule 34 requests; therefore, the error constituted an abuse of discretion. The opinion of the Court of Appeals upholding this aspect of the trial court's order was reversed, and the matter was remanded with instructions to vacate the discovery order and for further proceedings. Sessoms v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. , No. 23PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Deposition—scope of topics—preservation of objections—protective order not required—legal error—In a suit against two automotive companies (defendants), in which plaintiff, as administratrix of her son's estate, asserted that the faulty design of her son's vehicle contributed to his death by a post-collision fire, the trial court erred by holding that defendants' objections to the scope of deposition topics were waived or overruled for failure to seek a protective order to limit the scope of Civil Procedure Rule 30(b)(6) deposition topics. Pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants here preserved their objections to the deposition topics by serving them directly on plaintiff in advance of the deposition and were not required to seek a protective order. The decision of the Court of Appeals upholding this aspect of the trial court's order was reversed, and the matter was remanded with instructions to vacate the discovery order and for further proceedings. Sessoms v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. , No. 23PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Misappropriation of trade secrets—spoliation of evidence—widespread deletion of electronic data—scope of adverse inference—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including misappropriation of trade secrets (specifically, client lists), although the Business Court properly granted plaintiffs' motion for adverse inference–based on evidence that defendants intentionally destroyed or failed to preserve electronic data and materials despite being aware of the litigation and having been sent cease-and-desist letters with a preservation notice–that court failed to identify where and how the inference would be drawn. The Supreme Court remanded the issue of spoliation for the Business Court to fulfill its discretionary function by clarifying with greater precision the application of the inference as to each claim. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Equitable distribution—personal goodwill—distinguished from enterprise goodwill—separate property—prospective—In an equitable distribution proceeding where the parties agreed on the division of all assets except the law firm started by plaintiff after the parties wed but before they separated (and where plaintiff was a sole practitioner), the Supreme Court for the first time distinguished enterprise goodwill from personal goodwill for equitable distribution purposes. Enterprise goodwill is marketable and stays with a professional practice, while personal goodwill is tied to, and thus goes with, the practitioner; accordingly, personal goodwill cannot qualify as marital property pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-20(a) because the statute assumes that all such property can be distributed. In addition, the Court emphasized that, because personal goodwill is prospective and concerns only future earnings, a trial court may still classify the income generated by a professional practice, even one with a sole practitioner, as marital property on the same basis as other “real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of the separation of the parties” under N.C.G.S. § 50-20(b)(1b). Sneed v. Johnston , No. 130PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Protective order—annotated statement from complainant—incorporation by reference—factfinding sufficient—In a proceeding for a domestic violence protective order (DVPO), the trial court’s incorporation-by-reference approach to factfinding–attaching to the DVPO a copy of the complainant's written statement bearing the judge's strike-throughs and other notes–was sufficient to sustain the DVPO issued because it allowed the appellate court to determine that the DVPO, and its underlying legal conclusions, reflected an appropriate application of law. A comparison of the testimony at the DVPO hearing with the judge’s annotated copy of the written statement revealed that the judge struck the portions that were not corroborated by the parties’ testimonies and left intact the portions that were corroborated. While not the best practice, the trial court's method demonstrated sufficient engagement with the written statement to transform what would otherwise be improper “mere recitations” of evidence into proper evidentiary findings under Civil Procedure Rule 52. Jay v. Jay , No. 97A25 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Keeping or maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling controlled substances—keeping versus selling—sufficiency of evidence—In a prosecution for keeping or maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling controlled substances (N.C.G.S. § 90-108(a)(7)), the State failed to offer substantial evidence that defendant kept or maintained his vehicle for the keeping of controlled substances, an offense which applies to using a vehicle for the storage of illegal drugs. While a defendant does not need to store drugs in a vehicle for any minimum time period, it is not sufficient for him to merely have drugs in a vehicle, since a keeping or maintaining a vehicle charge is distinct from a possession of controlled substances charge. Here, the totality of the circumstances failed to demonstrate storage: the drugs and drug paraphernalia at issue were in a bookbag–entirely self-contained and meant to facilitate transportation into and out of the vehicle–in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. However, the matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the State met its burden to prove that defendant used his vehicle to sell (rather than keep) controlled substances. State v. Garmon , No. 329A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Expert testimony—sexual offenses against a child—impermissible vouching for victim's credibility—no plain error—In a prosecution for multiple charges of taking indecent liberties with a child and first-degree statutory sexual offense, where the evidence consisted solely of witness testimony, the trial court's admission of two expert witnesses' testimonies did not constitute plain error because, even if both experts had impermissibly vouched for the victim's credibility when testifying, nothing in the record suggested that the jury probably would have reached a different verdict absent those testimonies. Firstly, the victim's uncorroborated testimony, even standing alone, was legally sufficient to convict defendant where it established each element of the charged offenses. Additionally, the State introduced other evidence–namely, the expert testimony of a child abuse evaluation specialist who conducted a forensic interview with the victim, and the testimony of the social worker who conducted the victim's initial intake and the investigation that followed–that supported the jury's finding of guilt independent of the alleged vouching testimony. State v. Wingate , No. 184A25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Murder trial—victim's prior felony convictions—to show defendant's state of mind—exclusion under Rule 404(b)—prejudicial—In a prosecution for first-degree murder arising from an altercation in a cornfield about the victim hunting too close to defendant's horse rescue farm, where defendant claimed that he acted in self-defense when he fatally shot the victim as he appeared to reach into his vest after angrily pushing defendant to the ground, the trial court prejudicially erred in excluding evidence of the victim's prior felony convictions under Evidence Rule 404(b). This evidence was not offered to show that the victim acted in conformity with his past crimes, but rather to show defendant's state of mind during the altercation–and the reasonableness of his fear during the incident, which was essential to his self-defense claim–where defendant knew that the victim was a convicted felon who illegally carried a firearm. State v. Hague , No. 225A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Text messages—voluminous and un-redacted—admitted without limiting instruction—plain error analysis—Where defendant was convicted of second-degree murder–upon evidence that: the victim (a married co-worker with whom defendant had been engaged in a sexual affair and significant drug use) was found face-down in defendant's bedroom doorway, shot twice in the back and with a key to defendant's home lying nearby; defendant was the only person armed when the encounter that led to the victim's death began; and defendant's accounts of the encounter were materially inconsistent–defendant could not demonstrate that, but for the trial court's admission of voluminous and un-redacted text messages and photos, some sexually explicit, sent from defendant's phone to the victim and other persons, the jury probably would have returned a different verdict. State v. Hicks , No. 136PA22-2 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Possession of a firearm by a felon—constructive possession—evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State—In reviewing the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon–for insufficient evidence that he constructively possessed a firearm–the Court of Appeals erred by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, resolving evidentiary conflicts in defendant's favor, and, as a result, reversing the judgment entered upon defendant's conviction. Properly considered (that is, in the light most favorable to the State), the evidence–that defendant shared nonexclusive possession of the bedroom where the firearm was found; had a key to the house and, upon seeing law enforcement approach, hurried inside; and was arrested a few steps away from the dresser where the firearm was discovered–showed defendant's occupation of the house, control of the premises, proximity to the firearm, and suspicious conduct, which in turn supported an inference that defendant constructively possessed the firearm. State v. Norris , No. 177PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—"exceeds authorized access"—post-employment computer access—remand for adverse inference consideration—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims involving the alleged misappropriation of client lists, the Business Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on three of plaintiffs' computer trespass claims made pursuant to the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. With regard to one defendant, there was sufficient evidence that she "exceed[ed] authorized access" by accessing a vendor portal post-employment and after plaintiffs sent her a cease-and-desist letter. For another defendant, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether, when he took client expiration lists prior to resigning from employment with plaintiffs, he knowingly violated an established company rule. For a third claim, although plaintiffs failed to sufficiently support their allegation that all defendants emailed confidential documents to their personal email accounts and took screenshots of confidential information from their work computers prior to resigning, the matter was remanded for the Business Court to fulfill its discretionary function regarding the application of a previously-granted adverse inference (based on defendants' extensive spoliation of evidence) to this claim. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Private school enrollment contract—termination by school—sufficiency of complaint—notice pleading standard met—In a lawsuit filed against a private school and its leadership (defendants) where, after plaintiffs–the parents of two students at the school–complained about the addition of polarizing political issues into the curriculum, the school terminated plaintiffs' enrollment contracts and expelled their children, the trial court improperly granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint, in accordance with the applicable "notice pleading" standard of review, alleged a narrow set of facts sufficiently stating a claim of fraud. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that: defendants promised there would be no "blowback" or "retaliation" against plaintiffs or their children if they met with school leadership to discuss their concerns; this promise was false, made with the intent to deceive and lure plaintiffs into the meeting to create a pretext for expelling the children; plaintiffs believed defendants' promise and therefore spoke openly during the meeting; and the school, at the same meeting, expelled the children, resulting in damage to plaintiffs. Importantly, taking the allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the promise of "no blowback" included a promise not to terminate the enrollment contracts and expel plaintiffs' children. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Jury instruction—castle doctrine—occupant of motor vehicle—need not be physically inside—presumption—In a prosecution where defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing a man during an altercation–the exact facts of which were disputed at trial, but that began with the victim approaching defendant while defendant was inside his car and ended with defendant exiting his vehicle and fatally shooting the victim–defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the castle doctrine. Under the plain language of the relevant statute (N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b)), although defendant chose to exit his vehicle during the incident, he was an "occupant" for purposes of the castle doctrine instruction. Further, the doctrine’s presumption (that a lawful occupant had a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or others) applied to defendant despite the victim's discontinuation of efforts to enter defendant's vehicle, which went toward rebutting the presumption rather than the statute's applicability. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' decision–remanding for a new trial–was affirmed, but was modified as it pertained to the interpretation of the statute, which was not ambiguous in its application to the matter at bar. State v. Williams , No. 21PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Habitual felon indictment—filed prior to commission of principal felony and filing of indictment—not untimely—The Court of Appeals erred in allowing defendant's motion for appropriate relief, in which he argued that his habitual felon indictment was untimely because it was filed prior to the commission of the principal felony and, thus, prior to the filing of the indictment for the principal felony; the plain language of the Habitual Felon Act (specifically, N.C.G.S. § 14-7.3) did not prohibit this practice. A habitual felon indictment need only include: (1) the dates of the prior felony offenses; (2) the state of the prior felonies; (3) the dates on which defendant pled guilty to, or was convicted of, the prior felonies; and (4) the court where the convictions occurred–all requirements which relate to and depend on the prior felonies, not the principal felony. State v. Garmon , No. 329A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult—lesser-included offense listed on indictment—not fatally flawed—In the prosecution of a father accused of sexually abusing his twelve-year-old son, where defendant was ultimately sentenced for committing statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult under N.C.G.S. § 14-27.28, but where his indictment expressly charged him with the lesser-included offense of first-degree statutory sexual offense under N.C.G.S. § 14-27.29, the indictment was not fatally flawed such that defendant was entitled to a new trial. The factual allegations in the indictment addressed all elements required for the more serious charge, including that defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the abuse, thereby rendering the incorrect statutory reference a harmless scrivener's error. Furthermore, both the allegations in the indictment and the frequent references to the more serious offense throughout the proceedings put defendant on constructive notice of the offense with which he was actually being charged. State v. Wingate , No. 184A25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Business Court—issuance of clarifying order—summary dismissal of claims—lack of written basis—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including misappropriation of trade secrets, after both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the Business Court entered an initial summary judgment order, the presiding Business Court Judge erred by issuing a "Clarifying Order" a few weeks later–which modified the first order by granting defendants' summary judgment motion pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 56–without legal analysis or legal basis as required by N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.3. The court's order summarily granting summary judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded for entry of a written, reasoned opinion as to defendants' motion. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Judicial standards—censure recommendation adopted—factual findings supported—The Supreme Court accepted the Judicial Standards Commission's recommendation for the censure of respondent (a superior court judge) for violations of Canons 1, 2A, and 5F of the Code of Judicial Conduct–which amounted to conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice, brought the judicial branch into disrepute, and constituted willful misconduct in office. The Commission's findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence, including that respondent had asked a court employee in his jurisdiction to put forth to the senior resident superior court judge respondent's deficient motions to withdraw as an attorney from cases and continued to appear as an attorney while a sitting judge, but also that respondent was otherwise cooperative with the Commission's investigation, eventually took appropriate remedial measures, and had no prior disciplinary history with the Commission. In re J.C. , No. 86A26 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Per Curiam)

Subject matter jurisdiction—education funding—facial challenge never properly invoked—vacatur and dismissal with prejudice—In a decades-long case involving the scope of public education rights guaranteed under the North Carolina Constitution and whether the allocation of state financial resources adequately provided students with an opportunity to receive a sound basic education, where the initial 1994 complaint sought a determination of whether the education rights of schoolchildren in a select number of counties had been violated by the lack of adequate funding–as-applied challenges under the conditions then in existence–the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction was limited to a set of relatively narrow claims for relief as set forth in the parties' pleadings. However, since at least 2017, the nature of the litigation transformed from a set of as-applied challenges to a facial constitutional challenge against the entire state education system, which had itself undergone numerous changes, even though no party invoked the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a facial challenge to the current education system in either the original pleading or in any supplemental pleading seeking a permissive amendment. Therefore, any order or opinion issued in the case since 24 July 2017 was void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction. Further, since 2014, any facial constitutional challenges needed to be directed to a three-judge panel of the Superior Court, Wake County. For these reasons, the trial court's order issued on 17 April 2023 purporting to grant relief on a statewide basis was vacated and, where further adjudication of the original claims was no longer necessary or appropriate, the case was dismissed with prejudice. Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State , No. 425A21-3 (N.C. Apr. 2, 2026) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Juror replacement during deliberations—N.C.G.S. § 15A-1215(a)—application of Chambers test—In reviewing convictions (including for second-degree murder) arising from a drive-by shooting at a Raleigh convenience store, where a juror was replaced with an alternate during deliberations and the resulting jury was instructed to start their deliberations afresh, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' grant of a new trial to defendant by applying the holding of State v. Chambers, 387 N.C. 521 (2025). Chambers upheld the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1215(a)–which authorizes trial courts to replace a juror with an alternate after deliberations have begun–in light of statutory safeguards of the right to a twelve-person jury: (1) substituting an alternate juror only after a sitting juror is excused, and then (2) instructing the newly composed jury to begin deliberations anew. After employing the special preservation rule from Chambers to reach the merits of defendant's argument despite his failure to object to the juror substitution at trial, the court declined defendant’s request to frame the Chambers test as a case-by-case inquiry into how long the jury deliberated, how recently the jury was instructed to begin deliberations anew, or what additional instructions the court provided. State v. Thomas , No. 248PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Restraint—independent from restraint inherent in murder by suffocation—sufficiency of evidence—In a prosecution for first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping, the State presented substantial evidence that the victim was restrained beyond the restraint that was inherent in the murder, which defendant perpetrated by suffocating the victim. Defendant not only bound his wife's hands, knees, and feet in such a manner as to prevent her from removing the plastic bags and duct tape over her head and mouth that caused her to suffocate, but he used additional restraints–including cables and zip ties–that were not inherent in the murder and, thus, supported a separate conviction for kidnapping. The decision of the Court of Appeals vacating the kidnapping conviction was therefore reversed. State v. Moore , No. 285A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Defamation—private school curriculum dispute—school characterization of parents' concerns—sufficiency of complaint—In a lawsuit filed against a private school and its leadership (defendants) by parents (plaintiffs) whose children were expelled from the school after plaintiffs complained about controversial changes to the curriculum, the trial court improperly dismissed plaintiffs' defamation per quod claim pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint alleged that defendants circulated an email to the greater school community accusing plaintiffs of making racist comments during a presentation at a parental focus group meeting. On appeal, the Supreme Court clarified that statements critiquing Critical Race Theory in education or advocating for meritocracy over race-conscious hiring and admissions were not legally equivalent to racist remarks; thus, the alleged defamatory statements–that the presentation referred to minority students and faculty as not having "earned their positions and honors" at the school and being "not up to the merit of the school" when compared to their white peers–did not accurately characterize the presentation, and therefore plaintiffs adequately pleaded that the statements were materially false. Additionally, the complaint adequately alleged the statements were "of and concerning" plaintiffs, since they were identifiable members of the focus group. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Negligent misrepresentation—private school enrollment contract—termination by school—forward-looking promise—improper basis for claim—In a lawsuit filed against a private school and its leadership (defendants) where, after plaintiffs–the parents of two students at the school–complained about the addition of polarizing political issues into the curriculum, the school terminated plaintiffs' enrollment contracts and expelled their children, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs' allegations–namely, that the school promised plaintiffs there would be "no blowback" or "retaliation" against them if they met with school leadership to discuss their concerns, and that this promise was false at the time it was made–were based on the type of forward-looking promise that, according to the relevant case precedent, could not serve as the basis of a negligent misrepresentation claim. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Sufficiency—negligent infliction of emotional distress—negligent retention—discretionary review improvidently allowed—In an appeal about an order granting a Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss claims raised against a private school by parents whose children were expelled from the school after the parents complained about controversial changes to the curriculum, the Supreme Court held that discretionary review was improvidently allowed with respect to their dismissed claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent retention, since neither claim involved matters over which there was any conflict in current jurisprudence, or issues sufficiently significant to meet the standard for discretionary review. Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Robbery with a dangerous weapon—taking of property—sufficiency of evidence—The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon where the State's evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, constituted substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that defendant took the victim's property–either himself or acting in concert with another–including: the victim was first pistol-whipped by defendant and then stomped on by defendant and other assailants and, when the victim woke up after a period of unconsciousness, his phone, house key, and cash were missing. Along with evidence of defendant's opportunity to take the victim's property, the State presented evidence pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b) that defendant participated in a prior armed robbery, which tended to support the inference that defendant committed the attack in this case with the intent to rob the victim. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing defendant's conviction was itself reversed. State v. Perry , No. 64PA24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Traffic stop—warrantless search—probable cause—totality of circumstances—marijuana odor only one factor—The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during a traffic stop where law enforcement officers had probable cause under the totality of the circumstances to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's person and vehicle. Relevant factors included: the excessive speed of the vehicle (a traffic violation which provided the officers with legal justification to initiate the stop); a marijuana odor; a cover scent (which, based on the officers' experience, was a common tactic used to mask the scent of marijuana); the criminal history of the vehicle's occupants; and a background check that revealed defendant had serious pending charges. Although the presence of a handgun on the car's dashboard was not a factor in the inquiry–because the driver provided her credentials as a probation and parole officer–the remainder of the circumstances collectively supported an inference that evidence of criminal activity would be discovered in the car; thus, the searches of defendant's person and vehicle were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Dobson , No. 190PA24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Anita Earls)

Traffic stop—warrantless search—reasonable suspicion—probable cause—totality of circumstances—marijuana odor—The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence where law enforcement officers had, under the totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry search of defendant's person and probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's vehicle. Relevant factors included: defendant's failure to pull over in response to a police vehicle's blue lights and sirens; defendant's presence in a "high crime area"; a marijuana odor coming from defendant's vehicle; defendant's evasive behavior during questioning; and defendant's prior criminal history. These circumstances, including the subsequent discovery of a marijuana "blunt" in defendant's pants pocket, were sufficient to create an inference that evidence of criminal activity would be discovered in the car; thus, the searches of defendant's person and vehicle were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Rowdy , No. 300PA24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Allison Riggs)

Harsher punishment following successful appeal—original minimum sentence erroneously undercalculated—proper punishment imposed after second trial—In a prosecution where defendant's multiple convictions on charges arising from a string of motor vehicle and credit card thefts were consolidated into two judgments for sentencing and where, on one consolidated judgment, the trial court erroneously undercalculated defendant’s minimum sentence under the Structured Sentencing Act (SSA) after his first trial, the prohibition on imposing a harsher punishment following a criminal defendant's successful appeal (as set forth in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1335) was not offended when the trial court imposed the proper, lawful minimum sentence after defendant's second trial. While both the SSA and section 15A-1335 appeared applicable to defendant’s resentencing, the former controlled because it provided more specific sentencing criteria than the latter. Thus, on remand, the trial court was required to enter a harsher sentence than defendant’s original sentence in order to comply with the SSA because courts may not impose illegal sentences. State v. Thomas , No. 262PA24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Chief Justice Paul Newby)

Sex offender registration—successive petitions to terminate—issue preclusion—tier level—law of the case—In a criminal case where defendant–who pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual activity by a substitute parent–filed three successive petitions for removal from the sex offender registry, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's order denying his third petition on the ground that he was a Tier II offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) and, therefore, was ineligible to seek removal before the applicable twenty-five-year waiting period. Successive petitions to terminate sex offender registration are part of the same underlying case; therefore, they are subject to the law of the case doctrine, meaning that any ruling made as to one petition concerning a legal question–such as a defendant's tier status under SORNA–is binding on subsequent petitions. Consequently, because the trial court had already held in a prior order–denying defendant's second petition–that defendant had committed a Tier II offense, and because defendant failed to appeal that ruling, defendant was precluded from challenging his tier designation on appeal from the subsequent order denying his third petition. State v. Lingerfelt , No. 38A25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Agreement by father to pay son's legal bills—enforceability—sufficiency of email correspondence—memorandum or note—In an action filed by plaintiff law firm to collect monies owed for legal services it provided to defendant's son, defendant's oral promise to pay his son's legal bills was enforceable where his email correspondence with the firm constituted a sufficient written "memorandum or note" of his promise, thereby satisfying the statute of frauds requirement (N.C.G.S. § 22-1); therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision reversing the trial court's judgment in favor of the law firm was itself reversed. Defendant's emails, though informal, were signed by defendant and provided adequate evidence of the essential terms of his oral guaranty, including the debt owed (the legal fees), the principal debtor (defendant's son), the promisor (defendant), and the promisee (the law firm). Notably, the emails indicated both defendant's ongoing involvement in managing his son's legal affairs and his commitment to paying his son's debt to the firm, including: an assurance that an "invoice" for "services rendered" by the firm would be "turned around promptly"; a request that the firm send all invoices directly to defendant's email; and a recurring use of plural pronouns like "us" and "our," suggesting a shared responsibility between him and his son. Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, LLP v. Muntjan , No. 29A24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Client lists—definition of "trade secret"—six-factor inquiry—summary judgment improper—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including misappropriation of trade secrets (specifically, client lists) under both federal and state law, the Business Court erred by determining at the summary judgment stage that two client lists (one containing names and addresses of clients serviced by one defendant; the other containing clients and their associated insurance policy renewal dates for various types of policies) did not qualify as protectable trade secrets. With regard to the two compilations, even if certain information about individual clients could be obtained publicly, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the lists' public availability, the extent to which other employees and those involved in the business knew about or could recreate the lists, the extent of measures taken to safeguard the lists' secrecy, the lists' value to plaintiffs, and the time and effort taken to acquire the information contained in each list. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Misappropriation—prima facie case—statutory criteria—absence of consent—remand for adverse inference consideration—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims including misappropriation of trade secrets (specifically, client lists) under both federal and state law, a prima facie case of misappropriation under N.C.G.S. § 66-155(2) requires a claimant to show not only that a specific opportunity to acquire a trade secret existed but also that the opportunity occurred absent consent or authority of the owner. Here, plaintiffs' evidence did not demonstrate that a production analysis document taken by one of the defendants had been obtained or used without defendants' consent or authority. However, where the Business Court had granted plaintiffs' motion for adverse inference due to extensive spoliation of evidence by defendants, the trade secret claim regarding the production analysis document was reversed and remanded for the Business Court to fulfill its discretionary function regarding the application of the adverse inference to this claim. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Revocable—all settlors named as parties in equitable distribution proceeding—Rule 19 joinder not required—In an issue of first impression, the Supreme Court held that Civil Procedure Rule 19 does not compel the joinder of a revocable trust to an equitable distribution (ED) proceeding when all of the trust's settlors are named parties in the ED proceeding because settlors retain complete, exclusive control over a revocable trust's property for life and, therefore, a judgment against settlors pertaining to property held in a revocable trust will effectively bind the revocable trust without interfering with the rights of anyone else. Face v. Face , No. 333PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

Statute of limitation—plain language—ability of parties to shorten the limitation period by contract—In a case brought under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA)–arising from defendant's failure to timely remediate damage from a water heater leak, resulting in plaintiffs' home being demolished due to mold–a term of the contract between the parties limiting plaintiffs' right to seek damages from defendant to one year controlled over the UDTPA's four-year statute of limitation. While statutes of limitation establish the maximum amount of time that can elapse between the accrual of a claim and the filing of that claim, because the legislature chose not to restrict parties' ability to contractually shorten the limitation period for UDTPA claims, the general rule of freedom of contract applied. Accordingly, where the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the contractual limitation was unenforceable, its decision was reversed. Warren v. Cielo Ventures, Inc. , No. 203PA24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Author: Justice Phil Berger, Jr.)

Unfair and deceptive trade practices—private school enrollment contract—termination by school—sufficiency of complaint—In a lawsuit filed against a private school and its leadership (defendants) where, after plaintiffs–the parents of two students at the school–complained about the addition of polarizing political issues into the curriculum, the school terminated plaintiffs' enrollment contracts and expelled their children, plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently stated a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices (UDTP) under the applicable "notice pleading" standard of review, where: the allegations, which concerned the regular activities of a private school that charges fees in exchange for its educational services, established that defendants' conduct was "in or affecting commerce;" and, because plaintiffs properly plead a fraud claim, as determined on appeal before the Supreme Court, the complaint also satisfied the unfair or deceptive element of the UDTP claim. Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' UDTP claim pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc. , No. 86A23-2 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Author: Justice Richard Dietz)

Business dispute—solicitation of employees and clients by former employees—lack of conferring of a benefit—In a complex business case in which an insurance agency and its holding company (plaintiffs) sued several former employees (defendants) for multiple claims, the decision of the Business Court to grant summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment was affirmed, although on alternative grounds. Where the basis of plaintiffs' claim was that defendants wrongfully retained plaintiffs' confidential information, clients, and employees, there was no evidence that plaintiffs conferred a benefit on defendants, a necessary element of an unjust enrichment claim, since defendants acted without plaintiffs' permission. Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC , No. 68A25 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Tamara Barringer)

General rate case—different returns on equity authorized based on similar evidence—not arbitrary and capricious—In a pair of general rate cases where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) under the performance-based regulation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 62-133.16–enacted to provide an alternative to traditional ratemaking with the aim of reducing the carbon emissions of electric public utilities–the Commission's authorization of a return on equity (ROE) (the return earned on a utility's capital investment by charging rates to customers) of 9.8% for DEP and 10.1% for DEC was upheld. Although DEP and DEC presented substantially similar evidence, it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to approve a higher ROE for DEC than it did for DEP. The Commission's ROE decisions involved the exercise of discretion and the application of subjective judgment to voluminous, complex, and sometimes contradictory evidence. Additionally, the customer interest portion of the DEC order demonstrated that the Commission duly considered that issue before approving DEC's ROE. The Commission followed the law and based its decision on competent, material, and substantial evidence. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

General rate case—performance-based regulation—electric vehicle charging—In a pair of general rate cases where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) under the performance-based regulation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 62-133.16 (the PBR statute)–enacted to provide an alternative to traditional ratemaking with the aim of reducing the carbon emissions of electric public utilities–the Commission's approval of the exclusion of revenue generated by residential electric vehicle (EV) charging from DEP's and DEC's decoupling mechanisms, which attempt to eliminate the incentive of electric public utilities to encourage greater energy consumption in order to increase revenue and are required in PBR applications, was upheld. The PBR statute allows such exclusions, and the Commission's approval of the estimation of revenue attributable to EV charging under existing residential schedules, rather than requiring DEC and DEP to develop rate schedules or riders specifically for EV charging, was permitted by the statute's plain language. Further, findings regarding the reasonableness of the costs was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

General rate case—performance-based regulation—fuel cost allocation—In a pair of general rate cases where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) under the performance-based regulation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 62-133.16–enacted to provide an alternative to traditional ratemaking with the aim of reducing the carbon emissions of electric public utilities–the Commission's prohibition on the utilities' continued use of the equal percentage fuel cost allocation method in fuel rider proceedings governed by N.C.G.S. § 62-133.2 was upheld. While section 62-133.2 includes a detailed definition of "cost of fuel and fuel-related costs," the statute leaves to the Commission's discretion how to allocate the cost adjustment among a utility's customer classes, and nothing in the record evidence indicated that the Commission acted (1) under a misapprehension of law regarding the applicability of the cost causation principle to fuel rider proceedings or (2) in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Instead, the Commission's findings of fact were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

General rate case—performance-based regulation—future capital projects—hazardous tree removal—In a general rate case where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) under the performance-based regulation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 62-133.16 (the PBR statute)–enacted to provide an alternative to traditional ratemaking with the aim of reducing the carbon emissions of electric public utilities, including by allowing a multiyear rate plan (MYRP) to be approved with second- and third-year rate increases based upon certain cost projections–where DEC identified capital spending projects for hazardous tree removal in its application but later reduced its cost estimates, the revised cost estimates were "known and measurable" as required by the PBR statute where that phrase was understood to apply to projected (future) capital investments. Moreover, there was no legal error in the Commission's assumption that hazardous tree removal could qualify as a capital spending project for MYRP purposes even though some project costs might be classified as maintenance expenses under accounting rules promulgated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which were mandatory for DEC to employ. Further, record evidence established that the Commission's decision rested on competent, material, and substantial evidence. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)

General rate case—performance-based regulation—interclass subsidization—In a pair of general rate cases where the Utilities Commission approved rate increases for Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) under the performance-based regulation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 62-133.16 (the PBR statute)–enacted to provide an alternative to traditional ratemaking with the aim of reducing the carbon emissions of electric public utilities–the Commission's approval of a 10% reduction in the utilities' interclass subsidies was upheld. The PBR statute required adherence "to the greatest extent practicable" with: (1) the cost causation principle (establishing a causal link between a customer class, its use of the electric system, and the costs incurred by the public utility) and (2) the minimization of interclass subsidies (where a customer class pays more than its share of the utility's cost to produce power for all customers); the 10% reduction in interclass subsidies was an appropriate balance of those directives with gradualism–adjusting rates incrementally to avoid "rate shock" to customers, a mandatory consideration under the PBR statute–and was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in the entire record. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II , No. 75A24 (N.C. May. 22, 2026) (Author: Justice Trey Allen)